Justia Florida Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Florida Supreme Court was asked to review a proposed amendment to the state constitution legalizing the recreational use of marijuana. The court evaluated the amendment for adherence to the constitution’s single-subject requirement, the clarity of the ballot summary, and whether the amendment was facially invalid under the federal constitution. The amendment, titled "Adult Personal Use of Marijuana," aimed to modify the Florida Constitution to legalize the personal use of marijuana by adults and allow licensed centers to sell and distribute marijuana for personal use.The court ruled that the amendment adhered to the single-subject requirement as it focused on a single dominant plan or scheme, which is the legalization of marijuana for personal use. The court disagreed with the argument that the amendment violated the single-subject requirement by both decriminalizing and commercializing recreational marijuana, stating that the sale and possession are logically and naturally related as part of a dominant plan or scheme.The court also ruled that the ballot summary met the statutory standard for clarity. The court disagreed with the opposition that the ballot summary was misleading because it implied that there were already other state-licensed entities ready to engage in the sale of recreational marijuana.Lastly, the court ruled that the amendment is not facially invalid under the U.S. Constitution. The court rejected the argument that the proposed amendment is preempted by the federal Controlled Substances Act and thus invalid under the Supremacy Clause.In conclusion, the court approved the proposed amendment for placement on the ballot, finding it complies with the requirements imposed by the Florida Constitution and Florida Statutes. View "Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General Re: Adult Personal Use of Marijuana" on Justia Law

This case before the Supreme Court of Florida concerned a constitutional challenge to an amended Florida statute that prohibits abortions if the gestational age of the fetus is more than 15 weeks, with certain exceptions. The petitioners, a group of abortion clinics and a medical doctor collectively known as Planned Parenthood, alleged that the statute violated the Privacy Clause of the Florida Constitution, which guarantees the right to be let alone and free from government intrusion into private life.While acknowledging the moral, ethical, and policy issues implicated in the subject matter of abortion, the court focused on the Privacy Clause’s text, its context, and the historical evidence surrounding its adoption. The court concluded that there was no basis under the Privacy Clause to invalidate the statute. In reaching this conclusion, the court receded from prior decisions in which it held that the Privacy Clause guaranteed the right to receive an abortion through the end of the second trimester.As such, the court found that the petitioners were not entitled to the temporary injunction granted by the trial court. The court approved the outcome reached by the First District Court of Appeal, which had reversed the temporary injunction on the basis that Planned Parenthood could not establish irreparable harm. Therefore, the Florida statute prohibiting abortions after 15 weeks of gestational age, subject to certain exceptions, was upheld. View "Planned Parenthood of Southwest and Central Florida v. State of Florida" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Fla. Stat. 120.68(3), which entitles a party to a presumptive stay upon the appeal of an agency decision that "has the effect of suspending or revoking a license," does not apply to an agency decision to administratively withdraw an incomplete renewal license application.When Ybor Medical Injury and Accident Clinic, Inc. (the clinic), applied to the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) to renew its expiring license the AHCA invited the clinic to supplement its application, which was incomplete. After the clinic failed to do so, AHCA administratively withdrew the incomplete renewal license application from further consideration. The AHCA appealed and sought a presumptive stay under section 120.68(3). The court of appeals granted the presumptive stay. The Supreme Court quashed the decision below, holding that the appeal of an agency’s withdrawal decision does not trigger the statute’s presumptive stay provision. View "Agency for Health Care Administration v. Ybor Medical Injury & Accident Clinic, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the First District Court of Appeals partially upholding a temporary injunction that prohibited enforcement of certain statutory provisions relating to the regulation of medical marijuana treatment centers, holding that Appellant had not demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of any of its constitutional claims.The temporary injunction at issue was entered during a pending lawsuit filed by Appellant. The lawsuit included constitutional challenges to Fla. Stat. 381.986(8), claiming that two provisions were inconsistent with the recent medical marijuana amendment to Fla. Const. art. X, 29. Appellant also argued that three provisions of section 381.986(8) were special laws granting privileges to private corporations. The trial court agreed as to every argument and entered a temporary injunction. The First District partially upheld the injunction. The Supreme Court quashed the decision below, holding that Appellant did not have a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of its challenges to section 381.986(8). View "Florida Department of Health v. Florigrown, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed a circuit court judgment denying validation of revenue bonds, holding that Halifax Hospital Medical Center, a special tax district, was not authorized to carry out the project for which it sought to issue the bonds.Halifax sought validation of bonds that it intended to issue for the purpose of financing the construction of a hospital outside the geographic boundaries established in the special act creating Halifax. The circuit court denied the complaint for bond validation on the grounds that Halifax lacked the authority operate a facility outside its geographical boundaries. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court properly denied the bond validation because neither Halifax's enabling act nor the Interlocal Act gave Halifax the authority to operate outside its geographic boundaries. View "Halifax Hospital Medical Center v. State" on Justia Law

Home health referral sources can be a protected legitimate business interest under Fla. Stat. 542.335.In these two cases consolidated for review before the Supreme Court, both Employees were former employees of licensed home health care companies. Both Employees engaged in conduct in violation of their non-compete compliment contracts by working for direct competitors of their prior employers within the non-compete territories during the relevant periods. Because a contract providing restrictions on competition must involve a legitimate business interest as defined by statute to be enforceable, at issue was whether home health service referral sources can be a protected legitimate business interest under section 542.335 sufficient to support a restriction on competition in a contract. The Supreme Court held that home health service referrals may be a protected legitimate business interest depending on the context and proof adduced. View "White v. Mederi Caretenders Visiting Services of Southeast Florida, LLC" on Justia Law

The indigent care provision of the special law applicable only to Sarasota County does not constitute an unconstitutional privilege because it applies equally to all hospitals in Sarasota County, whether public or private.Certain private hospitals sought a declaration establishing their right to reimbursement from Sarasota County for providing indigent care under the indigent care provision of the special law. The County asserted that such reimbursement would provide an unconstitutional privilege to private corporations in violation of Fla. Const. art. III, section 11(a)(12). The trial court entered summary judgment for the County. The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that the indigent care provision constitutes an unconstitutional privilege because it provides for reimbursement to the public and private hospitals only in Sarasota County rather than in the entire state. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the indigent care provision of the special law does not grant a privilege to a private corporation within the plain meaning of article III, section 11(a)(12) because it applies to all hospitals in Sarasota County. View "Venice HMA, LLC v. Sarasota County" on Justia Law

An individual’s right to have a judicial officer physically present at hearings held to determine whether the individual may be involuntarily committed to a mental health facility or hospital pursuant to “the Baker Act,” Fla. Stat. 394.467, is denied by the remote appearance of judicial officers at Baker Act hearings. In this case, a single judicial officer of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit instituted a process providing for the remote appearance of judicial officers via an e-mail. The Florida Supreme Court quashed the decision of the panel of the Second District Court of Appeal, which concluded there was no legal duty clearly established in the law that requires judicial officers presiding over Baker Act hearings to be physically present. The Supreme Court remanded the proceedings to the Second District for instructions not inconsistent with this opinion. View "Doe v. State" on Justia Law

Florida Constitution Article X, section 25 (Amendment 7), adopted by citizen initiative in 2004, provides patients “a right to have access to any records made or received in the course of business by a health care facility or provider relating to any adverse medical incident.” “Adverse medical incident” includes “any other act, neglect, or default of a health care facility or health care provider that caused or could have caused injury to or death of a patient.” Amendment 7 gives medical malpractice plaintiffs access to any adverse medical incident record, including incidents involving other patients [occurrence reports], created by health care providers. The Federal Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act, however, creates a voluntary, confidential, non-punitive system of data sharing of health care errors for the purpose of improving medical care and patient safety, 42 U.S.C. 299b-21(6), and establishes a protected legal environment in which providers can share data “both within and across state lines, without the threat that the information will be used against [them].” The Supreme Court of Florida reversed a holding that Amendment 7 was preempted. The Federal Act was never intended as a shield to the production of documents required by Amendment 7. The health care provider or facility cannot shield documents not privileged under state law by virtue of its unilateral decision of where to place the documents under the federal voluntary reporting system. View "Charles. v. Southern Baptist Hospital of Florida, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant, an intellectually disabled man, was charged with sexual battery and, in 2004, was involuntarily admitted to nonsecure residential services under Fla. Stat. 393.11. In 2011, Appellant filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988 in federal district court against the Director of the Agency for Persons with Disabilities, seeking a declaratory judgment that the state’s statutory scheme for involuntarily admitting intellectually disabled persons to residential services violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it does not provide people who have been involuntarily admitted to nonsecure residential services with periodic review of their continued confinement by someone with authority to release them. The district court granted the Agency’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that section 393.11 is constitutional. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal certified questions of law to the Supreme Court concerning the issue. The Supreme Court answered (1) “support plan” review under section 393.0651 does not require the Agency to consider the propriety of a continued involuntary admission to residential services order entered under section 393.11; and (2) the Agency is not statutorily required to petition the circuit court for the release from an involuntary admission order in cases where the Agency determines that the circumstances that led to the initial admission have changed. View "J.R. v. Palmer" on Justia Law