Justia Florida Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

On October 21, 2018, Tyrone T. Johnson called 911 from an East Tampa apartment, stating he had shot his girlfriend, Stephanie Willis, and her 10-year-old son, Ricky Willis. When deputies arrived, they found Johnson with blood on his hands and the victims' bodies in the master bedroom. Investigators discovered evidence, including a Glock 22 .40 caliber handgun, shell casings, and blood spatter. Johnson claimed the shootings occurred after an argument with Stephanie escalated, leading him to fire his gun in self-defense. He also stated that Ricky was shot when he tried to intervene.A Hillsborough County grand jury indicted Johnson for first-degree murder of Ricky Willis, second-degree murder of Stephanie Willis, and aggravated child abuse. During the trial, the State presented 19 witnesses, while the defense called none. The jury found Johnson guilty on all charges. In the penalty phase, the jury unanimously found three aggravating factors and recommended the death penalty for Ricky's murder. The trial court sentenced Johnson to death, finding the aggravators heavily outweighed the mitigators.The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed Johnson's appeal, focusing on three main issues: the admission of the second portion of his interrogation video, the testimony of his brother Al Johnson, and the sentencing order. The court found no abuse of discretion in admitting the interrogation video, as it provided relevant responses from Johnson. The court also found no fundamental error in the handling of Al Johnson's testimony, despite claims of prosecutorial threats. Lastly, the court acknowledged an error in the trial court's understanding of the "no significant history" mitigator but deemed it harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court affirmed Johnson's conviction and death sentence. View "Johnson v. State" on Justia Law

In 1999, Allen Ward Cox, an inmate at Lake Correctional Institute, was indicted for the premeditated murder of fellow inmate Thomas Baker. Cox discovered that $500 had been stolen from his footlocker and offered $50 to anyone who could identify the thief, threatening to kill the person responsible. The next day, Cox attacked Baker, beating and stabbing him with a shank, resulting in Baker's death. Cox was found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to death.The Florida Supreme Court affirmed Cox's conviction and death sentence in 2002. After exhausting initial state and federal postconviction proceedings, Cox filed a motion for postconviction relief based on Hurst v. Florida, which was granted in 2017. A new penalty phase trial was ordered, and the jury unanimously recommended the death penalty, finding two aggravating factors: imprisonment and a prior violent felony. The trial court sentenced Cox to death, considering both aggravating and mitigating factors.The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed Cox's appeal, which raised seven issues, including the rejection of certain nonstatutory mitigating factors, the cumulative effect of the prosecutor's comments during closing arguments, and the constitutionality of Florida's death penalty scheme. The court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's rejection of the mitigating factors, determining that the evidence supported the trial court's findings. The court also concluded that the prosecutor's comments did not constitute fundamental error and upheld the constitutionality of Florida's death penalty scheme based on established precedent.The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed Cox's death sentence, finding no reversible error in the trial court's proceedings. The court did not address the issue raised by the State on cross-appeal, as Cox's convictions and sentences were affirmed. View "Cox v. State" on Justia Law

The case involves James Herard, a member of the "BACC Street Crips," a branch of the national Crips gang. Herard was found guilty of 18 gang-related felonies, including the first-degree murders of Eric Jean-Pierre and Kiem Huynh. The crimes were committed as part of a body-count competition within the gang. Herard was sentenced to death for the murder of Jean-Pierre and life without parole for the murder of Huynh. He appealed his convictions and death sentence.Herard's trial was held in May 2014, where the prosecution presented evidence of incriminating statements made by Herard to law enforcement following his arrest for stealing a pit bull. The defense argued that Herard's statements were inconsistent, unreliable, and involuntary. The jury found Herard guilty on 18 counts and not guilty on a robbery count.In the penalty phase, the jury recommended a death sentence for the murder of Jean-Pierre by a vote of 8 to 4. The trial court found that the State had proven three aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt and sentenced Herard to death for the Jean-Pierre murder and to life without the possibility of parole for the Huynh murder.The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the lower court's decision. The court rejected Herard's arguments that the trial court erred in denying his due process-based motion to dismiss, denying his motions to suppress incriminating statements, admitting physical evidence he claimed was unrelated to the crimes charged, excluding his expert witness testimony about false confessions, and sentencing him in a manner that violated the Sixth and Eighth Amendments. The court also found that there was sufficient evidence to sustain Herard’s conviction for the murder of Eric Jean-Pierre. View "Herard v. State of Florida" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between Pinellas County and Pasco County in Florida. Pinellas County owns approximately 12,400 acres of real estate in neighboring Pasco County. Although Pinellas County once paid ad valorem taxes to Pasco County for the property, it now asserts that sovereign immunity relieves it of that obligation. Pinellas County filed a lawsuit against the Pasco County Property Appraiser, seeking a judgment declaring the property immune from ad valorem taxes and an injunction prohibiting future assessment and collection of such taxes.The trial court ruled in favor of Pinellas County, holding that as a political subdivision of the state, Pinellas County is entitled to sovereign immunity, which includes immunity from the ad valorem taxation of its properties, regardless of whether those properties are located within the boundaries of Pinellas County or in another county within the state of Florida. The Pasco County Property Appraiser appealed this decision.The Second District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's ruling. The district court noted that each county has statutory and constitutional authority to assess ad valorem taxes on “all property in the county.” The district court also rejected Pinellas County’s primary contention that its immunity from taxation extends beyond its own borders, noting that Pinellas County had not identified any supporting authority.The Supreme Court of Florida disagreed with Pinellas County's argument that its property in Pasco County was not taxable based on principles of sovereign immunity. The court held that although a county’s real property is immune from that county’s own efforts to assess ad valorem taxes, Pinellas County has not identified any authority recognizing an immunity from taxation of the county’s property located beyond its territorial boundaries. Therefore, the court concluded that sovereign immunity does not shield a county from the obligation of paying ad valorem taxes for property owned by that county but located outside its territorial boundaries. The court approved the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal. View "Pinellas County, Florida v. Joiner" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Florida was asked to interpret Florida’s law prohibiting riot, section 870.01(2), Florida Statutes (2021). The question was whether the law applies to a person who is present at a violent protest, but neither engages in, nor intends to assist others in engaging in, violent and disorderly conduct. The court ruled that it does not.The case originated from a lawsuit filed by a group of plaintiffs against Governor Ron DeSantis, three Florida sheriffs, and Attorney General Ashley Moody in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida. The plaintiffs argued that the statute was vague and overbroad in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court agreed and enjoined the enforcement of the statute. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that the central constitutional question was the statute’s scope and certified the question to the Supreme Court of Florida.The Supreme Court of Florida concluded that a "violent public disturbance" under section 870.01(2) is characterized by harm to persons or property, and not by peacefulness. To "willfully participate" in a "violent public disturbance," a defendant must have "intentionally, knowingly, and purposely" chosen to be part of it. Therefore, to be guilty of the crime of riot, one must "engage in," or at least "intend to assist others in engaging in, violent and disorderly conduct." The court found that the statute was not ambiguous and returned the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. View "DeSantis v. Dream Defenders" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Monique H. Worrell, who was suspended from her position as State Attorney for the Ninth Judicial Circuit by Governor Ron DeSantis through Executive Order 23-160. The order alleged that during Worrell's tenure, the administration of criminal justice in the Ninth Circuit was fundamentally derelict, constituting both neglect of duty and incompetence. The order detailed that Worrell authorized or allowed charging practices that permitted violent offenders, drug traffickers, serious juvenile offenders, and pedophiles to evade incarceration when otherwise warranted under Florida law. It also alleged that Worrell authorized or allowed practices that prevented assistant state attorneys from seeking certain sentencing enhancements and limited charges for possession of child pornography.The Florida Constitution allows the governor to suspend any state officer not subject to impeachment for neglect of duty or incompetence. Worrell, not being subject to impeachment, was constitutionally subject to suspension. The Florida Senate has the power to remove from office or reinstate the suspended official.The Supreme Court of Florida's role was to determine whether the governor had met the constitutional mandate to state the grounds of the officer's suspension. The court's review was deferential, confirming that the governor had specified the applicable grounds for suspension and that the allegations in the suspension order bore a reasonable relation to the asserted basis for the suspension.The Supreme Court of Florida found that the Executive Order passed this test. It named the grounds for Worrell's suspension—neglect of duty and incompetence—and provided various factual allegations that reasonably related to those grounds of suspension. The court disagreed with Worrell's claim that the allegations in the Executive Order were impermissibly vague or that they addressed conduct that fell within the lawful exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Therefore, the court denied Worrell's petition for a writ of quo warranto. View "Worrell v. DeSantis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Florida was asked to consider amendments to the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure. The amendments were in response to recent legislation and involved changes to several forms, including Forms 8.959 (Summons for Dependency Arraignment), 8.979 (Summons for Advisory Hearing), and 8.982 (Notice of Action for Advisory Hearing). Initially, the changes were only made to the English versions of the forms, and the Spanish and Creole translations were deleted to prevent inconsistencies. The Committee later requested that the forms be further amended with updated Spanish and Creole translations.The Supreme Court of Florida found that the Creole translations did not conform to the recent amendments to the English versions of the forms and contained errors. Therefore, the court decided to only amend the forms to include the Spanish translations at this time. The court requested that if the Committee wanted to amend the forms with Creole translations, they should file a new case proposing accurate Creole translations.The court ruled that the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure are to be amended as reflected in the appendix to the opinion. The amendments were to take effect immediately upon the release of the opinion. The court also clarified that the filing of a motion for rehearing would not alter the effective date of these amendments. View "In Re: Amendments to Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure" on Justia Law

Reginald Scott Walter, an inmate serving a thirty-year sentence for attempted first-degree murder and armed burglary, filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Supreme Court of Florida. This was not his first petition; since 2014, Walter had filed eight habeas corpus petitions and two mandamus petitions, all related to his convictions and sentences. All of these petitions were denied, dismissed, or transferred by the court. In his most recent petition, Walter argued that the evidence against him was insufficient to support his convictions, a claim he had raised in two previous habeas petitions.Walter's convictions and sentences were affirmed by the Second District Court of Appeal in 2001. His continued filings began in 2014, and all were related to his original case. Despite the repeated denials, dismissals, or transfers of his petitions, Walter continued to file petitions with the Supreme Court of Florida.The Supreme Court of Florida denied Walter's latest petition as successive and directed him to show cause why he should not be barred from filing any further pro se requests for relief. Walter responded by repeating much of his previous argument and asserting his constitutional right of access to courts and equal protection under the law. However, he failed to acknowledge the frivolous nature of his repeated filings and expressed no remorse for his misuse of the court's resources. The court found that Walter had failed to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed and concluded that he had abused the court's limited judicial resources. As a result, the court ordered that any future pleadings or requests for relief submitted by Walter related to his original case be rejected unless signed by a member in good standing of The Florida Bar. The court also directed the clerk to forward a copy of the opinion to the Florida Department of Corrections' institution where Walter is incarcerated. View "Walter v. Department of Corrections Secretary" on Justia Law

The case involves Joshua Lyle Creller, who was charged with resisting an officer without violence and possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, following a 2018 traffic stop. Creller refused to comply with a K-9 officer’s command to exit his vehicle during the traffic stop for officer safety. After his arrest, methamphetamine was found on his person. Creller moved to suppress the evidence of its discovery.The trial court denied Creller’s motion to suppress, finding the State’s evidence credible. The court concluded that the officer's request for Creller to exit the vehicle was for officer safety and did not violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. Creller was subsequently convicted by a jury. However, the Second District Court of Appeal reversed the conviction, holding that Creller was unlawfully seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment when the initial traffic stop transformed into a narcotics investigation for which no prior probable cause existed. The court certified conflict with the Fifth District Court of Appeal in State v. Benjamin, which reached the opposite conclusion.The Supreme Court of Florida disagreed with the Second District Court of Appeal's interpretation. The court held that the Fourth Amendment allows a K-9 officer to order a driver to exit a vehicle during a lawful traffic stop for officer safety reasons. The court concluded that the K-9 officer's command to Creller to exit the vehicle was reasonable and did not transform the traffic stop into a narcotics investigation. Therefore, the court quashed the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal and approved the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in State v. Benjamin. View "State of Florida v. Creller" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Jennifer Ripple, who married Richard Counter after he was diagnosed with mesothelioma, a disease allegedly caused by asbestos exposure from the 1950s to the 1990s. Counter filed a personal injury complaint against multiple defendants, claiming negligence and strict liability. After Counter's death, Ripple, as the personal representative of Counter's estate, amended the complaint to wrongful death claims under the Florida Wrongful Death Act. The estate sought damages for Ripple under section 768.21(2) of the Act, which allows a surviving spouse to recover for loss of companionship and mental pain and suffering from the date of injury.The trial court granted the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Ripple could not recover damages under section 768.21(2) because she was not married to Counter at the time of his alleged asbestos exposure. The court based its decision on Florida's common law rule that a party must have been legally married to the injured person at the time of the injury to assert a claim for loss of consortium. The trial court also granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the claim of Counter's adult children, concluding that Ripple was Counter's surviving spouse, thus barring the children from recovery under section 768.21(3) of the Act.The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision regarding Ripple's claim but reversed the decision regarding the adult children's claim. The district court held that Ripple could not recover damages as a surviving spouse under section 768.21(2) because she was not married to Counter at the time of his injury.The Supreme Court of Florida disagreed with the lower courts' decisions. The court held that a spouse who married the decedent after the injury can recover damages as a surviving spouse under section 768.21(2). The court rejected the argument that the common law "marriage before injury" rule bars recovery under section 768.21(2). Consequently, the court approved the holding in Domino’s Pizza, LLC v. Wiederhold, where the Fifth District Court of Appeal held that a spouse who married the decedent after the injury can recover damages as a surviving spouse under section 768.21(2). The court concluded that Jennifer Ripple can recover as a surviving spouse under section 768.21(2). View "Ripple v. CBS Corporation" on Justia Law