Justia Florida Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case involves a claim by Mitchell against Race under the Florida Security of Communications Act, which prohibits recording phone calls without the consent of all parties. Mitchell alleged that Race, while out of state, recorded phone calls with him, a Florida resident, without his consent. The central issue was whether Florida courts have personal jurisdiction over Race, a nonresident defendant.The trial court focused on whether Race committed a tortious act in Florida, concluding that he did because the interceptions occurred where Mitchell's statements were made. The court also found that exercising personal jurisdiction over Race did not violate due process. On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's decision, concluding that Race lacked sufficient minimum contacts with Florida to justify personal jurisdiction. The Fourth District did not address whether Race committed a tortious act in Florida but certified conflict with a previous case, France v. France, which addressed the first step of the jurisdictional test.The Supreme Court of Florida initially accepted jurisdiction to resolve the certified conflict. However, after further consideration, the court concluded that the conflict was not clear and that the record was insufficient to address the due process issue analyzed by the Fourth District. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Florida decided to discharge jurisdiction and dismiss the proceeding, determining that the issues presented were largely academic given the unique procedural history of the case. View "Mitchell v. Race" on Justia Law

Adam Richardson, a citizen and taxpayer, petitioned the Supreme Court of Florida for writs of quo warranto and mandamus, alleging that the Governor, Attorney General, and Secretary of the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) violated section 104.31, Florida Statutes, by advocating against a proposed constitutional amendment (Amendment 4) related to abortion rights. Richardson claimed that their actions, including statements on an AHCA webpage and social media, as well as participation in a public call and opinion piece, unlawfully interfered with the vote on Amendment 4.The lower courts did not review this case as it was directly brought to the Supreme Court of Florida. Richardson argued that the respondents' actions violated a statute limiting political activities of state officers and employees, which he believed should be enforced through extraordinary writs.The Supreme Court of Florida denied the petition. The court held that the writ of quo warranto is traditionally used to test the right of a person to hold an office or exercise a state-derived power, not to compel criminal prosecution or enable private enforcement of a criminal statute. The court found that Richardson's grievances were more about the merits of the respondents' actions rather than their authority to act. Additionally, the court denied the writ of mandamus, stating that Richardson did not establish a clear legal right or an indisputable legal duty on the part of the respondents, nor did he show that there was no other adequate remedy available. The court concluded that no further relief was required to complete the exercise of its jurisdiction and denied the petition without permitting a rehearing. View "Richardson v. Secretary, Florida Agency for Health Care Administration" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Jennifer Ripple, who married Richard Counter after he was diagnosed with mesothelioma, a disease allegedly caused by asbestos exposure from the 1950s to the 1990s. Counter filed a personal injury complaint against multiple defendants, claiming negligence and strict liability. After Counter's death, Ripple, as the personal representative of Counter's estate, amended the complaint to wrongful death claims under the Florida Wrongful Death Act. The estate sought damages for Ripple under section 768.21(2) of the Act, which allows a surviving spouse to recover for loss of companionship and mental pain and suffering from the date of injury.The trial court granted the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Ripple could not recover damages under section 768.21(2) because she was not married to Counter at the time of his alleged asbestos exposure. The court based its decision on Florida's common law rule that a party must have been legally married to the injured person at the time of the injury to assert a claim for loss of consortium. The trial court also granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the claim of Counter's adult children, concluding that Ripple was Counter's surviving spouse, thus barring the children from recovery under section 768.21(3) of the Act.The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision regarding Ripple's claim but reversed the decision regarding the adult children's claim. The district court held that Ripple could not recover damages as a surviving spouse under section 768.21(2) because she was not married to Counter at the time of his injury.The Supreme Court of Florida disagreed with the lower courts' decisions. The court held that a spouse who married the decedent after the injury can recover damages as a surviving spouse under section 768.21(2). The court rejected the argument that the common law "marriage before injury" rule bars recovery under section 768.21(2). Consequently, the court approved the holding in Domino’s Pizza, LLC v. Wiederhold, where the Fifth District Court of Appeal held that a spouse who married the decedent after the injury can recover damages as a surviving spouse under section 768.21(2). The court concluded that Jennifer Ripple can recover as a surviving spouse under section 768.21(2). View "Ripple v. CBS Corporation" on Justia Law

In this case, two companies and an individual, all involved in Florida's gaming industry, petitioned against the Governor of Florida and others, challenging a gaming compact between the State and the Seminole Tribe. The petitioners argued that a sports betting provision in the compact violated the Florida Constitution, which limits the expansion of casino gambling to the citizens' initiative process. They claimed that the Governor and Legislature exceeded their constitutional authority by allowing the compact to be enacted. The petitioners requested a declaration that the law implementing the compact was unconstitutional and sought an injunction to stop the Seminole Tribe from continuing to operate mobile sports betting.However, the Supreme Court of Florida rejected this petition on the grounds that a writ of quo warranto, which the petitioners used to challenge the compact, was not an appropriate means to question the substantive constitutionality of an enacted law. The court underscored that quo warranto is a common law remedy used to test the right of a person to hold an office or exercise some right derived from the state, not to challenge the constitutionality of a law. Therefore, the petitioners' claim was beyond the relief that quo warranto provides.The petitioners' reliance on previous cases, where the writ of quo warranto was used to question the Governor's authority to bind the state to a compact without ratification by the Legislature, was also rejected. The court pointed out that these cases were fundamentally different as they did not challenge the substance of the agreement enacted by the Governor and ratified by the Legislature.In conclusion, the Supreme Court of Florida denied the petition, stating that the relief sought by the petitioners was beyond what quo warranto provides and declined to extend the scope of the writ to test the substantive constitutionality of a statute. View "West Flagler Associates, Ltd. v. DeSantis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Florida was tasked with reviewing a case involving the interpretation of the state's comparative fault statute and its application to tort actions involving the "dram-shop exception." The case originated from a tragic accident in which an intoxicated 18-year-old, Jacquelyn Faircloth, was hit by a speeding truck driven by an intoxicated 20-year-old, Devon Dwyer. Faircloth's guardianship sued two bars, asserting that they had "willfully and unlawfully" served alcohol to Dwyer and Faircloth, leading to their intoxication and the subsequent accident.The central legal question in this case was whether the action permitted under the dram-shop exception, section 768.125, which allows liability when alcohol is "willfully and unlawfully" provided to an underage patron causing intoxication and injury, is a "negligence action" for the purposes of the comparative fault statute, section 768.81.The court agreed with the district court’s finding that the action permitted by the underage drinker exception in section 768.125 is indeed a negligence action for purposes of the comparative fault statute, section 768.81. The court reasoned that while the dram-shop exception requires a finding of willful misconduct, this does not alter the basic relationship between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury inherent in a negligence claim. The court clarified that willfulness in this context pertains to the defendant’s knowledge of the purchaser's underage status, not an intentional infliction of harm.The court did not, however, rule on the district court's conclusions about how fault should be allocated among the bars and underage patrons involved in the case, considering those issues outside the scope of the certified question. View "Faircloth v. Main Street Entertainment, Inc., etc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Florida heard a case involving an appeal by James Seadler against Marina Bay Resort Condominium Association, Inc. following an injury Seadler sustained when a pool chair at the resort collapsed. The case revolved around the jury selection process during the initial trial and specifically, the denial by the trial court of Seadler’s request to dismiss a potential juror (Juror 16) for cause. Seadler argued that this decision by the trial court led to an unfair trial as he was forced to use his peremptory challenges to exclude Juror 16, leaving him without a challenge to exclude another juror (Juror 22), who he found objectionable. The First District Court of Appeal rejected Seadler's claim that an error by the trial court in denying his cause challenge to a potential juror automatically entitled him to a new trial. The Supreme Court of Florida agreed with the First District Court that the harmless error standard applies in such cases, rather than automatic entitlement to a new trial. However, the Supreme Court found that Marina Bay did not demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the error by the trial court did not contribute to the verdict. The court concluded that Seadler was entitled to a new trial and quashed the decision of the First District Court. View "Seadler v. Marina Bay Resort Condominium Association, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that neither the common law doctrine of legislative immunity nor of governmental function immunity prohibited the statutory civil actions and penalties imposed against local governments and officials for certain violations of the firearms preemption statute, Fla. Stat. 790.33.Petitioners brought suit seeking a declaration from the circuit court that sections 790.33(3)(c),(d) and (f) were invalid because sections 790.33(3)(c) and (d) violated legislative immunity and that section 790.33(3)(f) violated governmental function immunity. The circuit court invalidated the challenged provisions. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the statutory penalty provisions at issue in this case were valid and enforceable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that neither legislative immunity nor governmental function immunity prohibited the statutory actions and penalties in section 790.33(3)(c), (d), or (f). View "Fried v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal affirming Defendant's convictions of driving under the influence (DUI) causing damage to property or person and DUI causing serious bodily injury, holding that Defendant's dual convictions violated double jeopardy.On appeal, Defendant argued that his dual convictions arising from a single episode violated double jeopardy. The Third District affirmed, holding that principles of double jeopardy did not prohibit dual convictions and sentences for DUI property damages/bodily injury and DUI serious bodily injury arising from the commission of a single act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the criminal offenses of DUI causing damage to property or person and DUI causing bodily injury are degree variants of the same offense under Fla. Stat. 775.021(4)(b)2; and (2) Defendant's dual convictions for both offenses as to the same victim arising from a single episode violated the prohibition against double jeopardy. View "Velazco v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court approved the ruling of the Fifth District Court of Appeal that a trial court may order a defendant over whom it has in personam jurisdiction to act on foreign property pursuant to Fla. Stat. 56.29(6), holding that a trial court has the authority to order a defendant over whom it has in personam jurisdiction to act on foreign property.The district court concluded that section 56.29(6) plainly authorizes a trial court to order a debtor, over whom the court has in personam jurisdiction, to act on assets located outside of the court's territorial jurisdiction. The Supreme Court approved the district court's ruling, holding that the trial court in this case undisputedly had in personam jurisdiction over the debtor and therefore compel him to act on his foreign assets under section 56.29(6). View "Shim v. Buechel" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal concluding that the circuit court had personal jurisdiction over Tribeca Asset Management, Inc., holding that the parties' agreement did not provide for arbitration in Florida.Tribeca and Ancla International, S.A. entered into a confidentiality agreement. Ancla later filed a petition to compel arbitration. The circuit court dismissed the petition for lack of personal jurisdiction, concluding that a provision in the parties' agreement did not contain a forum selection clause and merely contained a choice of law provision. The Third District reversed, concluding that the provision contained a forum selection clause. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the agreement did not provide for arbitration in Florida. View "Tribeca Asset Management, Inc. v. Ancla International, S.A." on Justia Law