Justia Florida Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was the victim of an armed robbery, carjacking, and shooting that occurred in the parking lot of an Embassy Suites hotel. Petitioner filed a negligence action against Hilton Hotels and related companies (collectively, Respondents). Following one mistrial, the parties commenced a second trial. Ultimately, the jury found that Petitioner sustained a total of $1.7 million in damages, and the trial court entered judgment in accordance with the verdict. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a motion for attorneys’ fees. The trial court denied the motion. The Fifth District affirmed, concluding that Petitioner’s pretrial offers of settlement to Respondents did not satisfy the requirements of Fla. Stat. 768.79 and Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.442. The Supreme Court quashed the decision below, holding that the plain language of both section 768.79 and Rule 1.442 indicated that Petitioner was entitled to attorneys’ fees because he submitted sufficient offers to settle his claims against Respondents and obtained satisfactory judgments in his favor. View "Anderson v. Hilton Hotels Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff served Defendants with offers of judgment. Plaintiff ultimately prevailed on her negligence claim against Defendants and was awarded damages in excess of the amount contained in her offers of judgment, enough to trigger the payment of fees under Fla. Stat. 768.79(1). The trial court granted Plaintiff’s motion to tax attorney’s fees and costs, determining that Plaintiff’s failure to include the attorney’s fees language in the offer of judgment did not create an ambiguity because Plaintiff did not seek attorney’s fees in her complaint. The First District Court of Appeal reversed the order granting Plaintiff’s motion to tax attorney’s fees and costs, holding that an offer of settlement that fails to address attorney’s fees is invalid even where no attorney’s fees have been sought in the case. The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the First District, holding that an offer of settlement is not invalid for failing to state whether the proposal includes attorney’s fees and whether attorney’s fees are part of the legal claim if attorney’s fees are not sought in the pleadings. View "Kuhajda v. Borden Dairy Co. of Alabama" on Justia Law

After Father and Mother were assigned case plans by the Department of Children & Families (DCF) regarding their two children, the children were reunified with Mother. The trial court then terminated supervision by DCF and issued an order limiting the ability of Father to seek future visitation to the discretion of the children. Father sought review, alleging that the trial court denied him due process by terminating DCF supervision without a motion and departed from the essential requirements of the law when it limited his future contact with his children to the sole discretion of the children. The Third District granted Father’s second claim and quashed the trial court’s order to the extent that it limited Father’s contact with the children to the children’s sole discretion. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether a post-dependency order that is subject to future modification for purposes of child welfare and parental visitation is reviewable as a final order by appeal, as an interlocutory order reviewable by appeal, or as a non-final order reviewable by certiorari. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision below, holding that a post-dependency order that is subject to future modification for purposes of child welfare and parental visitation is a non-final order reviewable by certiorari. View "M.M. v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families" on Justia Law

Plaintiff prevailed in an action filed against GEICO General Insurance Company. Thereafter, Plaintiff moved for attorney’s fees. Plaintiff sought discovery related to her opposition’s attorneys’ time records and propounded Lodestar/Multiplier Fee Determination Interrogatories. GEICO objected to the discovery requests, but the circuit court overruled the objections. GEICO filed a petition for writ of certiorari requesting that the Fourth District quash the orders relating to the request to produce and the interrogatory. The Fourth District granted the petition, concluding that Plaintiff failed to establish that the billing records of opposing counsel were actually relevant and necessary and that their substantial equivalent could not be obtained elsewhere. The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Fourth District, holding that hours expended by counsel for a defendant insurance company in a contested claim for attorney’s fees filed pursuant to Fla. Stat. 624.155 and 627.428 is relevant to the issue of the reasonableness of time expended by counsel for the plaintiff, and discovery of such information, where disputed, falls within the sound decision of the trial court. View "Paton v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Condominium Association of La Mer Estates filed a complaint to quiet title to the condominium unit. The Association served Bank of New York Mellon, which was assigned the mortgage securing the property. The Association obtained a default final judgment and quieted title against the Bank. The Bank later moved to vacate the quiet title judgment on grounds that it was void because the complaint failed to state a cause of action. The trial court granted the motion. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, ruling that, although the complaint failed to state a cause of action, the resulting default judgment was voidable, rather than void. The Supreme Court approved the decision of the Fourth District, holding that a default judgment is voidable, rather than void, when the complaint upon which the judgment is based fails to state a cause of action. View "Bank of New York Mellon v. Condo. Ass’n of La Mer Estates, Inc." on Justia Law

Valerie Audiffred and her husband, Robert Kimmons, filed an action against Thomas Arnold that arose from an automobile collision. A settlement proposal was filed on behalf of Audiffred, which Arnold constructively rejected. After a trial, a verdict was entered against Arnold for Audiffred’s past medical expenses. The jury did not award anything to Kimmons for his loss of consortium claim. Audiffred and Kimmons subsequently filed a motion seeking an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to Fla. Stat. 768.79 and Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.442. Arnold moved to strike the settlement proposal, arguing that it was defective because it did not apportion the settlement amount between Audiffred and Kimmons. The trial court denied the motion to strike and awarded attorney’s fees. The district court reversed the award of attorney’s fees, concluding that the settlement offer constituted a joint proposal and that the proposal was invalid for failing to comply with the statute and rule. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that when a single offeror submits a settlement proposal to a single offeree pursuant to section 768.79 and rule 1.442 and the offer resolves pending claims by or against additional parties who are neither offerors nor offerees, it constitutes a joint proposal that is subject to the apportionment requirement of the rule. View "Audiffred v. Arnold" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against medical malpractice action against multiple defendants, including FMC Hospital, Ltd., d/b/a Florida Medical Center, and FMC Medical, Inc., d/b/a Florida Medical Center. A proposed settlement offer was served upon Plaintiff, but Plaintiff did not accept the offer. A jury subsequently returned a verdict adverse to Plaintiff, and the trial court entered final judgment in favor of Defendants. Thereafter, Defendants filed a motion for attorney’s fees and costs. Plaintiff opposed the motion, asserting that the entities were joint offerors and that the proposal was invalid because it failed to apportion the amount offered as required by Fla. Stat. 768.79 and Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.442. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that there was only a single offeror - Florida Medical Center - and therefore, apportionment of the amount offered was not required. The district court affirmed, concluding that because the offer was made on behalf of the single hospital entity allegedly responsible for Plaintiff’s injury, the settlement proposal complied with the statute and rule. The Supreme Court quashed the district court’s decision, holding that the offer constituted a joint proposal and, under a strict construction of section 768.79 and rule 1.442, apportionment of the settlement amount was required. View "Pratt v. Weiss" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant. Defendant did not file an answer or other responsive pleadings and failed to appear at the hearing on Plaintiff’s motion for final default. Defendant later moved to set aside the default and final default judgment entered against him and to quash service of process on the bases that service was defective and that the return of service was defective on its face. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the return of service was not facially defective and that Plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption that service was proper. The Second District Court of Appeal concluded that a strict construction of Fla. Stat. 48.21, defining valid return of service, does not require express reference to Fla. Stat. 48.031(1)(a), listing the factors defining the “manner of service.” The Second District then certified conflict with three decisions from the Third District Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court granted review and answered that a facially valid return of service is not required to expressly list the factors defining the “manner of service” contained in section 48.031(1)(a), which are not included in the requirements of section 48.21. View "Koster v. Sullivan" on Justia Law

In 2012, individuals and groups challenging the constitutional validity of a 2012 congressional redistricting plan issued a subpoena duces tecum to Pat Bainter, the president of Data Targeting, Inc., a political consulting company. The challengers sought certain documents in the possession of Bainter, Data Targeting, and the company's employees (collectively, Appellants) related to the redistricting litigation. Bainter did not file a motion for a protective order or raise any legal objection to producing the documents sought by the challengers but instead attended a deposition testifying that he had produced what he had found, which was a limited amount. After being served with additional subpoenas duces tecum including the disputed documents within their scope, and during six months of hearings and filings regarding document production, Appellants did not raise any claim of a First Amendment privilege. It was only after Appellants were held in contempt of court that Appellants raised a belated claim of a qualified First Amendment privilege. Ultimately, the trial court ordered that Appellants produce 538 pages of the disputed documents. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, based on the totality of the circumstances, Appellants’ belated assertions of a qualified First Amendment privilege had been waived. View "Bainter v. League of Women Voters of Fla." on Justia Law

Beach Community Bank filed an action against the City of Freeport. The City moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The trial court entered a nonfinal order finding that the City was not immune from suit based on sovereign immunity. The First District Court of Appeal determined that the City’s claim to sovereign immunity rested on a pure question of law and that it could exercise its certiorari jurisdiction to review the trial court’s nonfinal order, ultimately concluding that the City was entitled to sovereign immunity. In deciding whether to accept review in this case, the Supreme Court noted that a proposed amendment to Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 permits district courts to review nonfinal orders of decisions determining entitlement to sovereign immunity where the case involves a pure legal question. The Court held (1) because this case fell squarely within the new rule amendment, the City should be entitled to the benefit of the new rule; and (2) the City was entitled to sovereign immunity regarding the question presented here. Remanded. View "Beach Cmty. Bank v. City of Freeport" on Justia Law