Justia Florida Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant. Defendant did not file an answer or other responsive pleadings and failed to appear at the hearing on Plaintiff’s motion for final default. Defendant later moved to set aside the default and final default judgment entered against him and to quash service of process on the bases that service was defective and that the return of service was defective on its face. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the return of service was not facially defective and that Plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption that service was proper. The Second District Court of Appeal concluded that a strict construction of Fla. Stat. 48.21, defining valid return of service, does not require express reference to Fla. Stat. 48.031(1)(a), listing the factors defining the “manner of service.” The Second District then certified conflict with three decisions from the Third District Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court granted review and answered that a facially valid return of service is not required to expressly list the factors defining the “manner of service” contained in section 48.031(1)(a), which are not included in the requirements of section 48.21. View "Koster v. Sullivan" on Justia Law

In 2012, individuals and groups challenging the constitutional validity of a 2012 congressional redistricting plan issued a subpoena duces tecum to Pat Bainter, the president of Data Targeting, Inc., a political consulting company. The challengers sought certain documents in the possession of Bainter, Data Targeting, and the company's employees (collectively, Appellants) related to the redistricting litigation. Bainter did not file a motion for a protective order or raise any legal objection to producing the documents sought by the challengers but instead attended a deposition testifying that he had produced what he had found, which was a limited amount. After being served with additional subpoenas duces tecum including the disputed documents within their scope, and during six months of hearings and filings regarding document production, Appellants did not raise any claim of a First Amendment privilege. It was only after Appellants were held in contempt of court that Appellants raised a belated claim of a qualified First Amendment privilege. Ultimately, the trial court ordered that Appellants produce 538 pages of the disputed documents. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, based on the totality of the circumstances, Appellants’ belated assertions of a qualified First Amendment privilege had been waived. View "Bainter v. League of Women Voters of Fla." on Justia Law

Beach Community Bank filed an action against the City of Freeport. The City moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The trial court entered a nonfinal order finding that the City was not immune from suit based on sovereign immunity. The First District Court of Appeal determined that the City’s claim to sovereign immunity rested on a pure question of law and that it could exercise its certiorari jurisdiction to review the trial court’s nonfinal order, ultimately concluding that the City was entitled to sovereign immunity. In deciding whether to accept review in this case, the Supreme Court noted that a proposed amendment to Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 permits district courts to review nonfinal orders of decisions determining entitlement to sovereign immunity where the case involves a pure legal question. The Court held (1) because this case fell squarely within the new rule amendment, the City should be entitled to the benefit of the new rule; and (2) the City was entitled to sovereign immunity regarding the question presented here. Remanded. View "Beach Cmty. Bank v. City of Freeport" on Justia Law

Since 2004, Petitioner had initiated forty-three cases other than the instant case that had been denied, transferred, or dismissed. In this case, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition but expressly retained jurisdiction to pursue possible sanctions against Petitioner based upon the number of her meritless and inappropriate filings. Petitioner was directed to show cause why she should not be barred from filing in the Supreme Court any future pro se pleadings, motions, or other requests for relief. Petitioner did not respond to the order, and the Court imposed such sanctions. View "Lomax v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-corporation filed a lawsuit against Defendant-insurer for personal injury protection benefits. The parties settled the case, and the trial court entered an order of dismissal with prejudice. After the attorney for Plaintiff learned of the dismissal order, he moved to vacate the order of dismissal based on excusable neglect so that he could file his motion for attorney’s fees. The county court vacated the initial dismissal, but the circuit court reversed and reinstated the order of dismissal. Plaintiff filed a petition for common law certiorari. The Fourth District Court of Appeal granted the petition and quashed the decision of the circuit court. Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for attorney’s fees. The Fourth District denied the motion on the basis of the Supreme Court’s holding in Stockman v. Downs, concluding that because Plaintiff did not request fees in the petition or reply, the motion was untimely. The Supreme Court quashed the decision below to the extent it held that, pursuant to Stockman, a request for attorney’s fees in Fla. R. App. P. 9.100 original proceedings must be made in the petition, a response, or a reply. Remanded. View "Advanced Chiropractic & Rehab. Ctr. v. United Auto. Ins. Co." on Justia Law