Justia Florida Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Roderick Orme was convicted of premeditated or felony murder, robbery, and sexual battery. The trial judge sentenced Orme to death. The Supreme Court found defense counsel ineffective for failing to investigate further Orme’s diagnosis of bipolar disorder with respect to the penalty phase and ordered a new penalty phase. After a new penalty phase, the trial court again sentenced Orme to death, finding three aggravating factors. The Supreme Court affirmed. Orme later filed the instant motion for postconviction relief, bringing four claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the postconviction court denied all of Orme’s postconviction claims. Orme appealed, raising four claims of ineffective assistance of resentencing phase counsel and one claim of ineffective assistance of postconviction. Orme also petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The Supreme Court denied relief on all claims, holding that Orme failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of resentencing phase counsel as to any of his claims and failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. View "Orme v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted and sentenced to death for the first-degree murder of an eleven-year-old girl. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. This appeal concerned Defendant’s amended successive Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850 motion in which Defendant alleged four claims. The trial court summarily denied all claims. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of one claim but remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the remaining claims. On remand, the trial court again denied all claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant failed to establish a Giglio violation; (2) Defendant failed to establish a Brady violation, and Defendant’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, pled as an alternative to his Brady claim, was procedurally barred; and (3) because newly discovered DNA evidence was not of such a nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial, relief on Defendant’s newly discovered DNA evidence claim was properly denied. View "Rivera v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of manslaughter with a firearm, attempted home invasion robbery with a firearm, and armed burglary. Prior to sentencing, the State informed the trial court that dual convictions for attempted home invasion robbery and armed robbery presented double jeopardy concerns. The parties subsequently debated as to which conviction should be vacated. The trial court accepted the position of the State and vacated the attempted home invasion robbery conviction, which carries a lesser sentence. The Second District Court of Appeal concluded that the lesser offense of armed burglary should have been vacated. The Supreme Court approved the decision below, holding that when a defendant is found guilty of two offenses and adjudication of the defendant as guilty for both offenses would violate double jeopardy protections, the lesser offense as defined by Pizzo v. State should be vacated. View "State v. Tuttle" on Justia Law

Tai Pham was convicted of first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, armed kidnapping, and armed burglary. The trial court entered a sentence of death. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences. Pham later filed a motion to vacate judgment of conviction and sentence of death, raising several claims. The circuit court summarily denied some claims and held an evidentiary hearing on the remaining claims. Thereafter, the court denied relief. Pham appealed and also filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Pham failed to establish that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during either the guilt or the penalty phase; and (2) appellate counsel likewise did not provide ineffective assistance. View "Pham v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to first-degree murder and robbery with a weapon. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences on appeal. Defendant subsequently filed an amended Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851 motion raising four claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied all claims after an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed the postconviction court’s denial of relief under Rule 3.851, holding that Defendant failed to demonstrate that counsel were ineffective at either the guilt or penalty phases of his trial. View "Guardado v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of four counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death for each murder. After Governor Scott signed the death warrant Appellant filed a third successive motion for postconviction relief, claiming, inter alia, that Florida’s death penalty statute is unconstitutional. Appellant also filed extensive public records requests with several entities. Appellant was provided with some, but not all, of the requested records. The circuit court summarily denied Appellant’s third successive postconviction motion. Appellant subsequently filed a fourth successive postconviction petition, asserting, inter alia, that Florida’s lethal injection protocol is unconstitutional because of the use of midazolam. The circuit court denied Appellant’s fourth successive motion for postconviction relief. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Appellant’s third and fourth successive motions for postconviction relief, as well as the circuit court orders sustaining the objections to the public records requests, holding (1) Appellant’s challenge to the use of midazolam failed; (2) Appellant’s public records challenges were without merit; and (3) Appellant was not entitled to relief on the remainder of his claims. View "Correll v. State" on Justia Law

In 2004, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder. The trial court entered an order sentencing Defendant to death. The Supreme Court affirmed on appeal. Defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851 alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and a Brady/Giglio claim. The court denied Defendant’s motion to vacate his conviction and sentence in its entirety. Defendant appealed and petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the order denying postconviction relief, holding that the postconviction court did not err in its rulings; and (2) denied Defendant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that Defendant failed to establish that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. View "Hernandez v. State" on Justia Law

In 2005, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, attempted armed robbery, and grand theft of a motor vehicle. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death for the murder conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed on appeal. In 2009, Defendant filed a second amended motion for postconviction relief, alleging several claims. The postconviction court denied Defendant’s motion to the extent it requested a new guilt phase but granted the motion to the extent that it requested a new penalty phase. Defendant appealed and, in addition, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, asserting four claims. The Supreme Court affirmed the postconviction court’s order that denied Defendant’s request for a new guilt phase trial and denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding (1) the postconviction court did not err in its rulings; and (2) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his habeas corpus claims. View "Blake v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and related crimes. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death for the murders. Defendant later filed a motion to vacate his conviction and sentence. The circuit court treated Defendant’s filing as an initial motion pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851 and summarily denied all of his claims for postconviction relief. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion and, in addition, petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the circuit court’s summary denial of relief, holding that while Defendant’s claims of trial court error were insufficiently pleaded and without merit, it was necessary to address the unusual procedure employed for jury selection in Defendant’s trial; and (2) denied the petition for writ of habeas corpus, holding that appellate counsel was not ineffective during Defendant’s direct appeal. View "Hojan v. State" on Justia Law

After an adjudicatory hearing, the trial court entered judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights to her child. Mother appealed, alleging ten claims of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding her counsel’s performance in the termination of parental rights (TPR) proceedings. The district court of appeal applied the Washington v. Strickland standard to Mother’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims and affirmed the order terminating Mother’s parental rights. The district court subsequently certified two questions regarding the right to effective counsel in TPR proceedings and vindication of that right. In its opinion, the Supreme Court established the appropriate standard for determining whether counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance in termination of parental rights proceedings and directing the development of rules providing the procedure for vindicating a parent’s constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel in TPR proceedings. The Court then affirmed in this case, holding that Mother failed to present any basis for setting aside the order terminating her parental rights. View "J.B. v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families" on Justia Law