Justia Florida Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was sentenced to death for the murder of Raul Lopez and separately sentenced to death for the murder of law enforcement officer Steven Bauer. The Supreme Court affirmed in both cases. During the postconviction proceedings in both cases, Defendant alleged that he was intellectually disabled and therefore could not be executed pursuant to Atkins v. Virginia. The circuit courts denied Defendant’s intellectual disability claims. The Supreme Court affirmed. Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court held that the Supreme Court’s interpretation in Cherry of Florida’s intellectual disability statute was unconstitutional. Defendant filed successive motions for postconviction relief, arguing that the Florida Supreme court’s prior rejections of his claims were based on Cherry, an interpretation of the intellectual disability statute that the United States Supreme Court found unconstitutional in Hall v. Florida, and asserting that he was entitled to an additional evidentiary hearing on his claim. The circuit court summarily denied both motions. The Supreme Court remanded both cases to the circuit court for a single evidentiary hearing, holding that Defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his intellectual disability claim pursuant to Hall. View "Franqui v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Mark James Asay was found guilty of two counts of murder. The jury recommended a death sentence. The trial court imposed a sentence of death for each conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed on appealed. Here, Asay appealed from the summary denial of his second successive postconviction motion and also filed two petitions for a writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of postconviction relief and denied the petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, holding (1) Hurst v. Florida does not apply retroactively to Asay’s case, in which the death sentence became final before the issuance of Ring v. Arizona; and (2) Asay failed to demonstrate that he was entitled to relief as to any of his claims. View "Asay v. State" on Justia Law

After a nonjury trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder, armed robbery, burglary of a dwelling, and grand theft of an automobile. Appellant was sentenced to death for the murder conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed. Thereafter, Appellant filed a motion to vacate his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death, presenting twenty-one claims for relief. The postconviction court denied all of Appellant’s claims. Appellant appealed the denial of his postconviction motion and petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court affirmed the postconviction court’s denial of relief and denied habeas relief, holding (1) penalty phase counsel did not provide ineffective assistance; (2) Appellant was not deprived of his right to self-representation; (3) Appellant’s claims that his waivers of guilt phase counsel and both guilt and penalty phase juries were not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary were procedurally barred; and (4) as to Appellant’s habeas claims, his arguments regarding the effective assistance of appellate counsel were without merit. View "Knight v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder. The jury recommended death sentences for the murder convictions, and the trial court sentenced Defendant to death. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions but vacated Defendant’s death sentences, holding (1) the trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s motion to suppress his confession and the corresponding video recording of it; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by precluding a false confession expert from testifying that Defendant’s statement to law enforcement was coerced; (3) the trial court did not err by advising the jury that the ultimate decision to impose the death penalty rested with the court; (4) the evidence was sufficient to support the first-degree murder convictions; but (5) the term-of-years sentences imposed against Defendant’s codefendants precluded Defendant’s death sentences. View "McCloud v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. After the United States Supreme Court ruled in Atkins v. Virginia that it was unconstitutional to execute persons with intellectual disabilities, Appellant raised claims that he was intellectually disabled and could not be executed. The trial court and Supreme Court denied relief, relying, in part, on the bright-line cutoff of an IQ score of 70 that was subsequently invalidated in theUnited States Supreme Court’s holding in Hall v. Florida. This appeal concerned Appellant’s seventh motion for postconviction relief, alleging that his death sentence violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under Atkins. The postconviction court summarily denied Appellant’s motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that failing to give Appellant the benefit of Hall would result in a manifest injustice, which is an exception to the law of the case doctrine. Remanded for a new evidentiary hearing regarding intellectual disability, to be conducted pursuant to Hall. View "Thompson v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of three counts of first-degree murder, one count of attempted first-degree murder, one count of armed robbery, and one count of first-degree arson. The trial court imposed two sentences of death. Defendant appealed his convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgments of conviction and sentences of death, holding (1) the trial court properly admitted the statements of one victim as a dying declaration; (2) the trial court did not err in admitted certain out-of-court and in-court identifications of Appellant; (3) the trial court did not err in admitting nearly four dozen autopsy and hospital photographs of the murder victims; (4) the trial court properly found that Appellant committed the murder of one victim in order to avoid arrest; (5) competent, substantial evidence of guilt supported Appellant’s convictions; and (6) Appellant’s death sentences satisfied the Court’s proportionality requirement. View "Davis v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Defendant moved to dismiss the charge, arguing (1) his rifle was a permissible antique firearm or replica thereof under Fla. Stat. 790.23, the felon-in-possession statute, and (2) section 790.23 is unconstitutionally vague if convicted felons are prohibited from possessing black-powder rifles. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and Defendant entered a plea of no contest to one count of constructive possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The First District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that section 790.23 is unconstitutional with respect to the possession of a replica of an antique firearm by a convicted felon. The Supreme Court approved the First District’s reversal of Defendant’s conviction but not its conclusion that section 790.23 is unconstitutionally vague, holding that Defendant was entitled to the statutory exception of the felon-in-possession statute because his firearm was a permissible “replica” of an “antique firearm” under section 790.23, as defined in Fla. Stat. 790.001(1). View "State v. Weeks" on Justia Law

Jacob John Dougan was convicted of a murder that occurred in 1974. Dougan was sentenced to death for the murder. Dougan filed an amended postconviction petition raising twenty-nine claims. The postconviction proceedings lasted more than twenty years. After an evidentiary hearing in 2013, the postconviction court granted relief as to multiple claims and vacated the murder conviction and sentence of death. Specifically, the postconviction court found (1) the State failed to disclose the full extent of its plea deal with William Hearn, the State’s only eyewitness to the murder, and allowed Hearn to testify falsely about the true nature of his deal with the State; and (2) Dougan’s guilt phase counsel was operating under two conflicts of interest and that ineffective assistance of counsel occurred in the guilt phase. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Dougan’s trial was tainted by the cumulative effect of the State’s violation of Giglio v. United States through the testimony of Hearn and the substandard performance of Dougan’s counsel, thus depriving Dougan of a fair and impartial trial. View "State v. Dougan" on Justia Law

This case involved a pending prosecution where the death penalty was sought. At issue was whether Florida’s newly enacted death penalty law (the Act), which was passed after the United States Supreme Court in Hurst v. Florida held that a portion of Florida’s capital sentencing scheme was unconstitutional, may be constitutionally applied to pending prosecutions for capital offenses that occurred prior to the new law’s effective date. In State v. Perry, the Fifth District Court of Appeal held that the Act could apply to pending prosecutions without offending the Constitution. The Fifth District then certified two questions of law to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered, holding (1) as decided on remand in Hurst v. State, Hurst v. Florida did not declare Florida’s death penalty unconstitutional, and because Fla. Stat. 775.082(2) is limited to those cases in which the defendant was “previously sentenced to death,” the statute is inapplicable; and (2) the Act cannot constitutionally be applied to pending prosecutions because it does not require unanimity in the jury’s final recommendation as to whether the defendant should be sentenced to death, contrary to the Supreme Court’s holding in Hurst v. State. View "Perry v. State" on Justia Law

In Hurst v. State, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s death sentence, which was imposed after a second penalty phase sentencing proceeding. Defendant sought certiorari review. Upon review, the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme was unconstitutional to the extent that the judge, independent of a jury’s fact-finding, finds the facts necessary for imposition of the death penalty. The Court left it to the Florida Supreme Court to consider whether the error in sentencing was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. On remand, the Supreme Court held (1) the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hurst v. Florida requires that a jury must unanimously find the critical findings necessary before the trial court may consider imposing a death sentence, and in order for the trial court to impose a sentence of death, the jury’s recommended sentence of death must be unanimous; (2) Fla. Stat. 775.082(2) does not mandate that Defendant receive an automatic life sentence; but (3) the error in Defendant’s sentencing was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Remanded for a new penalty phase proceeding. View "Hurst v. State" on Justia Law