Justia Florida Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and burglary of a dwelling with a firearm. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death for the two murders. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and death sentences, holding (1) the trial court did not commit error in its evidentiary rulings; (2) no fundamental error occurred in the trial court’s placement of certain restrictions on Defendant’s presentation of his case; (3) the prosecutor did not improperly comment on Defendant’s guilt in front of the jury; (4) the trial court did not err in finding certain aggravating circumstances; (5) there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions; (6) the death sentences were proportionate; and (7) the trial court did not violate the attorney-client privilege by appointing Defendant’s standby counsel and investigators to present mitigation. The Court also prospectively modified the principles and procedures articulated in Muhammad v. State to the limited extent that trial courts should utilize an independent, special counsel, rather than standby counsel, to present mitigation evidence even when the defendant waives mitigation - as was done in this case. View "Marquardt v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of the murder of a seventy-year-old woman. Appellant was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed on appeal. Appellant subsequently filed a motion to vacate his conviction and sentence pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, asserting, inter alia, that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The postconviction court denied all claims. Appellant appealed the denial of his postconviction motion and also petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Appellant’s postconviction claims and denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding (1) the postconviction court did not err in determining that Appellant failed to demonstrate prejudice by any purported failure to trial counsel; and (2) the majority of Appellant’s claims were not cognizable in a petition for habeas relief, and the remainder of his claims were without merit. View "Zommer v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was found guilty of first-degree murder and three counts of sexual battery with the use of a deadly weapon or physical force, among other crimes. Appellant was sentenced to death. Appellant later filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850 and 3.851, alleging a claim of newly discovered evidence. Specifically, Appellant alleged that he was not the shooter and that his codefendant was the shooter. The trial court denied relief, determining that the newly discovered evidence was not credible and would not have changed the outcome of the trial. The Supreme Court affirmed. Appellant then filed a successive postconviction motion pursuant to rule 3.851, asserting claims of newly discovered evidence and ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel. The trial court summarily denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the record conclusively showed that Appellant was not entitled to relief on his claim of newly discovered evidence; and (2) Appellant’s ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel claim was not cognizable in a rule 3.851 motion. View "Kormondy v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, two counts of kinapping, and two counts of robbery. The trial court imposed two sentences of death for each murder. The Supreme Court affirmed on appeal. Appellant later filed a motion for postconviction relief, raising twelve issues. After an evidentiary hearing conducted on two of Appellant’s claims, the postconviction court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the postconviction court did not err in denying Appellant’s claims that trial counsel was ineffective during the guilt phase, during the penalty phase, and during jury selection. View "Wade v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Norman McKenzie was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder. The trial court sentenced McKenzie to death for the murders. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences. McKenzie later filed a motion to vacate the convictions and sentences pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, asserting four claims. The postconviction court summarily denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing. McKenzie appealed and also petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) McKenzie’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, in which he presented several issues arising from his decision to represent himself during his capital criminal proceeding, was properly denied; (2) McKenzie was not entitled to a second proportionality review at the postconviction appellate stage for evidence he chose not to present during his capital trial; and (3) McKenzie was not entitled to relief on his claim that because he was mentally ill, to execute him would be unconstitutional. View "McKenzie v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder, attempted armed robbery, and grand theft of a motor vehicle. The trial court imposed a sentence of death for the murder conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed on appeal. Appellant later filed a motion for postconviction relief, alleging twelve claims. After an evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court denied Appellant’s motion to the extent that it requested a new guilt phase but granted the motion to the extent that it requested a new penalty phase. Appellant appealed and filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court affirmed the postconviction court’s order and denied Appellant’s habeas petition, holding (1) the postconviction court did not err in denying Appellant’s request for a new guilt phase trial; and (2) Appellant failed to establish that he was entitled to habeas corpus relief. View "Blake v. State" on Justia Law

Fla. Stat. 550.054(14)(a), effective July 1, 2010, sets forth the standards a holder of a permit to conduct jai alai must meet to convert the permit to a permit to conduct greyhound racing in lieu of jai alai. Two businesses d applied for the conversion of their jai alai permits on the day section 550.054 became effective. The Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering (DBPR) granted the applications. Thereafter, Appellees instituted a declaratory judgment alleging that section 550.054(14) was an unconstitutional special law. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the two businesses and DBPR, concluding that the statute was a general law. The First District reversed, concluding that section 550.054(14)(a) was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute is a valid general law. View "Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation v. Debary Real Estate Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2012, individuals and groups challenging the constitutional validity of a 2012 congressional redistricting plan issued a subpoena duces tecum to Pat Bainter, the president of Data Targeting, Inc., a political consulting company. The challengers sought certain documents in the possession of Bainter, Data Targeting, and the company's employees (collectively, Appellants) related to the redistricting litigation. Bainter did not file a motion for a protective order or raise any legal objection to producing the documents sought by the challengers but instead attended a deposition testifying that he had produced what he had found, which was a limited amount. After being served with additional subpoenas duces tecum including the disputed documents within their scope, and during six months of hearings and filings regarding document production, Appellants did not raise any claim of a First Amendment privilege. It was only after Appellants were held in contempt of court that Appellants raised a belated claim of a qualified First Amendment privilege. Ultimately, the trial court ordered that Appellants produce 538 pages of the disputed documents. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, based on the totality of the circumstances, Appellants’ belated assertions of a qualified First Amendment privilege had been waived. View "Bainter v. League of Women Voters of Fla." on Justia Law

Due to a dispute between the Citrus County Hospital Board and the Citrus Memorial Health Foundation, Inc., the Legislature enacted a special law that reeancted the Board’s charter. Section 16 of the charter included subsections that specifically addressed the Board’s relationship with the Foundation. The Foundation filed suit against the Board seeking a declaratory judgment that the the special law was an unconstitutional impairment of the parties’ contracts. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Board, concluding (1) the Foundation was prohibited from challenging the constitutionality of the special law because it was a public or quasi-public corporation; and (2) the special law did not impair the Foundation’s contracts. The First District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that, as applied to the Foundation, the special law significantly altered the parties’ contractual rights and was an unconstitutional impairment of their contracts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Contract Clause of the Florida Constitution applies to the Foundation’s contracts; and (2) as applied, the special law unconstitutionally impairs the Foundation’s contracts. View "Citrus County Hosp. Bd. v. Citrus Memorial Health Found., Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded no contest to two counts of first-degree murder and one count of sexual battery on a child under the age of twelve. After a capital penalty-phase trial, the trial court sentenced Appellant to death for the murder of his stepdaughter. The Governor signed the death warrant on September 22, 2014. Appellant subsequently filed a second successive motion for postconviction relief, presenting three claims. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant was not entitled to relief on his claim that postconviction counsel rendered ineffective assistance; (2) Appellant’s claim that Florida’s lethal injection protocol violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment did not warrant reconsideration of the Court’s prior decisions upholding the constitutionality of the current protocol; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining objections made by various agencies to Appellant’s public records requests. View "Banks v. State" on Justia Law