Justia Florida Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a claim with Defendant, his homeowner's insurance company, for fire damage on his home. Plaintiff's insurance policy with Defendant was a replacement cost policy. Defendant made a payment to Plaintiff that included costs of repair even though Defendant had not completed any repairs to the home. Defendant, however, refused to pay for a general contractor's overhead and profit because Plaintiff had not yet incurred those expenses. Plaintiff filed a breach of contract claim against Defendant, contending that, like the other costs of repair Defendant paid, Defendant was required to pay costs for overhead and profit. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant, and the court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court quashed the court of appeal's decision, holding (1) replacement cost insurance includes overhead and profit where the insured is reasonably likely to need a general contractor for repairs; and (2) the court of appeal erred in determining the Florida law and the insurance policy permitted Defendant to withhold payment of overhead and profit because Plaintiff had not actually incurred those costs. Remanded. View "Trinidad v. Fla. Peninsula Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff's automobile insurance policy with Geico included a condition that Plaintiff submit to examination under oath (EUO) before recovering personal injury protection (PIP) benefits. Geico denied Plaintiff's PIP claim due to her failure to satisfy this condition after she was injured in a car accident. Plaintiff filed a class action complaint alleging that Geico had violated Florida's PIP statute. The federal district court dismissed the case, concluding that the PIP statute did not prohibit an insured from requiring an EUO. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit certified a question of law to the Florida Supreme Court, which answered by holding that, under Fla. Stat. 627.736, an insurer cannot require an insured to attend an EUO as a condition precedent to recovery of PIP benefits. View "Nunez v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Compass Construction and First Baptist Church were named as defendants in an action arising from a construction accident. Ultimately, First Baptist prevailed against the plaintiff in the main action and on its cross-claim for indemnity against Compass. First Baptist was awarded attorneys fees as part of its indemnity claim, but the parties disagreed about the appropriate hourly rate at which the fee for First Baptist's attorney should be calculated. In the main action, First Baptist's insurance company assigned an attorney to represent First Baptist. The attorney had a written fee agreement with the insurance company providing that attorney would be paid $170 per hour. In an alternative fee recovery clause, however, the agreement provided that if anyone other than the insurance company was required to pay attorney's fees, the attorney's hourly rate would be $300. The trial court calculated the award at the higher rate. The court of appeal reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the alternative fee recovery clause was valid. Remanded for reinstatement of the judgment awarding attorney's fees. View "First Baptist Church of Cape Coral, Fla., Inc. v. Compass Constr., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint against a check advance company, asserting claims based on numerous Florida statutes. Plaintiffs later amended the complaint to add Tiffany Kelly as an additional plaintiff and named class member. Because Kelly had signed the version of Defendant's arbitration agreement that contained a class action waiver, this case focused on her contracts with Defendant. The trial court eventually denied Defendant's motion to compel arbitration, ruling that the class action waiver was unenforceable because it was void as against public policy. The court of appeal affirmed, finding that no other reasonable avenue for relief would be available if it enforced the class action waiver. After the court of appeal decided this case, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion. Applying the rationale of Concepcion to the facts set forth in this case, the Supreme Court quashed the court of appeal's decision, holding that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted invalidating the class action waiver in this case on the basis of the waiver being void as against public policy. View "McKenzie Check Advance of Fla., LLC v. Betts" on Justia Law

Law Firm, located in Virginia, leased a vehicle from Company. Tortfeasor, who was driving the car with permission by Law Firm, collided with a car driven by Plaintiff. The day before the accident, the insurance policy on the vehicle lapsed for nonpayment. Plaintiff filed suit in Florida against Law Firm, Tortfeasor, and Company, alleging that because Company had failed to comply with the insurance requirements of Fla. Stat. 324.021(9)(b)(1), Company was vicariously liable for Tortfeasor's negligent operation of the car under Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine. Company moved for summary judgment, contending that its liability should be based on Virginia tort law and that if Florida law applied, section 342.021(9)(b)(1) was preempted by the Graves Amendment, a federal law providing that the owner of a motor vehicle who leases the vehicle shall not be vicariously liable from harm that results from the operation of the vehicle during the lease. The trial court concluded that Florida law applied but that the Graves Amendment did preempt section 324.021(9)(b)(1). The court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court approved the decision, holding that the Graves Amendment preempts section 324.021(9)(b)(1). View "Rosado v. Daimlerchrysler Fin. Servs. Trust" on Justia Law

EB Acquisitions I (EB) entered into a written contract to purchase real property from DK Arena. The parties orally agreed to modify their contract for the sale of the property by extending the due diligence deadline. After the original due diligence period expired, EB attempted to terminate the contract of sale and sought a return of its deposit. DK Arena filed suit alleging breach of contract. EB asserted several counterclaims, including breach of contract. The trial court held in favor of EB on all claims, concluding that the oral agreement was valid and enforceable, notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds, under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The court ruled that EB retained an unqualified right to terminate the contract and obtain the return of its deposit. The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the district court to the extent it was inconsistent with this opinion, holding that the district court applied an improper estoppel exception to the Statute of Frauds in express and direct conflict with the Court's decision in Tanenbaum v. Biscayne Osteopathic Hospital, Inc. Remanded. View "DK Arena, Inc. v. EB Acquisitions I, LLC" on Justia Law

Tiara Condominium Association (Tiara) retained Marsh & McLennan (Marsh) as its insurance broker. Marsh secured windstorm coverage through Citizens Property Insurance Corporation (Citizens), which issued a policy that contained a loss limit in an amount close to $50 million. Tiara's condominium subsequently sustained damages caused by two hurricanes. After being assured by Marsh that the loss limits coverage was per occurrence, Tiara spent more than $100 million in remediation efforts. However, when Tiara sought payment from Citizens, Citizens claimed that the loss limit was $50 million in the aggregate, not per occurrence. Tiara filed suit against Marsh, alleging, inter alia, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment for Marsh on all claims. The appeals affirmed with the exception of the negligence and breach of fiduciary claims, as to which it certified a question to the Supreme Court to determine whether the economic loss rule prohibits recovery, or whether an insurance broker falls within the professional services exception that would allow Tiara to proceed with the claims. The Court answered by holding that the application of the economic loss rule is limited to products liability cases. View "Tiara Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Marsh & McLennan Cos. " on Justia Law

A nursing home patient (Decedent) signed an agreement providing for arbitration of disputes arising out of treatment and care at the nursing home. Decedent subsequently died, allegedly through the nursing home's negligence. Through Decedent's personal representative, Decedent's survivors (Plaintiffs) subsequently brought a cause of action for deprivation of rights under the applicable nursing home statute and, alternatively, a wrongful death action. At issue on appeal was whether an arbitration agreement signed by the decedent requires his estate and heirs to arbitrate their wrongful death claims. The court of appeal concluded that the estate and heirs were bound by the arbitration agreement but certified a question to the Supreme Court. The Court approved of the court of appeal's decision and answered that the execution of a nursing home arbitration agreement by a patient with capacity to contract binds the patient's estate and statutory heirs in a subsequent wrongful death action arising from an alleged tort within the scope of the valid arbitration agreement. View "Laizure v. Avante at Leesburg, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioners and Respondents entered into a contract for the purchase of real property owned by Petitioners, twenty-five percent of which constituted wetlands. Respondents filed an action against Petitioners for fraudulent misrepresentation, alleging that in the advertisement for the sale of the property, Petitioners knowingly and falsely misrepresented that the property had no wetlands. Petitioners moved to dismiss, asserting that the fraud claim arose out of, and was related to, the contract, and therefore, the claim fell within the arbitration provision of the contract. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the action based on fraud was not a dispute subject to arbitration under the contract. The Supreme Court quashed the decision below and concluded that the fraud action had a contractual nexus with, and a significant relationship to, the contract between Petitioners and Respondents and was, as a general principle, within the scope of the contract's broad arbitration provision. Remanded. View "Jackson v. Shakespeare Found., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2004, Defendant, a general contractor, subcontracted with Plaintiff, who was unlicensed under Florida law at the time, to perform work on a parking garage. After a dispute, Plaintiff sued Defendant for breach of contract. Defendant counterclaimed for breach of contract. During litigation, Defendant argued that because Plaintiff was unlicensed, its breach of contract claim was barred under Fla. Stat. 489.128, which provides that contracts entered into by an unlicensed contractor shall be unenforceable. Plaintiff countered that Defendant was also barred from enforcing the contract because the parties were in pari delicto based on Defendant's alleged knowledge of Plaintiff's unlicensed status. The trial court ruled against Plaintiff, holding that the common law defense of in pari delicto was unavailable under section 498.128. The fifth district court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a party's knowledge that a contractor or subcontractor does not hold the state-required license to perform the construction work of the contract is legally insufficient to establish the defense that the parites stand in pari delicto. In so holding, the Court expressly disapproved the third district court of appeals' decision in Austin Building Co. v. Rago, Ltd., which directly conflicted with the fifth district's decision. View "Earth Trades, Inc. v. T&G Corp." on Justia Law