Justia Florida Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a resident of Arizona, sued Defendant, a foreign corporation that operates in Florida, after he contracted to buy an aircraft from Defendant but Defendant failed to deliver the aircraft. The U.S. district court applied Florida with respect to some of Plaintiff's claims and applied Arizona law to the remainder of the claims. The court also denied Defendant's motion for attorney's fees under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA). On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit certified several questions to the Florida Supreme Court. The Court answered (1) because Plaintiff invoked FDUTPA by filing an action asserting a claim seeking recovery under FDUTPA in which Defendant ultimately prevailed, Defendant was entitled to attorney's fees under FDUPTA; (2) Defendant was entitled to fees for only the period of litigation until the federal district court held that FDUPTA did not apply to Plaintiff's claim; (3) Florida's offer of judgment statute does not apply to cases that seek both equitable relief and damages and in which Defendant has served an offer of judgment that seeks release of all claims; and (4) even if Florida's offer of judgment statute applied in this case, Defendant would not be entitled to attorney's fees under that section. View "Diamond Aircraft Indus., Inc. v. Horowitch" on Justia Law

In this contract dispute, Respondent filed an action against Petitioner, claiming negligent misrepresentation, fraud in the inducement, unjust enrichment, and reformation of the contract. During discovery, Petitioner propounded to Respondent a request for the production of documents, seeking, inter alia, corporate financial documents, tax returns, budgets, and auditor's reports. Respondent objected to the request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and irrelevant. Petitioner, in turn, moved to compel Respondent to provide the requested documents. The trial court granted Petitioner's motion and ordered Respondent to produce the requested items. Respondent petitioned the court of appeal for a writ of certiorari. The court of appeal quashed the order compelling production, holding that the order of the trial court compelling production was overbroad. The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the court of appeals, holding (1) the basis stated for certiorari relief was incorrect and in express conflict with numerous Florida decisions; and (2) because the requested information was relevant to the disputed issues and Respondent had not demonstrated irreparable harm through its disclosure, the information was discoverable. View "Bd. Of Trs. of Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Am. Educ. Enters., LLC" on Justia Law

This action arose from an appeal to the Eleventh Circuit wherein plaintiff appealed the dismissal of insurance coverage claims under section 627.701(4)(a), Florida Statutes, and the denial of a motion to enforce execution of the judgment, and defendant cross-appealed the denial of motions for a new trial and for judgment as a matter of law. In answering five certified questions, the court concluded that, under Florida law: (1) first-party claims were actually statutory bad-faith claims that must be brought under section 624.155; (2) an insured could not bring a claim against an insurer for failure to comply with the language and type-size requirements established by section 627.701(4)(a); (3) an insurer's failure to comply with the language and type-size requirements established in section 627.701(4)(a) did not render a noncompliant hurricane deductible provision in an insurance policy void and unenforceable as the Legislature had not provided for this penalty; and (4) a contractual provision mandating payment of benefits upon "entry of a final judgment" did not waive the insurer's procedural right to post a bond and stay the execution of a money judgment pending resolution of appeal. View "QBE Ins. Corp. v. Chalfonte Condominium Apt. Assoc., Inc." on Justia Law

This action stemmed from an appeal to the Eleventh Circuit wherein plaintiff appealed the dismissal of claims under section 627.701(4)(a), Florida Statutes, and the denial of a motion to enforce execution of the judgment, and defendant appealed the denial of motions for a new trial and for judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiff had filed a claim with defendant, its property insurer, pursuant to an insurance policy but was dissatisfied with defendant's investigation and processing of its claim. Based on the facts and analysis, the court answered the first, third, fourth, and fifth questions certified by the Eleventh Circuit in the negative. In doing so, the court did not reach the second certified question. The court concluded that under Florida law: (1) first-party claims were actually statutory bad-faith claims that must be brought under section 624.155; (2) an insured could not bring a claim against an insurer for failure to comply with the language and type-size requirements established by section 627.701(4)(a); (3) an insurer's failure to comply with the language and type-size requirements established in section 627.701(4)(a) did not render a noncompliant hurricane deductible provision in an insurance policy void and unenforceable as the Legislature had not provided for this penalty; and (4) a contractual provision mandating payment of benefits upon "entry of a final judgment" did not waive the insurer's procedural right to post a bond and stay the execution of a money judgment pending resolution of appeal. View "QBE Ins. Corp. v. Chalfonte Condominium Apartment Assoc., Inc." on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute between the parties when Auto-Owners issued a performance bond in connection with the work of Southeast pursuant to a contract which provided that Southeast would build a floating dock for Rivermar. The certified question at issue was whether Florida's offer of judgment statute, section 768.79, Florida Statutes, constituted substantive law and therefore was inapplicable in instances where parties to a contract have agreed to be bound by the substantive law of another forum. The court held that section 768.79 created a substantive right to costs and attorney's fees upon the satisfaction of certain conditions. Accordingly, under a conflict of law analysis, when parties have agreed to be bound by the substantive law of another jurisdiction, section 768.79 simply did not apply. As a result, the court answered the certified question and by doing so, the two remaining certified questions were rendered moot. View "Southeast Floating Docks, Inc., et al. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Michael Warfel filed a sinkhole claim with Universal Insurance Company, with whom he had an all-risks homeowners insurance policy that covered sinkhole claims. Universal relied on a report by an outside firm, which determined that the damage was caused by factors that were excluded from coverage under the policy, to deny the claim. Warfel subsequently filed an action against Universal for breach of contract, seeking the recovery of insurance benefits for the loss caused by damage to his home. The trial court granted Universal's motion to apply Fla. Stat. 90.304 to the burden shifting presumption articulated in Fla. Stat. 627.7073(1)(c). The jury returned a verdict in favor of Universal. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the trial court misapplied the presumption at work in this case and gave the jury an instruction improperly shifting the burden of proof. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the language of section 627.7073(1)(c) does not create a presumption affecting the burden of proof under section 90.304 nor does the language create a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence under Fla. Stat. 90.303. View "Universal Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Warfel" on Justia Law

Petitioners sought review of the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Geico Indemnity Co. v. Shazier on the basis that it conflicted with the decisions of the court in Susco Car Rental System of Florida v. Leonard and Roth v. Old Republic Insurance Co. In Shazier, the district court resolved a question regarding an insurer's duty to defend and indemnify its insured in favor of the insurer. In doing so, the First District relied on a very constricted definition of "consent" and employed an unauthorized driver provision in contradiction of the court's clear precedent to the contrary under Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine to defeat coverage. Accordingly, the court quashed the First District's decision and directed that judgment be entered in favor of the insureds and injured parties. View "Chandler, etc., et al., v. Geico Indemnity Co. et al.; Steele v. Geico Indemnity Co. et al." on Justia Law

State Farm petitioned for review of the Third District's determination that the household exclusion in its policy issued to respondents was ambiguous and therefore could not be enforced to eliminate coverage for bodily injuries suffered by members of the household of a permissive-driver insured. The court held that the plain language of the household exclusion precluded coverage for bodily injuries suffered by members of the household of a permissive-driver insured, such as the parents in this case. Therefore, the court quashed the Third District's decision, approved Linehan v. Alkhabbaz, and remanded for further proceedings. View "State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Menendez, et al." on Justia Law

This case arose from certain hurricane damage claims made by respondent under a 2004 insurance policy issued by respondent's original insurer. When the original insurer became insolvent, the Florida Insurance Guaranty Association (FIGA) then became obligated to respond to certain claims made under that insurance policy. At issue was the proper test to be utilized by a court when determining whether a statute could be applied retroactively, in this case to a contract of insurance. The court held that the court's precedents both before and after the Fourth District's decision required the court to engage in a two-pronged inquiry to determine if the 2005 amendments to section 627.7016, Fla. Stat., were to be applied retroactively. Thus, the Fourth District misapplied this precedent when it omitted the first inquiry into whether the Legislature clearly expressed an intent that the statute be applied retroactively and moved directly to the second inquiry, whether retroactive application would be constitutional. For this reason, and because there was no clear evidence of legislative intent for retroactivity, the court quashed the decision of the Fourth District to the extent it was inconsistent with the opinion and remanded for further proceedings. View "Florida Ins. Guar. Assoc., Inc. v. Devon Neighborhood Assoc., Inc." on Justia Law