Justia Florida Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

John Sexton was convicted of the first-degree murder of Ann Parlato, a 94-year-old woman he knew from cutting her lawn. The crime was particularly brutal, involving severe physical trauma and post-mortem mutilation. A jury initially recommended the death penalty by a 10-2 vote, and the Florida Supreme Court upheld the conviction but remanded for a new penalty phase under Hurst v. Florida. On remand, Sexton waived his right to a jury, and the trial court sentenced him to death again.In the lower courts, Sexton moved for the recusal of Judge Mary Handsel, citing a contentious pretrial exchange. Judge Handsel denied the motion but delegated funding decisions to Chief Judge Anthony Rondolino, who granted some requests and denied others, including funding for a PET scan and travel expenses for mitigation specialists. Sexton also waived his right to a jury trial and limited the mitigation evidence presented. The trial court took judicial notice of the original trial transcripts and sentenced Sexton to death, citing three aggravating factors and giving little weight to the mitigating factors.The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the case and addressed eight issues raised by Sexton. The court found no abuse of discretion in denying funding for a PET scan and travel expenses, noting that Sexton failed to show a particularized need or prejudice. The court also held that the trial court erred in calling Sexton's mitigation specialist as a witness but deemed the error harmless. The court found no violation of Sexton's rights in the trial court's judicial notice of prior proceedings, denial of the motion to disqualify, or comments on Sexton's silence. The court concluded that the trial court properly considered mitigating evidence and understood its discretion in sentencing. Finally, the court rejected Sexton's constitutional challenge to Florida's capital sentencing scheme. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed Sexton's death sentence. View "Sexton v. State of Florida" on Justia Law

In 1994, Jermaine Foster was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, one count of attempted first-degree murder, and four counts of kidnapping. The jury recommended two death sentences, which the trial court imposed. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentences, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. Foster later sought postconviction relief based on intellectual disability claims, but the postconviction court denied his motion. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed this denial.Foster filed a successive motion for postconviction relief after the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Hall v. Florida, which was applied retroactively in Walls v. State. The postconviction court denied his motion without an evidentiary hearing, but the Florida Supreme Court remanded for a Hall-compliant hearing. Before this hearing occurred, the Florida Supreme Court decided Phillips v. State, which held that Hall should not be applied retroactively. The State moved to cancel Foster's hearing, but the postconviction court denied the motion based on the State's concession that it could not deviate from the mandate requiring a hearing.After the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Thompson v. State, which clarified that Phillips represented a change in controlling legal principles, the State renewed its motion for summary denial of Foster's intellectual disability claim. The postconviction court granted this motion, concluding that Phillips constituted an intervening change in law and that Hall did not apply retroactively.The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the postconviction court's denial of Foster's successive motion for postconviction relief. The court held that Foster's intellectual disability claim failed because Hall did not apply retroactively, and the State's initial concession did not preclude it from challenging the retroactive application of Hall. Consequently, Foster's request for an evidentiary hearing was denied. View "Foster v. State" on Justia Law

In 1994, Loran Cole and his companion encountered John Edwards and his sister while they were camping. Cole murdered John and raped his sister. Cole was indicted and found guilty of first-degree murder, kidnapping, robbery, and sexual battery. The jury recommended the death penalty, which the trial court imposed. Cole's convictions and death sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, and his certiorari petition was denied by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1998.Cole filed multiple postconviction relief motions, all of which were denied by the circuit court and affirmed by the Florida Supreme Court. His claims included ineffective assistance of counsel, newly discovered evidence, and constitutional challenges. Cole also sought federal habeas relief, which was denied. His subsequent motions for postconviction relief, including claims based on newly discovered evidence and Hurst v. Florida, were also denied.The Florida Supreme Court reviewed Cole's fourth successive motion for postconviction relief and his public records requests. Cole argued newly discovered evidence regarding his treatment at the Dozier School for Boys, Eighth Amendment violations due to his prison conditions, and the unconstitutionality of Florida's lethal injection procedures. The postconviction court denied these claims as untimely, procedurally barred, or without merit. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the postconviction court's decision, finding no error in the summary denial of Cole's claims and public records requests. The court also denied Cole's motion to stay his execution and his request for oral argument. View "Cole v. State of Florida" on Justia Law

On October 21, 2018, Tyrone T. Johnson called 911 from an East Tampa apartment, stating he had shot his girlfriend, Stephanie Willis, and her 10-year-old son, Ricky Willis. When deputies arrived, they found Johnson with blood on his hands and the victims' bodies in the master bedroom. Investigators discovered evidence, including a Glock 22 .40 caliber handgun, shell casings, and blood spatter. Johnson claimed the shootings occurred after an argument with Stephanie escalated, leading him to fire his gun in self-defense. He also stated that Ricky was shot when he tried to intervene.A Hillsborough County grand jury indicted Johnson for first-degree murder of Ricky Willis, second-degree murder of Stephanie Willis, and aggravated child abuse. During the trial, the State presented 19 witnesses, while the defense called none. The jury found Johnson guilty on all charges. In the penalty phase, the jury unanimously found three aggravating factors and recommended the death penalty for Ricky's murder. The trial court sentenced Johnson to death, finding the aggravators heavily outweighed the mitigators.The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed Johnson's appeal, focusing on three main issues: the admission of the second portion of his interrogation video, the testimony of his brother Al Johnson, and the sentencing order. The court found no abuse of discretion in admitting the interrogation video, as it provided relevant responses from Johnson. The court also found no fundamental error in the handling of Al Johnson's testimony, despite claims of prosecutorial threats. Lastly, the court acknowledged an error in the trial court's understanding of the "no significant history" mitigator but deemed it harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court affirmed Johnson's conviction and death sentence. View "Johnson v. State" on Justia Law

In 1999, Allen Ward Cox, an inmate at Lake Correctional Institute, was indicted for the premeditated murder of fellow inmate Thomas Baker. Cox discovered that $500 had been stolen from his footlocker and offered $50 to anyone who could identify the thief, threatening to kill the person responsible. The next day, Cox attacked Baker, beating and stabbing him with a shank, resulting in Baker's death. Cox was found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to death.The Florida Supreme Court affirmed Cox's conviction and death sentence in 2002. After exhausting initial state and federal postconviction proceedings, Cox filed a motion for postconviction relief based on Hurst v. Florida, which was granted in 2017. A new penalty phase trial was ordered, and the jury unanimously recommended the death penalty, finding two aggravating factors: imprisonment and a prior violent felony. The trial court sentenced Cox to death, considering both aggravating and mitigating factors.The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed Cox's appeal, which raised seven issues, including the rejection of certain nonstatutory mitigating factors, the cumulative effect of the prosecutor's comments during closing arguments, and the constitutionality of Florida's death penalty scheme. The court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's rejection of the mitigating factors, determining that the evidence supported the trial court's findings. The court also concluded that the prosecutor's comments did not constitute fundamental error and upheld the constitutionality of Florida's death penalty scheme based on established precedent.The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed Cox's death sentence, finding no reversible error in the trial court's proceedings. The court did not address the issue raised by the State on cross-appeal, as Cox's convictions and sentences were affirmed. View "Cox v. State" on Justia Law

The case involves James Herard, a member of the "BACC Street Crips," a branch of the national Crips gang. Herard was found guilty of 18 gang-related felonies, including the first-degree murders of Eric Jean-Pierre and Kiem Huynh. The crimes were committed as part of a body-count competition within the gang. Herard was sentenced to death for the murder of Jean-Pierre and life without parole for the murder of Huynh. He appealed his convictions and death sentence.Herard's trial was held in May 2014, where the prosecution presented evidence of incriminating statements made by Herard to law enforcement following his arrest for stealing a pit bull. The defense argued that Herard's statements were inconsistent, unreliable, and involuntary. The jury found Herard guilty on 18 counts and not guilty on a robbery count.In the penalty phase, the jury recommended a death sentence for the murder of Jean-Pierre by a vote of 8 to 4. The trial court found that the State had proven three aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt and sentenced Herard to death for the Jean-Pierre murder and to life without the possibility of parole for the Huynh murder.The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the lower court's decision. The court rejected Herard's arguments that the trial court erred in denying his due process-based motion to dismiss, denying his motions to suppress incriminating statements, admitting physical evidence he claimed was unrelated to the crimes charged, excluding his expert witness testimony about false confessions, and sentencing him in a manner that violated the Sixth and Eighth Amendments. The court also found that there was sufficient evidence to sustain Herard’s conviction for the murder of Eric Jean-Pierre. View "Herard v. State of Florida" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Florida was asked to interpret Florida’s law prohibiting riot, section 870.01(2), Florida Statutes (2021). The question was whether the law applies to a person who is present at a violent protest, but neither engages in, nor intends to assist others in engaging in, violent and disorderly conduct. The court ruled that it does not.The case originated from a lawsuit filed by a group of plaintiffs against Governor Ron DeSantis, three Florida sheriffs, and Attorney General Ashley Moody in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida. The plaintiffs argued that the statute was vague and overbroad in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court agreed and enjoined the enforcement of the statute. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that the central constitutional question was the statute’s scope and certified the question to the Supreme Court of Florida.The Supreme Court of Florida concluded that a "violent public disturbance" under section 870.01(2) is characterized by harm to persons or property, and not by peacefulness. To "willfully participate" in a "violent public disturbance," a defendant must have "intentionally, knowingly, and purposely" chosen to be part of it. Therefore, to be guilty of the crime of riot, one must "engage in," or at least "intend to assist others in engaging in, violent and disorderly conduct." The court found that the statute was not ambiguous and returned the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. View "DeSantis v. Dream Defenders" on Justia Law

Reginald Scott Walter, an inmate serving a thirty-year sentence for attempted first-degree murder and armed burglary, filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Supreme Court of Florida. This was not his first petition; since 2014, Walter had filed eight habeas corpus petitions and two mandamus petitions, all related to his convictions and sentences. All of these petitions were denied, dismissed, or transferred by the court. In his most recent petition, Walter argued that the evidence against him was insufficient to support his convictions, a claim he had raised in two previous habeas petitions.Walter's convictions and sentences were affirmed by the Second District Court of Appeal in 2001. His continued filings began in 2014, and all were related to his original case. Despite the repeated denials, dismissals, or transfers of his petitions, Walter continued to file petitions with the Supreme Court of Florida.The Supreme Court of Florida denied Walter's latest petition as successive and directed him to show cause why he should not be barred from filing any further pro se requests for relief. Walter responded by repeating much of his previous argument and asserting his constitutional right of access to courts and equal protection under the law. However, he failed to acknowledge the frivolous nature of his repeated filings and expressed no remorse for his misuse of the court's resources. The court found that Walter had failed to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed and concluded that he had abused the court's limited judicial resources. As a result, the court ordered that any future pleadings or requests for relief submitted by Walter related to his original case be rejected unless signed by a member in good standing of The Florida Bar. The court also directed the clerk to forward a copy of the opinion to the Florida Department of Corrections' institution where Walter is incarcerated. View "Walter v. Department of Corrections Secretary" on Justia Law

The case involves Joshua Lyle Creller, who was charged with resisting an officer without violence and possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, following a 2018 traffic stop. Creller refused to comply with a K-9 officer’s command to exit his vehicle during the traffic stop for officer safety. After his arrest, methamphetamine was found on his person. Creller moved to suppress the evidence of its discovery.The trial court denied Creller’s motion to suppress, finding the State’s evidence credible. The court concluded that the officer's request for Creller to exit the vehicle was for officer safety and did not violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. Creller was subsequently convicted by a jury. However, the Second District Court of Appeal reversed the conviction, holding that Creller was unlawfully seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment when the initial traffic stop transformed into a narcotics investigation for which no prior probable cause existed. The court certified conflict with the Fifth District Court of Appeal in State v. Benjamin, which reached the opposite conclusion.The Supreme Court of Florida disagreed with the Second District Court of Appeal's interpretation. The court held that the Fourth Amendment allows a K-9 officer to order a driver to exit a vehicle during a lawful traffic stop for officer safety reasons. The court concluded that the K-9 officer's command to Creller to exit the vehicle was reasonable and did not transform the traffic stop into a narcotics investigation. Therefore, the court quashed the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal and approved the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in State v. Benjamin. View "State of Florida v. Creller" on Justia Law

In 2015, Zachary Penna committed a series of violent crimes in Florida, including two murders. After his arrest, Penna was read his Miranda rights and initially invoked his right to counsel. However, during his hospitalization, Penna voluntarily initiated several conversations with Deputy Michael Nettles, during which he made incriminating statements. Penna was subsequently charged with several crimes, including two counts of first-degree murder. Before trial, Penna moved to suppress the statements made to Deputy Nettles, arguing that they were obtained in violation of Miranda. The trial court denied the motion, and Penna was found guilty on all counts and sentenced to life in prison.Penna appealed to the Fourth District Court of Appeal, which found that the statements during the first two conversations were not obtained in violation of Miranda. However, the court ruled that Deputy Nettles violated Miranda by failing to re-read Penna his Miranda rights prior to the final three conversations. The court relied on its own precedent, which had interpreted a previous Florida Supreme Court decision to require a full re-reading of Miranda warnings under the circumstances of this case. The court found that the error was not harmless, despite the overwhelming evidence of Penna’s guilt.The Supreme Court of Florida accepted the case for review. The court was asked to consider whether a defendant’s Fifth Amendment Miranda rights are automatically violated when an officer fails to re-read a Miranda warning following a defendant’s voluntary re-initiation of contact. The court held that there is no per se requirement that an officer remind or readvise a defendant of his Miranda rights. The court found that the Fourth District Court of Appeal had improperly expanded the requirements of Miranda and receded from its previous decision that had established a categorical rule requiring a full re-reading of Miranda warnings. The court remanded the case for reconsideration under the proper standard. View "State of Florida v. Penna" on Justia Law