Justia Florida Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the postconviction court denying Appellant’s motion filed pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, holding that Appellant was not entitled to relief under Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016).Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The death sentence was imposed following a jury’s recommendation for death by a vote of seven to five. Appellant’s death sentence became final in 1997. In 2017, Appellant filed the successive motion for postconviction relief at issue in this case, seeking relief pursuant to Hurst. The postconviction court summarily denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Hurst did not apply retroactively to Appellant’s sentence of death, and therefore, Appellant was not entitled to the relief he claimed. View "Mungin v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the postconviction court’s summary denial of Appellant’s successive postconviction motion to vacate his sentences of death under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, holding that the record conclusively demonstrated that Appellant was not entitled to relief.In 1986, Appellant was convicted of two counts of murder. Appellant’s death sentences became final in 1989. In the instant appeal, Appellant argued that the postconviction court erred in denying his intellectual disability claim without holding an evidentiary hearing and in denying his claim under Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the record conclusively showed that Appellant’s intellectual disability claim was untimely and that Appellant’s Hurst claim did not entitle him to relief. View "Harvey v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Appellant’s successive motion for postconviction relief under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, holding that Appellant was not entitled to relief pursuant to Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), nor was he entitled to relief on his other claims.Appellant was convicted of the 1992 first-degree murder of his wife. The jury recommended a death sentence by a vote of seven to five. The trial court imposed a sentence of death. Appellant later filed a successive motion to vacate his death sentence in light of Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and Hurst. The circuit court summarily denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Appellant’s sentence became final prior to Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), Appellant was not entitled to Hurst relief. View "Spencer v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant’s death sentence and remanded this case to the trial court for a new penalty phase, holding that the error pursuant to Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder of a law enforcement officer and other crimes. The jury recommended a sentence of death by a vote of nine to three on the murder charge. The trial court imposed a death sentence on the murder charge and lesser sentences on the other charges. Defendant appealed, arguing that he was entitled to a new penalty phase pursuant to Hurst. The Supreme Court agreed, vacated Defendant’s death sentence but affirmed his convictions and sentences on all lesser charges, holding that Hurst-related precedent required reversal of Defendant’s death sentence. View "Tisdale v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court approved the decision of the First District Court of Appeal affirming the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to vacate his 1000-year sentences with parole eligibility pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850, holding that Defendant’s sentences did not violate the categorical rule of Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).Defendant committed nonhomicide crimes at age seventeen and received concurrent sentences of 1000 years. The Parole Commission, after eleven review hearings, calculated a presumptive parole release date of 2352. After the United States Supreme Court decided Graham and Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), Defendant filed a motion to vacate his sentences pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850, arguing that his sentences violated the Eighth Amendment as delineated in Graham. The trial court denied the motion, and the First District Court of Appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant was not entitled to resentencing under chapter 2014,200, Laws of Florida. View "Franklin v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court approved the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in this appeal concerning the rule of completeness codified in the Florida Evidence Code and a related issue concerning the rule of evidence authorizing the impeachment of hearsay declarants.The Court held (1) a defendant is not permitted to require the State under Fla. Stat. 90.108(1) - the statutory rule of completeness - to introduce into evidence the entire video recording of the defendant’s statement to police when the State has questioned a detective of direct examination concerning inculpatory statements of the defendant unless the State introduces any portion of the recorded statement into evidence; and (2) the State is permitted to impeach a defendant under Fla. Stat. 90.806(1), which authorizes attacking the credibility of a hearsay declarant, whenever the defendant introduces through cross-examination hearsay exculpatory statements of the defendant. View "Nock v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court approved the decision of the First District Court of Appeal concluding that an automobile can be a weapon for purposes of Florida’s reclassification statute, Fla. Stat. 775.087(1), holding that an automobile is a weapon under section 775.087(1) if it is used to inflict harm on another and that it is a question of fact for the jury to determine whether an automobile or other object was used as a weapon by the defendant.Defendant was convicted of manslaughter with a weapon, where the weapon supporting the charge was an automobile, and leaving the scene of a crash involving death. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in allowing his manslaughter conviction to be reclassified from a second-degree felony to a first-degree felony for using a weapon pursuant to section 775.087(1). The First Circuit disagreed and upheld the conviction. The Supreme Court approved the First District’s conclusion that an automobile can be a weapon for purposes of the reclassification statute, holding that any object used or intended to be used to inflict harm on another constitutes a weapon within the meaning of the statute. View "Shepard v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that juvenile offenders’ sentences of life with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years do not violate the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, as delineated by the United States Supreme Court in Graham v. Florida, 460 U.S. 48 (2010), Miller v. Alabama, 467 U.S. 460 (2012), and related cases, and therefore, such juvenile offenders are not entitled to resentencing under Fla. Stat. 921.1402.Appellee was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and related crimes he committed when he was sixteen years old. Appellee was sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years for the murder. Appellee later filed a motion for postconviction relief asserting that he was entitled to relief under Miller. The trial court summarily denied the motion, determining that Miller was inapplicable because Appellee had the opportunity for release on parole. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that resentencing was required. The Supreme Court quashed the Fourth District’s opinion, holding that juvenile offenders’ sentences of life with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years do no violate Graham’s requirement that juvenile have a meaningful opportunity to receive parole. View "State v. Michel" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reaffirmed the postconviction court’s denial of Appellant’s intellectual disability (ID) claim, holding that Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017), did not impact the denial of Appellant’s ID claim.On direct appeal in this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Appellant’s ID claim. Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court issued Moore, a decision potentially relevant to this case. The United States Supreme Court then vacated the Supreme Court’s decision and remanded to allow the Court to reconsider its decision on appeal. On remand, the Supreme Court held that Appellant failed to prove adaptive deficits by clear and convincing evidence - a conclusion that Moore did not alter. View "Wright v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the postconviction court dismissing the postconviction proceedings brought by Appellant, a prisoner under sentence of death, but not discharging counsel, holding that the postconviction court’s order was not erroneous.Appellant was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder, kidnapping, and sexual battery. The jury recommended sentence of death by a vote of seven to five, and the trial court imposed a sentence of death. The Supreme Court affirmed. Thereafter, Appellant filed a motion to vacate judgments of conviction and sentence of death pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851. After concluding that Appellant sought to waive the postcondition proceedings, the postconviction court dismissed the postconviction motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Appellant’s waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, and therefore, valid, and the postconviction court properly allowed Appellant to waive the instant proceedings while maintaining counsel. View "Davis v. State" on Justia Law