Justia Florida Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal reversing the trial court’s decision imposing consecutive sentences and remanding to the trial court for consideration of whether, in the court’s discretion, it wished for Defendant to serve his sentences concurrently or consecutively, holding that consecutive sentences in this case were impermissible.Defendant was convicted of kidnapping with a firearm, aggravated battery, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Defendant was determined to be a habitual felony offender, and the trial court ordered Defendant to serve his sentences consecutively. The First District affirmed the consecutive sentences. The Supreme Court quashed the First District’s decision and remanded for reconsideration in light of Walton v. State, 106 So. 3 522 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013), and Williams v. State, 186 So. 3d 989 (Fla. 2016). On remand, the First District determined that the Supreme Court did not explicitly discuss a case factually similar to this one and that either concurrent or consecutive sentences were permissible. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that Fla. Stat. 775.087(2)(d) neither mandates nor permits consecutive sentences for crimes stemming from a single criminal episode involving a single victim in which the gun was not discharged. View "Miller v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reaffirmed the denial of Defendant’s intellectual disability (ID) claim, holding that Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017), did not compel a different result.In Wright v. State, 213 So. 3d 881 (Fla. 2017) (Wright), the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Defendant’s ID claim. Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court issued Moore. In the instant case, the United States Supreme Court vacated the Supreme Court’s decision in Wright and remanded to allow the Court to reconsider Wright. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the denial of the ID claim, holding that the intelligence prong and the adaptive functioning prong of the ID test did not require reversal of Defendant’s ID claim. View "Wright v. State" on Justia Law

The circuit court denied Zakrzewski’s motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, seeking relief pursuant to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in Hurst v. Florida. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the denial of relief, concluding that its prior denial of Zakrzewski’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus raising similar claims is a procedural bar to the claims at issue. All of Zakrzewski’s claims depend upon the retroactive application of Hurst, to which the court has held he is not entitled. View "Zakrzewski v. Florida" on Justia Law

Lynch pled guilty to two counts of first-degree premeditated murder, one count of armed burglary of a dwelling, and one count of kidnapping, all stemming from the 1999 deaths of Morgan and her 13-year-old daughter. Lynch’s counsel recommended that he waive a penalty phase jury because a jury would be more emotional and unsympathetic to mitigation presented for the murder of a child than a seasoned trial judge. Lynch waived his right to a penalty phase jury. The court sentenced Lynch to death. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed. In 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court denied Lynch’s petition for certiorari. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the denial of Lynch’s initial motion for postconviction relief and denied his petition for habeas corpus. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Lynch’s petition for federal habeas relief and, in 2016, the Supreme Court denied Lynch’s petition for certiorari to the Eleventh Circuit. Lynch filed a successive motion for postconviction relief, citing Hurst v. State. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the denial of relief. Lynch is not entitled to Hurst relief in light of his valid waiver of a penalty phase jury. Lynch argued, that the test for prejudice under the Strickland standard for ineffective assistance has changed post-Hurst. The court stated that trial counsel is not required to anticipate changes in the law in order to provide effective legal representation. View "Lynch v. Florida" on Justia Law

Andres was convicted of first-degree murder, armed burglary with assault or battery, first-degree arson, and armed robbery for crimes that resulted in the death of the occupant of a Miami apartment where Andres was performing renovation work. After the penalty phase, the jury recommended a sentence of death by a vote of nine to three. The court imposed a sentence of death. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed Andres’ conviction for first-degree murder but vacated his death sentence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to conduct a full Richardson hearing after determining that a witness’s trial testimony was merely a clarification of his prior deposition testimony. The court also rejected claims concerning evidentiary rulings and alleged improper burden shifting. The court remanded for a new penalty phase. Andres’ sentence was imposed under the capital sentencing scheme found to violate the Sixth Amendment in the Supreme Court’s holding, Hurst v. Florida, The Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a death sentence. A jury’s mere recommendation is not enough. The court imposed Andres’ death sentence following the jury’s nonunanimous recommendation of death. It is not clear why the dissenting jurors voted for a life sentence, so the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Andres v. Florida" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the postconviction court granting in part and denying in part Appellant’s motion to vacate his conviction of first-degree murder and his sentence of death, holding that the postconviction court did not err in denying Appellant's claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to move to an improper comment made during closing argument and failing to move for a mistrial.After the Supreme Court affirmed Appellant’s conviction and death sentence, Appellant filed his initial motion for postconviction relief. The postconviction court found that Appellant was entitled to a new penalty phase based on Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016) . The postconviction court then held an evidentiary hearing on Appellant’s claims premised upon allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel and denied the claims. Appellant appealed the denial of his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to an improper comment made during the State’s closing argument and failing to move for a mistrial. The Supreme Court held that the postconviction court did not err in denying this claim. View "Brown v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the postconviction court’s summary denial of Appellant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, holding that the postconviction court properly denied the claims.Appellant was sentenced to death for the murders of Byrd and Melanie Billings. Appellant filed an amended motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, which included a claim for relief pursuant to Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016). The postconviction court summarily denied relief on Appellant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims but granted a new penalty phase based on his Hurst claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the record positively refuted Appellant’s claim ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to renew his motion for change of venue; and (2) the postconviction court properly denied Appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to challenge the indictment as legally insufficient. View "Gonzalez v. State" on Justia Law

In this dispute over whether the trial court properly allowed a witness's identification testimony during a criminal trial, the Supreme Court held that a witness who identifies a defendant’s voice can establish a prior special familiarity with the defendant’s voice at any time prior to trial.On appeal from his conviction of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine Defendant argued that the trial court erred in allowing a witness’s identification testimony because the witness lacked the prior special familiarity to identify Defendant’s voice on phone calls recorded during an ongoing investigation under Evans v. State, 177 So. 3d 1219 (Fla. 2015). The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that the identification testimony met the requirements under Evans because the witness both possessed a prior special familiarity with Defendant’s voice and was a witness who heard the crime. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because allowing voice identification testimony that was acquired during an ongoing investigation is consistent with aiding the jury, this Court now recedes from Evans; and (2) the trial court properly allowed the witness to identify Defendant’s voice on the recorded calls. View "Johnson v. State" on Justia Law

In this case before the Supreme Court on Petitioner’s pro se petition for a writ of mandamus, the Court found that Petitioner failed to show cause why he should not be barred from filing further pro se requests for relief in the Court related to certain cases and sanctioned him accordingly.Since May 2017, Petitioner filed forty-two petitions or notices with the Court. After the Court dismissed Petitioner’s instant petition, the Court expressly retained jurisdiction and ordered Petitioner to show cause why he should not be barred from filing further pro se requests for relief. The Court then found that Petitioner has demonstrated a pattern of vexatious filing of meritless pro se requests for relief and abused the Court’s limited judicial resources. Accordingly, the Court directed the clerk of court to reject any future pleadings or other requests for relief submitted by Petitioner related to certain case numbers, unless such filings are signed by a member in good standing of The Florida Bar. View "Raghubir v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s order denying Appellant’s motion filed pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, holding that the Court’s prior denial of Appellant’s successive motion for postconviction relief raising similar claims was a procedural bar to the claims at issue in this appeal.All of the claims raised in Appellant’s Rule 3.851 motion depended upon the retroactive application of Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016). The Supreme Court previously held that Appellant was not entitled to such relief. Therefore, as to Appellant’s Rule 3.851 motion, in which he sought relief pursuant to Hurst and Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), the Supreme Court held that the circuit court properly denied the motion. View "Lightbourne v. State" on Justia Law