Justia Florida Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Andres was convicted of first-degree murder, armed burglary with assault or battery, first-degree arson, and armed robbery for crimes that resulted in the death of the occupant of a Miami apartment where Andres was performing renovation work. After the penalty phase, the jury recommended a sentence of death by a vote of nine to three. The court imposed a sentence of death. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed Andres’ conviction for first-degree murder but vacated his death sentence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to conduct a full Richardson hearing after determining that a witness’s trial testimony was merely a clarification of his prior deposition testimony. The court also rejected claims concerning evidentiary rulings and alleged improper burden shifting. The court remanded for a new penalty phase. Andres’ sentence was imposed under the capital sentencing scheme found to violate the Sixth Amendment in the Supreme Court’s holding, Hurst v. Florida, The Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a death sentence. A jury’s mere recommendation is not enough. The court imposed Andres’ death sentence following the jury’s nonunanimous recommendation of death. It is not clear why the dissenting jurors voted for a life sentence, so the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Andres v. Florida" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the postconviction court granting in part and denying in part Appellant’s motion to vacate his conviction of first-degree murder and his sentence of death, holding that the postconviction court did not err in denying Appellant's claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to move to an improper comment made during closing argument and failing to move for a mistrial.After the Supreme Court affirmed Appellant’s conviction and death sentence, Appellant filed his initial motion for postconviction relief. The postconviction court found that Appellant was entitled to a new penalty phase based on Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016) . The postconviction court then held an evidentiary hearing on Appellant’s claims premised upon allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel and denied the claims. Appellant appealed the denial of his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to an improper comment made during the State’s closing argument and failing to move for a mistrial. The Supreme Court held that the postconviction court did not err in denying this claim. View "Brown v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the postconviction court’s summary denial of Appellant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, holding that the postconviction court properly denied the claims.Appellant was sentenced to death for the murders of Byrd and Melanie Billings. Appellant filed an amended motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, which included a claim for relief pursuant to Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016). The postconviction court summarily denied relief on Appellant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims but granted a new penalty phase based on his Hurst claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the record positively refuted Appellant’s claim ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to renew his motion for change of venue; and (2) the postconviction court properly denied Appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to challenge the indictment as legally insufficient. View "Gonzalez v. State" on Justia Law

In this dispute over whether the trial court properly allowed a witness's identification testimony during a criminal trial, the Supreme Court held that a witness who identifies a defendant’s voice can establish a prior special familiarity with the defendant’s voice at any time prior to trial.On appeal from his conviction of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine Defendant argued that the trial court erred in allowing a witness’s identification testimony because the witness lacked the prior special familiarity to identify Defendant’s voice on phone calls recorded during an ongoing investigation under Evans v. State, 177 So. 3d 1219 (Fla. 2015). The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that the identification testimony met the requirements under Evans because the witness both possessed a prior special familiarity with Defendant’s voice and was a witness who heard the crime. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because allowing voice identification testimony that was acquired during an ongoing investigation is consistent with aiding the jury, this Court now recedes from Evans; and (2) the trial court properly allowed the witness to identify Defendant’s voice on the recorded calls. View "Johnson v. State" on Justia Law

In this case before the Supreme Court on Petitioner’s pro se petition for a writ of mandamus, the Court found that Petitioner failed to show cause why he should not be barred from filing further pro se requests for relief in the Court related to certain cases and sanctioned him accordingly.Since May 2017, Petitioner filed forty-two petitions or notices with the Court. After the Court dismissed Petitioner’s instant petition, the Court expressly retained jurisdiction and ordered Petitioner to show cause why he should not be barred from filing further pro se requests for relief. The Court then found that Petitioner has demonstrated a pattern of vexatious filing of meritless pro se requests for relief and abused the Court’s limited judicial resources. Accordingly, the Court directed the clerk of court to reject any future pleadings or other requests for relief submitted by Petitioner related to certain case numbers, unless such filings are signed by a member in good standing of The Florida Bar. View "Raghubir v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s order denying Appellant’s motion filed pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, holding that the Court’s prior denial of Appellant’s successive motion for postconviction relief raising similar claims was a procedural bar to the claims at issue in this appeal.All of the claims raised in Appellant’s Rule 3.851 motion depended upon the retroactive application of Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016). The Supreme Court previously held that Appellant was not entitled to such relief. Therefore, as to Appellant’s Rule 3.851 motion, in which he sought relief pursuant to Hurst and Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), the Supreme Court held that the circuit court properly denied the motion. View "Lightbourne v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s order denying Appellant’s motion filed pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, holding that Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), did not apply retroactively to Appellant’s sentence of death.After a jury unanimously recommended death, Appellant was sentenced to death. Appellant’s death sentence became final in 2001. In his Rule 3.851 motion, Appellant sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and the Supreme Court’s decision on remand in Hurst. The circuit court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Hurst did not apply retroactively to Appellant’s sentence of death. View "Kearse v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s order denying Appellant’s motion filed pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, holding that Appellant was not entitled to relief under Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016).In his motion, Appellant sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and the Supreme Court’s decision on remand in Hurst. The circuit court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Court’s previous denial of Appellant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus raising similar claims was a procedural bar to the claims Appellant raised in this appeal. View "Booker v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the postconviction court’s order granting Milo Rose’s pro se motion to dismiss postconviction proceedings and discharge collateral counsel, holding that the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Rose’s postconviction waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.Rose was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Bjorn Brunvand was later appointed to represent Rose. In 2005, Rose successfully moved to discharge Brunvand and represent himself in state court proceedings. Although counsel was not reappointed to represent Appellant in state court, in 2017, Brunvand, who represented Rose in federal court, filed a second successive postconviction motion on Rose’s behalf, and against Rose’s wishes, seeking relief pursuant to Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016). Rose sought to dismiss the postconviction proceedings and discharge Brunvand. After conducting the inquiry required by Durocher v. Singletary, 623 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 1993), the postconviction court granted the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the postconviction court followed the procedures set forth in Durocher and Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(i) and did not abuse its discretion in finding that Rose’s waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. View "Rose v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s orders summarily denying Appellant’s fifth motion for postconviction relief filed under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851 and 3.203.Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and armed burglary in 1982. In 1994, following a new penalty phase on resentencing, the jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of ten to two. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant’s death sentence. In 2015, Appellant filed this postconviction motion seeking relief based on Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014), and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). Thereafter, Appellant filed an amended postconviction motion seeking additional relief based on Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016). The circuit court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant’s intellectual disability claim was foreclosed by the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Rodriguez v. State, an unpublished order; and (2) Appellant’s Hurst claim was foreclosed by the Court’s decision in Hitchcock v. State, 226 So. 3d 216 (Fla. 2017). View "Blanco v. State" on Justia Law