Justia Florida Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court approved the First District Court of Appeal’s holding in Hall v. Lopez, 213 So. 3d 1003 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017), that Fla. Stat. 57.105 does not prohibit awarding attorney’s fees in dating, repeat, and sexual violence injunction proceedings under Fla. Stat. 784.046.Nicole Lopez filed a petition for injunction for protection against repeat and dating violence under section 784.046 against Sean Hall and received a temporary injunction. Hall later moved for attorney’s fees and sanctions under section 57.105, claiming that Lopez perjured herself in her petitions. Thereafter, Lopez voluntarily dismissed her action. The trial court denied Hall’s motion for attorney’s fees, concluding that section 784.046 does not authorize an award of section 57.105 attorney’s fees on any basis. The First District reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 57.105 may be applied to repeat, dating, and sexual violence injunction proceedings under section 784.046. View "Lopez v. Hall" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction for first-degree murder but vacated his death sentence and remanded for a new penalty phase. Defendant was sentenced to death after a jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of ten to two. On appeal, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court did not err by allowing Defendant’s co-defendant to testify that he and Defendant were involved in the separate murder; (2) substantial evidence supported the conviction; but (3) the jury’s nonunanimous recommendation of death violated Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), and the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Kirkman v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction of first-degree murder but vacated his sentence of death and remanded for a new penalty phase. The jury in this case recommended death by a vote of ten to two. The Supreme Court held (1) the trial court did not err when it granted the State’s motion for reconsideration of Defendant’s motion for change of venue; (2) the trial court did not err in overruling Defendant’s objection to the admission of his spontaneous statements while under observation in jail; (3) assuming that two of the prosecutor’s statements were improper, neither of these issues individually amounted to fundamental error, and the cumulative effect of these errors did not deprive Defendant of a fair trial; (4) substantial evidence supported Defendant’s conviction; but (5) the Hurst error in Defendant’s sentencing was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Morris v. State" on Justia Law

A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is the proper vehicle by which to seek release from close management, which the Florida Administrative Code defines as “the confinement of an inmate apart from the general population.”Defendant, an inmate, was reassigned to a “close management” cousin classification. The Department of Corrections upheld the decision. Defendant then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which the circuit court denied. On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal announced its decision to “recede from prior decisions…allow[ing] [c]lose [m]anagement decisions to be challenged by writ of habeas corpus,” concluding that the appropriate vehicle for challenges to close management assignments was a petition for writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the First District, holding that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus remains the correct mechanism by which to challenge a reassignment. View "Banks v. Jones" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court approved the First District Court of Appeal’s decision ruling that the Dangerous Sexual Felony Offender Act (the DSFO Act) authorizes a mandatory minimum life sentence regardless of the statutory maximum for the crimes.The First District certified conflict with Wilkerson v. State, 143 So. 3d 462 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014), in which the First District Court of Appeal concluded that, when the statutory maximum for a particular crimes is less than twenty-five years, the DSFO authorizes a trial court to impose only a mandatory minimum term of twenty-five years’ imprisonment. In the instant case, the trial court sentenced Defendant under the DSFO Act to a mandatory minimum life sentence for a second-degree felony that generally carried a fifteen-year statutory maximum. The Supreme Court approved the First District’s decision in Williams and disapproved the Fifth District’s decision in Wilkerson to the extent it was inconsistent with this opinion, holding that, in upholding the sentence int his case, the First District interpreted the “25 to life” provision in the DSFO Act consistently with Mendenhall v. State, 48 So, 3d 740 (Fla. 2010), which controls this case. View "Williams v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was entitled to a new penalty phase proceeding pursuant to Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016) and Mosley v. State, 209 So. 3d 1248 (Fla. 2016) and based on his claim of ineffective assistance of penalty phase counsel.Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and other crimes. The jury recommended a sentence of death for the murder by a vote of eleven to one. The trial court imposed a sentence of death. Defendant later filed a motion to vacate judgment of conviction and sentence pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851. The postconvcition denied all claims, concluding that penalty phase counsel was deficient but that Defendant was not prejudiced as a result. Defendant appealed and filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking relief pursuant to Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. __ (2016). The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of postconvcition relief but granted the petition for writ of habeas corpus, vacated Defendant’s death sentence, and remanded, holding (1) trial counsel was deficient for failing to discover paternal neglect, paternal abuse, and the extent of paternal substance abuse, and the deficiency was prejudicial; and (2) the failure to require a unanimous verdict regarding the sentence of death was not harmless. View "Ellerbee v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions for first-degree murder and other crimes but vacated his death sentence and remanded for a new penalty phase. After the penalty phase, the jury voted nine to three to recommend a sentence of death. The trial judge followed the jury’s recommendation. On appeal, Defendant raised seven allegations of error regarding guilt phase issues. The Supreme Court held that none of the issues warranted relief and that the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s first-degree murder conviction. The court, however, concluded that Defendant’s death sentence violated Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. __ (2016) and that the error in Defendant’s sentencing was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Lebron v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s order summarily denying Appellant’s first successive motion for postconviction relief filed under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851. Appellant was convicted of two counts of first-degree premeditated murder. Following a penalty phase bench trial and a Spencer hearing, the trial court sentenced Appellant to death for each of the murders. This appeal concerned the denial of Appellant’s first successive postconviction motion in which Appellant raised several claims in light of Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016) and Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant validly waived the right to a penalty phase jury, and Appellant’s arguments did not compel departing from precedent denying Hurst relief to defendants that have waived the right to a penalty phase jury. View "Allred v. State" on Justia Law

In this appeal from an order entered on Defendant’s postconviction motion to vacate his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death and related convictions and sentences, the Supreme Court reversed the portion of the postconviction court’s order granting Defendant a new guilt phase but affirmed the portions of the postconviction court’s order granting Defendant a new penalty phase. The court held that the postconviction court (1) erred in granting relief on Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims regarding the voluntariness and reliability of Defendant’s written statement to the police detailing his involvement in the victim’s death and trial counsel’s guilt phase investigation; and (2) did not err in finding that trial counsel was ineffective for failing adequately to investigate and prepare for the penalty phase. As to Defendant’s cross-appeal, the Supreme Court held that the postconviction court (1) did not err to the extent that it denied four of Defendant’s postconviction claims; and (2) did not err in declining to conduct a cumulative error analysis. View "State v. Morrison" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s summary denial of Appellant’s successive motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851. In his motion, Appellant, a prisoner under sentence of death, raised five claims of newly discovered evidence or Brady violations. The court held (1) all of Appellant’s claims were properly denied by the trial court; and (2) where the only additional evidence presented in this proceeding potentially admissible in any retrial was that regarding evidence addressed in claim two, and there was no reasonable probability that, had this evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the trial would have been different, Appellant was not entitled to a new trial when all of the allegations presented in this proceeding were considered cumulatively. View "Suggs v. State" on Justia Law