Justia Florida Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Here the Supreme Court considered two petitions for writs of prohibition filed in Evans v. State and Rosario v. State. In Evans, the trial court determined that it would death qualify the jury in Evans’ first-degree murder trial and instruct the jury that Evans could receive a death sentence if the jury unanimously made the requisite findings of fact and unanimously recommended a death sentence. In Rosario, the trial court determined that the State was prohibited from seeking the death penalty in a pending prosecution and ordered that the case proceed with a mandatory life maximum penalty. The Fifth District Court of Appeal granted the State’s petition for a writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court denied Evans’ and Rosario’s petitions for writs of prohibition, holding that the trial courts in both cases may proceed with death qualifying juries, as, pursuant to the Court’s holdings in Hurst v. State and Perry v. State, the revised statutory scheme in chapter 2016-13, Laws of Florida, can be applied to pending prosecutions for a jury recommendation of death if twelve jurors unanimously determine that a defendant should be sentenced to death. View "Evans v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant pled no contest to multiple offenses arising out of a road rage incident. The trial court adjudicated Defendant guilty and imposed a downward sentence. At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor argued against a downward sentence. The First District affirmed the trial court’s decision to impose a downward departure sentence, concluding that the State failed to preserve the issue for appeal. The Supreme Court quashed the First District’s decision, holding that because the State timely opposed the downward departure during the same proceeding in which the sentence was imposed, the issue was properly preserved for appellate review as to the legal grounds asserted. View "State v. Wiley" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted and sentenced to death for the first-degree premeditated murder of a corrections officer. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentence. Defendant later filed a motion to vacate his judgment of conviction and sentence pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and that his execution will violate his constitutional rights. The postconviction court denied relief. Defendant appealed and also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the jury instructions in capital sentencing are unconstitutional and that trial counsel was ineffective in litigating constitutional challenges to Florida’s capital sentencing statute. The Supreme Court affirmed the postconviction court’s denial of Defendant’s postconviction motion, holding (1) Defendant failed to demonstrate that the postconviction court erred in finding that no Strickland error occurred; (2) Defendant’s claim of possible incompetence at the time of execution was not ripe for review; and (3) Defendant failed to establish that he was entitled to habeas relief. View "Hall v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder. The jury recommended death by a vote of ten-to-two. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death. The Supreme Court affirmed on direct appeal. Defendant later filed an amended motion to vacate his conviction and sentence under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant appealed and petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of postconviction relief and denied the habeas petition, holding (1) the postconviction court properly denied relief on Defendant’s Rule 3.851 motion; and (2) Defendant was not entitled to habeas relief. View "Bogle v. State" on Justia Law

After a second jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of both first-degree premeditated murder and felony murder, with burglary as the underlying felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions but vacated his death sentence, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for mistrial based on juror misconduct; (2) the evidence presented by the State was sufficient to support the first-degree premeditated murder conviction and the first-degree felony murder conviction; (3) the trial court did not commit reversible error by allowing the instruction on felony murder based on burglary to go to the jury; (4) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for change of venue; and (5) Hurst error occurred because the recommendation of death in this case was not unanimous, and the error was not harmless. Remanded for a new penalty phase proceeding. View "Dubose v. State" on Justia Law

Hojan was charged with armed robbery, armed kidnapping, attempted murder, and two murders arising out of the 2002 robbery of and shooting of employees at a Waffle House. A surviving victim gave law enforcement officers a taped statement, in which she identified Mickel and Hojan, known to her, as being involved. The jury recommended death by a vote of nine to three, and the trial court followed that recommendation, finding six aggravators, one statutory mitigator, and two nonstatutory mitigators. After an unsuccessful direct appeal, Hojan sought post-conviction relief, arguing that the survivor’s statement to an officer was not an excited utterance; the trial court improperly treated Hojan’s waiver of the opportunity to present mitigating evidence in the penalty phase as a waiver of his opportunity to present motions challenging the death penalty; his confession should have been suppressed; Florida’s death penalty statute is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the denial of relief, finding no error under Hojan’s asserted claims, that sufficient evidence exists, and that the death sentence is proportional. The court nonetheless granted Hojan a new penalty phase, based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in Hurst v. Florida. View "Hojan v. Florida" on Justia Law

In 2006, a jury found Knight guilty of two counts of first-degree murder for the deaths of his housemate, Stephens, and her four-year-old child. Police, responding to a 911 call about noises in the apartment, found the bodies. All of the doors were locked and the apartment had not been ransacked. Knight was found outside, with cuts and bloodstains. Fingernail scrapings taken from the victim contained Knight’s DNA profile; the victim’s blood was found on Knight’s clothing. In jail, Knight described the crime to another inmate. The jury unanimously recommended a death sentence for each murder. The court sentenced Knight to death, finding that the state had proven beyond a reasonable doubt statutory aggravating circumstances: a previous conviction of another violent capital felony, that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, and that one victim was under 12 years of age. The court found no statutory mitigating circumstances but found eight nonstatutory mitigators. After unsuccessful appeals, Knight sought post-conviction relief, arguing he was improperly denied access to public records; the one-year deadline in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure was unconstitutionally applied to him; he was denied adversarial testing at the guilt and penalty phases; the rule prohibiting juror interviews is unconstitutional; and Florida’s lethal injection protocol is unconstitutional. The circuit court denied all of Knight’s claims. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed, rejecting several claims of ineffective assistance, claims of Brady violations, and challenges to the death penalty. View "Knight v. Florida" on Justia Law

Section 322.2615, Florida Statutes, authorizes a law enforcement officer to suspend driving privileges when a person is driving or in physical control of a vehicle and has a blood- or breath alcohol level of .08 or higher. An officer may also suspend the driving privilege of one who refuses to submit to a urine, breath, or blood-alcohol test. If the driver refuses to perform a lawfully requested test, the officer must notify the driver that his license will be suspended for a year, or 18 months if the driver has previously had his license suspended for failure to submit to such tests. Section 316.1932 provides that the requested tests “must be incidental to a lawful arrest” and that the officer must have “reasonable cause.” Once the license is suspended, the driver may request review by the Department of Motor Safety and Vehicles through an administrative hearing within 10 days after issuance of the notice of suspension; the review hearing essentially functions as a trial before the Department. The hearing officer’s authorization to determine the “lawfulness of the stop” is built into the provision of the essential element of whether probable cause existed; the decision may be reviewed by the circuit court. The Supreme Court of Florida held that a circuit court, conducting review under Section 322.2615, must review video evidence and reject officer testimony as competent, substantial evidence when that testimony is contrary to video evidence. View "Wiggins v. Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

In 1999, Mack’s family found Mack’s body, naked from the waist down, with a cord wrapped around her neck. Durousseau’s DNA was found inside Mack’s vagina. In 2003, Durousseau was indicted for first-degree murder for the deaths of five women. The similar methodology of the crimes caused investigators to conclude that Mack was one of Durousseau’s victims. Durousseau was convicted of Mack’s murder. The jury voted to impose a death sentence. The court found four aggravating factors: Durousseau was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence; the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of a robbery or sexual battery, was committed for pecuniary gain, and was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. The court did not find any statutory mitigating circumstances, but found 16 nonstatutory mitigating circumstances and sentenced Durousseau to death. The Supreme Court affirmed. Durousseau sought post-conviction relief, arguing that counsel was ineffective for failing to request additional physical and psychiatric testing and for failing to conduct meaningful voir dire. Before the hearing, Durousseau abandoned his first claim. The court denied Durousseau’s claim. While his appeal was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Hurst v. Florida (2016), holding that Florida’s death penalty sentencing statute violated the Sixth Amendment. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief but vacated Durousseau’s sentences under Hurst because the jury did not make any of the requisite factual findings beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Durousseau v. Florida" on Justia Law

Kaczmar was convicted for first-degree murder, attempted sexual battery, and arson. Kaczmar had been previously convicted of a robbery. The state presented a victim impact statement from the victim’s brother. The defense presented testimony from Kaczmar’s family and friends, depicting Kaczmar as a good person who had a troubled upbringing. A child psychiatrist, testified that Kaczmar was traumatized by his father’s alcoholism and his own chronic drug abuse, and that although he believed Kaczmar to be competent during trial, he did not think Kaczmar knew what he was doing during the murder and did not know right from wrong. The jury recommended a death sentence. The court found that four aggravating circumstances outweighed 14 mitigation factors and imposed a death sentence . The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed Kaczmar’s convictions, but held that the court erred in finding the crimes were committed in the course of attempted sexual battery aggravators. After remand, Kaczmar waived his right to present mitigation, but agreed to reading to the jury a stipulation regarding his age (24). The jury unanimously recommended the death sentence. The state did not present additional evidence; Kaczmar admitted into evidence the transcripts of testimony from mitigating witnesses who testified during the first penalty proceeding. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed reimposition of the death penalty, rejecting arguments that the court: erred in assigning great weight to the jury’s recommendation; improperly dismissed juror questions as “not relevant”; and erred in failing to give weight to the mitigating circumstance that Kaczmar was abused. The court also rejected claims that the death sentence was disproportionate; Florida’s death penalty statute is unconstitutional; and the prosecutor engaged in impermissible closing argument. View "Kaczmar v. Florida" on Justia Law