Justia Florida Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Housemates McCumbers, Junk, Blair, and Markus invited three women to their garage/recreation room to socialize. At 12:20 a.m. Officers Prendergast and Edu were dispatched to a noise disturbance, which had dissipated before they arrived. Prendergast testified that as he approached Markus, who was outside, he smelled marijuana. Prendergast identified himself and asked Markus to stop. Markus dropped his cigarette, raised both hands and walked backward. Prendergast instructed Markus to stop. Prendergast claimed Markus turned and ran into the garage/recreation room. The officers followed. Prendergast later testified that Markus was on the couch and resisted the officers. Additional officers arrived; they pulled Markus down. Prendergast straddled Markus to apply handcuffs, turned Markus on his side, and was alerted that there was a pistol in Markus’ waistband. McCumbers, who was in the home, testified that he handed Markus a tobacco cigarette and lit it before Markus walked outside to talk to men who were standing along the road, and that, when approached by the officers, Markus raised his hands and walked backward at a slow pace until he reached the couch. The officers had their Tasers drawn and pushed Markus, so that he “spun around.” Others testified that the officers were rough with the other occupants and that they searched the bedrooms. Markus was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The Supreme Court of Florida reversed. The totality of the circumstances must be considered in evaluating Fourth Amendment cases. The exigent circumstance exception of hot pursuit does not justify a warrantless home entry, search, and arrest when the underlying conduct for which there is probable cause is only a nonviolent misdemeanor and the evidence of the alleged misdemeanor is outside the home. View "Florida v. Markus" on Justia Law

A high-speed pursuit on Alabama 167 ended when both vehicles crashed into a ditch after the Camry fired shots at the patrol car. After both cars stopped, the Camry returned more gunshots; its driver, Rafsky, fled but was apprehended. Wood, a passenger, was taken into custody at the scene. Officers discovered inside the Camry a wallet belonging to Shores, the Camry’s registered owner. Shores was found dead, with his hands and legs bound, with massive head trauma. Wood told investigators that he and Rafsky had been on Shores’s property, riding dirt bikes, when Shores confronted them. Wood claimed that he discovered that Rafsky had beaten Shores and that they subsequently bound Shores. At trial, Wood also testified about his drug use on the day of the murder and that Wood had shot him in the leg. The jury found Wood guilty of first-degree murder. The court instructed the jury on aggravating factors: the capital felony was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification; was committed while defendant was engaged, or was an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit burglary and/or robbery; and was committed to avoid arrest. The jury recommended a death sentence. After victim-impact testimony, the court considered mitigating circumstances, and sentenced Wood to death. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the conviction, but directed imposition of mandatory life sentence without parole. The court erred in finding two aggravating factors and in rejecting some uncontroverted mitigation. With respect to the remaining aggravating factor, that the felony was committed while Wood was engaged in commission of a burglary and robbery, the court concluded that this murder is not among the most aggravated and least mitigated, so that Wood’s death sentence was disproportionate. View "Wood v. Florida" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of five counts of first-degree murder, armed robbery, armed kidnapping, and armed burglary with an assault or battery. The jury recommended a sentence of death for each count of first-degree murder by a vote of seven to five. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by limiting the scope of voir dire; (2) the trial court erred when it failed to conduct a Frye hearing, but the error was harmless; (3) the remaining allegations of error regarding the trial court’s evidentiary rulings failed; (4) the State did not impermissibly shift the burden of proof to Defendant during its guilt phase closing statements; (5) the trial court acted within its discretion to prevent an improper argument proffered by defense counsel during the closing statement of the penalty phase; (6) substantial evidence supported Defendant’s convictions; but (7) Defendant was entitled to a new penalty phase pursuant to Hurst v. State. Remanded. View "Calloway v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, involuntary sexual battery, and kidnapping. After a Spencer hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to death. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentences. Defendant later filed a motion to vacate judgment and sentence pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, alleging, inter alia, ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The postconviction court granted an evidentiary hearing on these two claims and then denied relief on all claims. Defendant appealed. Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Hurst v. Florida, which held that the capital sentencing scheme in Florida violated the Sixth Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant failed to demonstrate that counsel rendered ineffective assistance; (2) Defendant’s challenges to Florida’s execution procedures were meritless, and Defendant’s claim regarding his potential future incompetency was not ripe; and (3) any Hurst error that occurred during sentencing was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "King v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was sentenced to death for the murder of Raul Lopez and separately sentenced to death for the murder of law enforcement officer Steven Bauer. The Supreme Court affirmed in both cases. During the postconviction proceedings in both cases, Defendant alleged that he was intellectually disabled and therefore could not be executed pursuant to Atkins v. Virginia. The circuit courts denied Defendant’s intellectual disability claims. The Supreme Court affirmed. Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court held that the Supreme Court’s interpretation in Cherry of Florida’s intellectual disability statute was unconstitutional. Defendant filed successive motions for postconviction relief, arguing that the Florida Supreme court’s prior rejections of his claims were based on Cherry, an interpretation of the intellectual disability statute that the United States Supreme Court found unconstitutional in Hall v. Florida, and asserting that he was entitled to an additional evidentiary hearing on his claim. The circuit court summarily denied both motions. The Supreme Court remanded both cases to the circuit court for a single evidentiary hearing, holding that Defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his intellectual disability claim pursuant to Hall. View "Franqui v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, robbery with a firearm, and fleeing to elude a law enforcement officer. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentences. Defendant later filed an amended motion to vacate judgment of conviction and sentence under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court denied Defendant’s amended rule 3.851 motion, concluding that, due to Defendant’s failure to offer any evidence, the burden of proof had not been met. Defendant appealed the denial of postconviction relief and also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of postconviction relief but granted the habeas petition and vacated Defendant’s death sentence, holding that a Hurst error occurred during Defendant’s penalty phase proceedings, and the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Remanded for a new penalty phase proceeding based on Hurst v. Florida. View "McGirth v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder (premeditated and felony murder) in the death of Georgette Sturmfels, two counts of first-degree murder (premeditated and felony murder) for the death of Robert Sturmfels, and other offenses. The jury recommended two death sentences for both murders by a vote of eight to four. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death. The Supreme Court affirmed the premeditated murder convictions and death sentences, reversed the two felony murder convictions that were duplicative of the premeditated murder convictions, and remanded to the trial court. The lower court subsequently vacated one felony murder conviction for each victim. Defendant later filed his first successive motion to vacate the judgment of conviction challenging the premeditated murder convictions and death sentences, arguing an improper doubling of aggravators. The postconviction court summarily denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of postconviction relief, holding that Defendant’s claim of improper doubling is untimely and procedurally barred. View "Gaskin v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder. The jury voted ten to two to impose the death sentence. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death. The Supreme Court affirmed. Defendant later filed a postconviction motion to vacate the judgment of conviction and sentence. The circuit court summarily denied Defendant’s postconviction motion. While Defendant’s appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Hurst v. Florida. The Supreme Court reversed the postconviction court’s order and remanded for a new penalty phase, holding that Defendant’s sentence was the result of a Hurst error, and the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Kopsho v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of one count of second-degree murder and two counts of attempted second-degree murder. Defendant appealed his second-degree murder conviction, arguing that he was entitled to relief because the jury instruction on the lesser included offense of manslaughter by act was erroneous. The district court concluded that the instruction did not constitute fundamental error. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because manslaughter as a matter of degree is a next lesser offense of second-degree murder, giving an erroneous instruction on manslaughter by act constitutes fundamental error even if manslaughter is not listed immediately below second-degree murder on the verdict form; (2) in this case, the error caused by a faulty instruction on manslaughter by act was not cured by the jury’s consideration of other offenses that were also one step removed; and (3) because the jury convicted Defendant of attempted second-degree murder after being erroneously instructed on attempted voluntary manslaughter, Defendant is entitled to a new trial for the attempted homicides. Remanded with instructions that Defendant be granted a new trial. View "Daugherty v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, kidnapping, and robbery. The jury recommended that Defendant be sentenced to death for the murder by a vote of nine to three. After concluding that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating circumstances, the trial court imposed the death penalty. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions but reversed the death sentence in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida and the Florida Supreme Court’s opinion on remand in Hurst v. State, holding that Defendant’s sentence was a result of a Hurst error, and the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Remanded for a new penalty phase. View "Williams v. State" on Justia Law