Justia Florida Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, two counts of kinapping, and two counts of robbery. The trial court imposed two sentences of death for each murder. The Supreme Court affirmed on appeal. Appellant later filed a motion for postconviction relief, raising twelve issues. After an evidentiary hearing conducted on two of Appellant’s claims, the postconviction court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the postconviction court did not err in denying Appellant’s claims that trial counsel was ineffective during the guilt phase, during the penalty phase, and during jury selection. View "Wade v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Norman McKenzie was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder. The trial court sentenced McKenzie to death for the murders. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences. McKenzie later filed a motion to vacate the convictions and sentences pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, asserting four claims. The postconviction court summarily denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing. McKenzie appealed and also petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) McKenzie’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, in which he presented several issues arising from his decision to represent himself during his capital criminal proceeding, was properly denied; (2) McKenzie was not entitled to a second proportionality review at the postconviction appellate stage for evidence he chose not to present during his capital trial; and (3) McKenzie was not entitled to relief on his claim that because he was mentally ill, to execute him would be unconstitutional. View "McKenzie v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder, attempted armed robbery, and grand theft of a motor vehicle. The trial court imposed a sentence of death for the murder conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed on appeal. Appellant later filed a motion for postconviction relief, alleging twelve claims. After an evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court denied Appellant’s motion to the extent that it requested a new guilt phase but granted the motion to the extent that it requested a new penalty phase. Appellant appealed and filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court affirmed the postconviction court’s order and denied Appellant’s habeas petition, holding (1) the postconviction court did not err in denying Appellant’s request for a new guilt phase trial; and (2) Appellant failed to establish that he was entitled to habeas corpus relief. View "Blake v. State" on Justia Law

In 2001, Petitioner was convicted for one count of first-degree murder and one count of home invasion robbery and sentenced to life imprisonment on the murder conviction. Since 2006, Petitioner filed at least twenty-three extraordinary writ petitions. The current case came before the Supreme Court on Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court denied Petitioner’s petition and expressly retained jurisdiction to pursue any possible sanctions against Petitioner based upon the volume of his meritless and inappropriate filings. After considering Petitioner’s response to the Court’s show cause order, the Court determined that the response failed to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed. The Court subsequently concluded that Petitioner’s habeas petition was a frivolous proceeding and instructed the Clerk of Court to reject any future pro se filings submitted by Petitioner. View "Clark v. Crews" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of three counts of attempted felony murder, which were predicated upon the underlying felony of attempted second-degree murder. As to each separate count, Defendant’s sole act was the discharge of a firearm at a group of individuals who were the victims of both the attempted felony murder and the attempted second-degree murder. The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed Defendant’s three convictions for attempted felony murder. The Supreme Court quashed the Third District’s decision, holding that while the act of discharging a firearm may be able to support attempted second-degree murder, the discharge of a firearm at the same individuals cannot support attempted felony murder, which requires the defendant to commit an “intentional act that is not an essential element of the underlying felony.” Remanded for a new trial on the underlying felony of attempted second-degree murder. View "Milton v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded no contest to two counts of first-degree murder and one count of sexual battery on a child under the age of twelve. After a capital penalty-phase trial, the trial court sentenced Appellant to death for the murder of his stepdaughter. The Governor signed the death warrant on September 22, 2014. Appellant subsequently filed a second successive motion for postconviction relief, presenting three claims. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant was not entitled to relief on his claim that postconviction counsel rendered ineffective assistance; (2) Appellant’s claim that Florida’s lethal injection protocol violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment did not warrant reconsideration of the Court’s prior decisions upholding the constitutionality of the current protocol; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining objections made by various agencies to Appellant’s public records requests. View "Banks v. State" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of lewd or lascivious battery. The circuit court sentenced Defendant to community control to be followed by seven years of sex offender probation. As an express condition of her plea agreement, Defendant agreed not to seek early termination of probation. Six years into her ten-year nonprison sentence, Defendant sought and was granted early termination of her probation. The State filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari. The Second District Court of Appeal granted the writ, acknowledging that the State had no statutory right of appeal in this case but that the State could seek certiorari review of the order terminating probation because the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of the law by violating the plea agreement, which called for no early termination. The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Second District, holding that the State did not have the right to petition the district court for certiorari review because the court lacked jurisdiction to review the circuit court’s order terminating Defendant’s probation. View "LaFave v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of theft of an amount greater than $20,000 but less than $100,000. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion for a mistrial, arguing that testimony elicited by the State during trial involving his failure to produce exculpatory evidence impermissibly shifted the burden of proof from the State to Defendant. The Third District affirmed, concluding that the State’s questioning of the lead detective assigned to investigate Defendant’s case involving Defendant’s failure to produce documentation during the detective’s pretrial investigation did not shift the burden of proof. The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Third District, holding that the State’s questioning of the detective constituted impermissible burden shifting because the testimony commented on Defendant’s failure to produce exculpatory evidence, which he had no legal duty to produce, and this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Remanded for a new trial. View "Warmington v. State" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the use of real time cell site location information to track a defendant violates the Fourth Amendment if probable cause was not provided to access and use that information. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence derived from the real time cell site information obtained from his cell phone for lack of probable cause. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the application for the order obtained by officers authorizing them to obtain the information did not contain a sufficient factual basis on which to issue a search warrant but that a warrant was not required to use Defendant’s real time cell site location data to track him on public streets where he had “no expectation of privacy.” The Fourth District affirmed. The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Fourth District, holding (1) Defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the location signals transmitted solely to enable the private and personal use of his cell phone, even on public roads, and therefore, probable cause was required; and (2) probable cause did not support the search in this case, and the evidence obtained as a result of this search was subject to suppression. Remanded. View "Tracey v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of lewd and lascivious molestation of a person younger than sixteen and aggravated stalking of a minor under the age of sixteen. Defendant was sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender (PRR) to consecutive sentences for each charge. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to correct a sentencing error, arguing that his PRR sentences were illegal because his two convictions arose from a single criminal episode. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion, concluding that even if Defendant’s convictions arose from a single criminal episode, Defendant could still receive consecutive PRR sentences. The First District Court of Appeal remanded for resentencing, holding that PRR sentences may not be ordered to run consecutively when the crimes were committed during a single criminal episode and that Defendant’s convictions arose from a single criminal episode. The Supreme Court quashed the First District’s decision, holding that a trial court may impose consecutive PRR sentences on a defendant for crimes committed during a single criminal episode. View "State v. Mosley" on Justia Law