Justia Florida Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of three counts of attempted felony murder, which were predicated upon the underlying felony of attempted second-degree murder. As to each separate count, Defendant’s sole act was the discharge of a firearm at a group of individuals who were the victims of both the attempted felony murder and the attempted second-degree murder. The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed Defendant’s three convictions for attempted felony murder. The Supreme Court quashed the Third District’s decision, holding that while the act of discharging a firearm may be able to support attempted second-degree murder, the discharge of a firearm at the same individuals cannot support attempted felony murder, which requires the defendant to commit an “intentional act that is not an essential element of the underlying felony.” Remanded for a new trial on the underlying felony of attempted second-degree murder. View "Milton v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded no contest to two counts of first-degree murder and one count of sexual battery on a child under the age of twelve. After a capital penalty-phase trial, the trial court sentenced Appellant to death for the murder of his stepdaughter. The Governor signed the death warrant on September 22, 2014. Appellant subsequently filed a second successive motion for postconviction relief, presenting three claims. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant was not entitled to relief on his claim that postconviction counsel rendered ineffective assistance; (2) Appellant’s claim that Florida’s lethal injection protocol violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment did not warrant reconsideration of the Court’s prior decisions upholding the constitutionality of the current protocol; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining objections made by various agencies to Appellant’s public records requests. View "Banks v. State" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of lewd or lascivious battery. The circuit court sentenced Defendant to community control to be followed by seven years of sex offender probation. As an express condition of her plea agreement, Defendant agreed not to seek early termination of probation. Six years into her ten-year nonprison sentence, Defendant sought and was granted early termination of her probation. The State filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari. The Second District Court of Appeal granted the writ, acknowledging that the State had no statutory right of appeal in this case but that the State could seek certiorari review of the order terminating probation because the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of the law by violating the plea agreement, which called for no early termination. The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Second District, holding that the State did not have the right to petition the district court for certiorari review because the court lacked jurisdiction to review the circuit court’s order terminating Defendant’s probation. View "LaFave v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of theft of an amount greater than $20,000 but less than $100,000. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion for a mistrial, arguing that testimony elicited by the State during trial involving his failure to produce exculpatory evidence impermissibly shifted the burden of proof from the State to Defendant. The Third District affirmed, concluding that the State’s questioning of the lead detective assigned to investigate Defendant’s case involving Defendant’s failure to produce documentation during the detective’s pretrial investigation did not shift the burden of proof. The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Third District, holding that the State’s questioning of the detective constituted impermissible burden shifting because the testimony commented on Defendant’s failure to produce exculpatory evidence, which he had no legal duty to produce, and this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Remanded for a new trial. View "Warmington v. State" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the use of real time cell site location information to track a defendant violates the Fourth Amendment if probable cause was not provided to access and use that information. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence derived from the real time cell site information obtained from his cell phone for lack of probable cause. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the application for the order obtained by officers authorizing them to obtain the information did not contain a sufficient factual basis on which to issue a search warrant but that a warrant was not required to use Defendant’s real time cell site location data to track him on public streets where he had “no expectation of privacy.” The Fourth District affirmed. The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Fourth District, holding (1) Defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the location signals transmitted solely to enable the private and personal use of his cell phone, even on public roads, and therefore, probable cause was required; and (2) probable cause did not support the search in this case, and the evidence obtained as a result of this search was subject to suppression. Remanded. View "Tracey v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of lewd and lascivious molestation of a person younger than sixteen and aggravated stalking of a minor under the age of sixteen. Defendant was sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender (PRR) to consecutive sentences for each charge. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to correct a sentencing error, arguing that his PRR sentences were illegal because his two convictions arose from a single criminal episode. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion, concluding that even if Defendant’s convictions arose from a single criminal episode, Defendant could still receive consecutive PRR sentences. The First District Court of Appeal remanded for resentencing, holding that PRR sentences may not be ordered to run consecutively when the crimes were committed during a single criminal episode and that Defendant’s convictions arose from a single criminal episode. The Supreme Court quashed the First District’s decision, holding that a trial court may impose consecutive PRR sentences on a defendant for crimes committed during a single criminal episode. View "State v. Mosley" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with several offenses, but the trial court entered an order declaring Defendant incompetent to proceed to trial. The trial court later held a competency hearing, during which defense counsel stipulated that Defendant was competent to proceed. The court did not enter a written order determining that Defendant was competent to proceed to trial, but the matter nevertheless proceeded to a jury trial. Defendant was found guilty of two charges. On appeal, Defendant argued that the lack of a written order adjudicating him competent required reversal of his conviction and a new trial. The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that the lack of a written order could be cured without a new trial because the trial court found Defendant competent based upon the stipulation of defense counsel. The Supreme Court quashed the judgment of the Fifth District in part, holding (1) Defendant’s stipulation as to his own competency did not absolve the trial court from its duty to independently make a determination of Defendant’s competency to proceed; and (2) the remedy for such a violation depends upon the circumstances of each case. View "Dougherty v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, kidnapping, and sexual battery. Defendant was sentenced to death for the murder conviction. On appeal, Defendant challenged only the propriety of the death sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentence of death, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; (2) the trial court did not fail to remain neutral during the penalty-phase proceedings; (3) the trial court’s findings on aggravators and mitigators were not in error with the exception of its finding of an avoid arrest aggravator, which error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; (4) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claim that his death sentence was unconstitutional based on Ring v. Arizona; and (5) the death sentence in this case was a proportionate penalty. View "Davis v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of felony petit theft and sentenced to five years in prison. Defendant’s offense was subject to the Criminal Punishment Code, but Defendant was entitled to a nonstate prison sanction unless the court made written findings that doing so could present a danger to the public. Defendant appealed and filed a motion to correct sentencing error, arguing that because the trial court failed to enter written findings as required by Fla. Stat. 775.082(10), the upward departure sentence must be vacated and he must be resentenced to a nonstate prison sentence. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeal held that the sentence was erroneous because the trial court failed to file the required written findings to support a departure. The court remanded for resentencing, concluding that the trial court may again impose a departure sentence on remand. The Supreme Court quashed the decision below, holding that when any upward departure sentence is vacated, a guidelines sentence must be imposed on remand. View "Bryant v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. The trial court subsequently ordered a new trial, after which Appellant was again convicted of murder and sentenced to death. Appellant later filed a postconviction motion. The postconviction court ultimately denied Appellant’s postconviction motion. Appellant appealed the denial of his postconviction motion and filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court affirmed the postconviction court’s denial of Appellant’s claims and denied habeas corpus relief, holding (1) the postconviction court properly found that Appellant was competent to proceed with his postconviction proceedings, correctly denied Appellant’s prosecutorial misconduct claim, and properly denied Appellant’s claim of a Brady violation; and (2) Appellant was not entitled to habeas relief based on his claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. View "Huggins v. State" on Justia Law