Justia Florida Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around Jennifer Ripple, who married Richard Counter after he was diagnosed with mesothelioma, a disease allegedly caused by asbestos exposure from the 1950s to the 1990s. Counter filed a personal injury complaint against multiple defendants, claiming negligence and strict liability. After Counter's death, Ripple, as the personal representative of Counter's estate, amended the complaint to wrongful death claims under the Florida Wrongful Death Act. The estate sought damages for Ripple under section 768.21(2) of the Act, which allows a surviving spouse to recover for loss of companionship and mental pain and suffering from the date of injury.The trial court granted the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Ripple could not recover damages under section 768.21(2) because she was not married to Counter at the time of his alleged asbestos exposure. The court based its decision on Florida's common law rule that a party must have been legally married to the injured person at the time of the injury to assert a claim for loss of consortium. The trial court also granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the claim of Counter's adult children, concluding that Ripple was Counter's surviving spouse, thus barring the children from recovery under section 768.21(3) of the Act.The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision regarding Ripple's claim but reversed the decision regarding the adult children's claim. The district court held that Ripple could not recover damages as a surviving spouse under section 768.21(2) because she was not married to Counter at the time of his injury.The Supreme Court of Florida disagreed with the lower courts' decisions. The court held that a spouse who married the decedent after the injury can recover damages as a surviving spouse under section 768.21(2). The court rejected the argument that the common law "marriage before injury" rule bars recovery under section 768.21(2). Consequently, the court approved the holding in Domino’s Pizza, LLC v. Wiederhold, where the Fifth District Court of Appeal held that a spouse who married the decedent after the injury can recover damages as a surviving spouse under section 768.21(2). The court concluded that Jennifer Ripple can recover as a surviving spouse under section 768.21(2). View "Ripple v. CBS Corporation" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Florida reviewed a decision from the Fifth District Court of Appeal related to the termination of a father's parental rights. The father, identified as C.C., had been convicted 18 times over a 15-year period, including for domestic violence, arson, and driving while intoxicated. He was repeatedly incarcerated, leading to his lack of involvement in the life of his son, L.A., who was taken into state custody shortly after his birth due to his mother's physical abuse of his older brother. Despite minimal involvement in L.A.'s life, C.C. challenged the termination of his parental rights, arguing that the termination was not the least restrictive means of protecting L.A.The trial court had concluded that C.C.'s repeated incarceration, token support, and failure to maintain a substantial and positive relationship with L.A. constituted abandonment, and that his repeated incarceration and unavailability presented a risk of harm to L.A., despite his receipt of services. On appeal, the Fifth District Court of Appeal concluded that C.C. should have been provided with a case plan and the opportunity to comply with it before his parental rights were terminated.The Supreme Court of Florida disagreed with the Fifth District's decision, finding that it had improperly reweighed the evidence. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's determination that termination was the least restrictive means of protecting L.A. was supported by competent, substantial evidence, and it remanded the case to the Sixth District to affirm the trial court's order terminating C.C.'s parental rights. The court emphasized that the paramount concern was the welfare of the child and that despite the services provided to C.C., he had not been able to overcome the issues that led to L.A.'s dependency. View "Statewide Guardian ad Litem Office v. C.C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's pro se petition for a writ of prohibition challenging the trial court's rulings in criminal cases and a separate civil case, holding that Petitioner failed to show cause why he should not be pro se barred for his repeated misuse of the Court's limited resources.Petitioner, an inmate whose most recent conviction was for possession of a controlled substance, began filing petitions in the Supreme Court in 2018 pertaining to several different criminal cases and a dependency case regarding his children. Petitioner filed the instant prohibition petition challenging the trial court's denial of a motion and seeking to dismiss the case. The Supreme Court denied the petition and directed Petitioner to show cause why he should not be barred from filing further pro se requests for relief. The Supreme Court then sanctioned Petitioner, holding that Petitioner had abused the Court's limited judicial resources. View "Hill v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Petitioner, who was ordered to show cause why she should not be further sanctioned and barred from filing any pro se pleadings in the Supreme Court, had abused the Court's limited judicial resources and directed the Clerk of Court to reject any future pleadings or other requests for relief submitted by Petitioner, unless such filings were signed by a member in good standing of The Florida Bar. The Court further denied any pending motions or requests for relief, holding that based on Petitioner's history of filing pro se petitions and requests for relief that were meritless or otherwise inappropriate for appellate review, Petitioner failed to show cause why she should not be sanctioned. View "A.C. v. Dep't of Children & Families" on Justia Law

In this action filed by Samuel Levy seeking to compel his former wife, Einath Levy, to comply with the parties' property settlement and support agreement (PSA), the Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal affirming the judgment of the trial court denying Einath's request for prevailing-party attorney's fees pursuant to Fla. Stat. Ann. 57.105(7), holding that section 57.105(7) did not apply to the attorney's fee provision in this case.In 2011, the marriage of Samuel and Einath was dissolved. The judgment incorporated two agreements between the parties, including the PSA. Each agreement included an attorney's fee provision. Later, Samuel filed a motion to compel Einath to comply with the PSA and requested attorney's fees based on the fee provision in the PSA. Einath, in turn, requested attorney's fees for defending the motion. The magistrate concluded that Einath prevailed in defending against the motion but denied her request for fees under the PSA. The Third District reversed in part, concluding that section 57.105(7) required that Einath be awarded attorney's fees. The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Third District, holding that section 57.105(7) did not apply to the attorney's fee provision in this case. View "Levy v. Levy" on Justia Law

In this certified conflict case, the Supreme Court held that a final judgment that modifies a preexisting parenting plan does not need to give a parent "concrete steps" to restore lost time-sharing and return to the premodification status quo.The parties in this case, the unmarried parents of a minor child, entered into a paternity agreement and parenting plan that was incorporated in a final judgment. Father later filed a petition to modify the parties' original parenting plan. The court entered a final judgment modifying the parenting plan. Mother appealed, arguing that the lower court's order was legally flawed because it lacked "concrete steps" that Mother could work toward to regain her lost timesharing. The court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court approved the decision below, holding that Mother's arguments in favor of a concrete steps requirement failed. View "C.N. v. I.G.C." on Justia Law

The biological father has standing to rebut the common law presumption that the mother’s husband is the legal father of a child born to an intact marriage - or the “presumption of legitimacy” - when he has “manifested a substantial and continuing concern” for the welfare of the child. **See Kendrick v. Everheart, 390 So. 2d 53, 61 (Fla. 1980).The biological father (Father) of a child filed a petition to establish paternity, child support, and timesharing. Mother moved to dismiss the action, arguing that it was barred by the common law presumption of legitimacy because she was married at the time of the child’s birth and remained married. The circuit court concluded that it was constrained by Fourth District precedent to dismiss the petition as a matter of law. The Fourth District reversed, concluding that the presumption of legitimacy should not be applied to bar this action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the the presumption of legitimacy does not create an absolute bar to an action by a biological father to establish parental rights when the child’s mother was married at the time of the child’s birth and both she and her husband object to the action. View "Simmonds v. Perkins" on Justia Law

Where the right to contract has been removed under Fla. Stat. 744.3215(2)(a), the ward is not required to obtain court approval prior to exercising the right to marry, but court approval is necessary before such a marriage can be given legal effect. Under section 744.3215(2)(a), even when a guardianship court does not remove an incapacitated person’s right to marry, the right to marry becomes subject to court approval when his or her right to contract has been removed. At issue was whether court approval must be obtained before the incapacitated person marries. The Supreme Court answered the question certified to it by the Fourth District Court of Appeal by holding (1) any marriage entered into by a ward whose right to contract has been removed without court approval is invalid; but (2) section 744.3215(2)(a) does not prevent the ward or the intended spouse from seeking court approval after marrying in order to ratify the marriage. View "Smith v. Smith" on Justia Law

B.R.C.M., an unaccompanied minor from Guatemala, illegally entered the United States at age thirteen and was released to his godmother as a sponsor. Thereafter, a private petition was filed on behalf of B.R.C.M. alleging three grounds for adjudication of dependency under Fla. Stat. 39.01(15). The circuit court denied the petition after a hearing during which the court made no factual findings. The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the summary denial of the petition, concluding that B.R.C.M. was not entitled to the protections of Chapter 39 because he was not “truly” abandoned, abused, or neglected and because his petition was filed for the sole purpose of seeking an immigration status. The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Third District, holding that B.R.C.M.’s private petition for dependency warranted individualized consideration and adjudication rather than summary denial. Remanded. View "B.R.C.M. v. Florida Department of Children & Families" on Justia Law

Before their marriage, the parties entered into a prenuptial agreement providing that, upon dissolution, each party would retain his or her premarital assets and any appreciation of those assets. Following a twenty-three-year marriage, Wife petitioned for dissolution of marriage. The property dispute in this case resulted from the trial court’s equitable distribution of two pieces of residential real property. In its amended final judgment the trial court concluded that these properties were marital assets. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s determination as to one property but concluded that the trial court erred in finding that Wife had an interest in the other property by virtue of an interspousal gift. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and quashed in part the Fourth District’s decision and reinstated the trial court’s amended final judgment, holding (1) the appropriate standard of review is competent, substantial evidence, and in this case, the Fourth District improperly reweighed the evidence under a preponderance of the evidence standard; and (2) the record contains competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court’s findings that both properties at issue were marital and therefore subject to equitable distribution. View "Hooker v. Hooker" on Justia Law