Justia Florida Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder. After a retrial, Defendant was again convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence, holding (1) the admission of testimony from Defendant's first trial did not violate Defendant's right to confrontation or to due process; (2) the trial court did not err in admitting a suicide note Defendant wrote while incarcerated; (3) the evidence was sufficient to support a first-degree murder conviction; (4) the trial court did not err in rejecting a proposed statutory mental mitigator; and (5) Defendant's death sentence was proportional in this case. View "Bolin v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant constructed a bomb with the specific purpose of killing a witness, but the bomb instead detonated and killed a highway patrol trooper. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and of making, possessing, placing, or discharging a destructive device or bomb. Defendant was sentenced to death. After the execution was set for February 26, 2013, Defendant filed a successive motion for postconviction relief, which the trial court summarily denied. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Defendant's motion for postconviction relief and denied Defendant's motion for a stay of execution, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to remove appointed registry counsel; (2) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motions to appoint experts and investigators; (3) the trial court did not err in finding that lethal injection did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment; and (4) Defendant failed to show that there were substantial grounds upon which relief might be granted regarding his application for a stay of execution. View "Howell v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with attempted first-degree murder. The jury was instructed on lesser included offenses, including attempted manslaughter by act. The instruction was given consistent with the standard instruction. Defendant was ultimately convicted of attempted second-degree murder. Defendant appealed, contending that giving the instruction constituted fundamental error similar to that found by the Supreme Court in State v. Montgomery, in which the Court held that giving the standard jury instruction for the completed crime of manslaughter by act - which required the jury to find that the defendant intended to kill the victim - was fundamental error when the defendant was convicted of an offense not more than one step removed from manslaughter because the manslaughter instruction does not require an intent to kill. The Supreme Court accepted certification to answer questions of law and held (1) the standard jury instruction on attempted manslaughter constitutes fundamental error where the defendant is convicted of an offense not more than one step removed from attempted manslaughter; and (2) the offense of attempted manslaughter remains a viable offense. View "Williams v. State" on Justia Law

A nursing home patient (Decedent) signed an agreement providing for arbitration of disputes arising out of treatment and care at the nursing home. Decedent subsequently died, allegedly through the nursing home's negligence. Through Decedent's personal representative, Decedent's survivors (Plaintiffs) subsequently brought a cause of action for deprivation of rights under the applicable nursing home statute and, alternatively, a wrongful death action. At issue on appeal was whether an arbitration agreement signed by the decedent requires his estate and heirs to arbitrate their wrongful death claims. The court of appeal concluded that the estate and heirs were bound by the arbitration agreement but certified a question to the Supreme Court. The Court approved of the court of appeal's decision and answered that the execution of a nursing home arbitration agreement by a patient with capacity to contract binds the patient's estate and statutory heirs in a subsequent wrongful death action arising from an alleged tort within the scope of the valid arbitration agreement. View "Laizure v. Avante at Leesburg, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was tried on the charge of second-degree murder. The jury was instructed without objection as to the lesser included offense of manslaughter, which included the instructions on manslaughter by act and manslaughter by culpable negligence. Defendant was found guilty of second-degree murder. Defendant appealed, alleging that fundamental error occurred when the jury was given the then-standard jury instruction on manslaughter by act, which the Supreme Court held to be fundamental error in State v. Montgomery. The Supreme Court accepted review in this case to answer a question certified to it by the court of appeal. The Court answered by holding that giving the erroneous manslaughter by act instruction is also fundamental error even if the instruction on manslaughter by culpable negligence is given where the evidence supports manslaughter by act but does not support culpable negligence, and the defendant is convicted of second-degree murder. View "Haygood v. State" on Justia Law

This case arose out alleged defamatory statements an attorney (Attorney) allegedly took in the course of investigating an underlying defamation action he was hired to defend. The legal issue was whether absolute immunity applied to Attorney's alleged defamatory statements, which were made during ex-parte, out-of-course questioning of a potential, nonparty witness. The court of appeal concluded that absolute immunity applied to Attorney's statements. The Supreme Court quashed the court of appeal's decision and held (1) Florida's absolute privilege was never intended to sweep so broadly as to provide absolute immunity from liability to an attorney under the circumstances presented here; and (2) a qualified privilege instead should apply to ex-parte, out-of-court statements, so long as the alleged defamatory statements bear some relation to the subject of inquiry in the underlying lawsuit. View "DelMonico v. Traynor" on Justia Law

Defendant, who had defaulted on his mortgage, sought to have a notice of voluntary dismissal of the mortgage foreclosure action struck and the case reinstated for the trial court to then dismiss the action with prejudice as a sanction to the mortgage holder for allegedly filing fraudulent documentation regarding ownership of the mortgage note. The court of appeal held that a trial court lacks the authority to set aside a plaintiff's notice of voluntary dismissal at the request of a defendant where the plaintiff has not obtained any affirmative relief before dismissing the case. The Supreme Court accepted certification to answer a question of public importance and held that when a defendant alleges fraud on the court as a basis for seeking to set aside a plaintiff's voluntary dismissal, the trial court has jurisdiction to reinstate the dismissed action only when the fraud, if proven, resulted in the plaintiff securing affirmative relief to the detriment of the defendant and, upon obtaining that relief, voluntarily dismissing the case to prevent the trial court from undoing the improperly obtained relief. View "Pino v. Bank of New York" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted and sentenced for lewd and lascivious molestation on a victim under twelve years of age by an offender eighteen years of age or older and for failure to appear. Defendant appealed, arguing that certain comments made by a prosecutor during closing argument were improper. The court of appeal affirmed, holding, among other things, that because the victim's age was not an issue which only Defendant was capable of refuting, the prosecutor's comment in regard to the victim's age could not be construed as a comment on Defendant's right to remain silent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the prosecutor's comment did not constitute an improper comment on Defendant's right to remain silent; (2) the court of appeal erred in holding that a second comment likewise did not constitute an improper comment on Defendant's right to remain silent and that two additional comments constituted improper burden shifting; but (3) the objections to the improper comments were not preserved for appellate review, and because the comments did not constitute fundamental error, they did not require reversal. View "Bell v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was sentenced to death for the 2000 murders of an elderly couple. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's convictions but reversed the death sentences and remanded for a new penalty phase. After a new penalty phase, the trial court followed the jury's recommendation and imposed two death sentences for the murders. The Supreme Court affirmed the sentences, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) finding that Appellant was not mentally retarded; (2) admitting a video of a statement Appellant made to law enforcement; (3) instructing the jury on its advisory role and denying Appellant's proposed instruction regarding victim impact evidence; (4) allowing the prosecution to cross-examine mental health experts regarding their knowledge of the facts surrounding the murders; and (5) considering and weighing several aggravators and mitigators. Lastly, the Court found that the prosecutor made permissible comments at closing argument and that the death sentence was proportionate in this case. View "Snelgrove v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioners and Respondents entered into a contract for the purchase of real property owned by Petitioners, twenty-five percent of which constituted wetlands. Respondents filed an action against Petitioners for fraudulent misrepresentation, alleging that in the advertisement for the sale of the property, Petitioners knowingly and falsely misrepresented that the property had no wetlands. Petitioners moved to dismiss, asserting that the fraud claim arose out of, and was related to, the contract, and therefore, the claim fell within the arbitration provision of the contract. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the action based on fraud was not a dispute subject to arbitration under the contract. The Supreme Court quashed the decision below and concluded that the fraud action had a contractual nexus with, and a significant relationship to, the contract between Petitioners and Respondents and was, as a general principle, within the scope of the contract's broad arbitration provision. Remanded. View "Jackson v. Shakespeare Found., Inc." on Justia Law