Justia Florida Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The State filed a petition for delinquency against Minor, alleging that Minor had violated Fla. Stat. Ann. 810.097(2) by trespassing on the grounds of a middle school after having been warned by the principal or designee. The two individuals who gave warnings to Minor were school police officers. The trial court denied Minor's motion and adjudged Minor delinquent. The district court affirmed. Minor appealed, contending (1) the State failed to prove that either of the warning officers was a designee of the school's principal; and (2) because the designee status of the warning individual is an element of the trespass offense under section 810.097(2), the State had failed to prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the district court and remanded the case, holding (1) the record did not contain competent, substantial evidence to support the finding that the officers were designees of the school's principal for purposes of section 810.097(2); and (2) therefore, the district court erred in affirming the trial court's adjudication of Minor's delinquency because an essential element of the offense was not supported by competent, substantial evidence. View "J.R. v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of the first-degree murder of Officer Donna Fitzgerald. Fitzgerald's body was found in the paint room at Tomoka Correctional Institute (TCI). After Defendant, an inmate at TCI, was apprehended by TCI personnel, Defendant repeated, "I freaked out. I snapped. I killed her." The trial court imposed the sentence of death. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence, holding (1) the trial court properly denied Defendant's motion to suppress his confessions; (2) the trial court did not err in admitting opinion testimony of the medical examiner regarding the sequence of wounds and position of the victim; (3) the trial court's finding of a certain aggravator was in error, but the error was harmless; (5) the death sentence was appropriate; and (6) Florida's death sentencing scheme is not unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona. View "Hall v. State" on Justia Law

Convicted of first-degree murder for causing the 2007 death of McKinness, Hampton was sentenced to death following the jury’s recommendation by a vote of nine to three. Hampton filed several motions seeking relief based on the allegation that one of the jurors was “under prosecution” at the time of his jury service. The trial court denied the motions. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and the proportionality of the death sentence. View "Hampton v. State of Florida" on Justia Law

Section 893.13 of the Florida Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, provided that “it is unlawful for any person to sell, manufacture, or deliver, or possess with intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver, a controlled substance… or … to be in actual or constructive possession of a controlled substance.” The law did not specify the mental state required for conviction. In prior decisions, the Florida Supreme Court determined that knowledge of the presence of the substance and knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance were required. In response, the Legislature, in 2011, stated that the decisions were contrary to legislative intent. “The Legislature finds that knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled substance is not an element of any offense under this chapter. Lack of knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled substance is an affirmative defense.” The statute does not eliminate the element of knowledge of the presence of the substance. Since the enactment, each court of appeal has ruled that the statute does not violate requirements of due process. The U.S. District Court (M.D. Fla.) concluded, however, that it is unconstitutional. Based on that decision, a trial court dismissed a case under the Act. The Florida Supreme Court reversed. View "State of Florida v. Adkins" on Justia Law

The Florida Bar filed a complaint against Knowles, alleging misconduct relating to her representation of a client in immigration and civil matters. Specifically, the Bar cited Rules Regulating the Florida Bar 4-1.3 (diligence), 4-1.6 (confidentiality of information), 4-3.3 (candor toward the tribunal), 4-8.4(c) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and 4-8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). In a motion to withdraw as attorney of record, Knowles had made disparaging statements about the client; she then told the client that she would continue the representation only if the client paid an additional $1,500. When the client decided to retain new counsel, Knowles made additional claims, including telling the Department of Homeland Security that she had reason to believe her client would lie to the Immigration Court. Knowles disclosed confidential paperwork pertaining to the client’s political asylum case; failed to appear at mediation in the client’s injury case, and failed to advise her client that a final judgment had been entered. A referee recommended that Knowles be suspended from the practice of law for 90days and attend the Florida Bar’s Ethics School and a professionalism workshop. The Florida Supreme Court concluded that a one-year suspension was the appropriate sanction. View "Florida Bar v. Knowles" on Justia Law

Judge Nelson was observed driving a vehicle erratically, weaving between lanes, striking a guardrail several times, and ultimately crashing on a bridge. After initially identifying herself as a judge to the police officer at the scene, she explained to the officer that she lost control of the vehicle because she was talking on her cellular phone. However, the officer smelled alcohol on her breath, and noticed that her eyes were glassy and bloodshot. Her clothes were in disarray. At first, Judge Nelson was unable to tell the officer where she was coming from or where she was going, but she later recalled that she may have been at a restaurant. She refused to exit the vehicle and refused to submit to field sobriety exercises. Judge Nelson was taken to the county jail where she refused to submit to a breathalyzer test. The Notice of Formal Charges stated that these acts, if they occurred as alleged, were in violation of Canons 1 and 2A of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The Florida Supreme Court recommended a sanction of public reprimand. View "Inquiry Concerning A Judge" on Justia Law

Defendant was sentenced to death for a drug-related 1988 murder. The Florida Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's denial of post-conviction relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase. Counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate, develop, and present available mitigating evidence that would have legally precluded the trial court from overriding the jury's life recommendation. The evidence in question concerned the abuse defendant endured at the hands of his father and the extremely negative influence his father had on his life and that from a young age he witnessed violent acts being committed against his mother and others, including witnessing others being killed. View "Robinson v. State of Florida" on Justia Law

Delhall, was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, unlawful use of a firearm, unlawful discharge of the firearm resulting in death or serious bodily harm, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. At the jury trial the State presented evidence that Delhall murdered the victim because he was, at that time, the only known eyewitness to the murder of another individual (Bennett) with which Delhall’s brother was charged. The jury recommended a death sentence by a vote of eight to four, and the trial court entered an order sentencing Delhall to death. The Florida Supreme Court vacated the sentence, stating that the prosecutor, “by her overzealous and unfair advocacy, appeared to be committed to winning a death recommendation rather than simply seeking justice.” Her improper advocacy continued even after an objection was sustained. In one instance, the judge was forced to step in and specifically admonish her to stop it. Cumulative errors fundamentally tainted the guilt phase, which was especially significant in view of the fact that the jury recommended death by a vote of eight to four, a recommendation that was far from unanimous. View "Delhall v. State of Florida" on Justia Law

Butler was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death for the 1997 murder of his former girlfriend. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and death sentence on direct appeal. Butler filed a motion to vacate his conviction and death sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. The post-conviction court held three evidentiary hearings and denied relief. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting claims that appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to file a petition for certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court; appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by abandoning the claim that a witness was incompetent to testify at trial; Florida’s lethal injection protocol constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; and Butler’s right against cruel and unusual punishment will be violated because he may be incompetent at the time of execution. View "utler v. State of Florida" on Justia Law

Based on unethical actions during the 2004-2005 hurricane season, the Legislature enacted Section 626.854(6), Florida Statutes: A public adjuster may not directly or indirectly through any other person or entity initiate contact or engage in face-to-face or telephonic solicitation or enter into a contract with any insured or claimant under an insurance policy until at least 48 hours after the occurrence of an event that may be the subject of a claim under the insurance policy unless contact is initiated by the insured or claimant. An adjuster sued. The trial court upheld the law, accepting an interpretation that it prohibited only in-person or telephonic communication, that it primarily regulates conduct, not speech, and furthers an important governmental interest. The appeals court reversed, finding that the section regulates commercial speech and that the Department failed to demonstrate that prohibiting property owners from receiving information from public adjusters for 48 hours is justified by the possibility that some public adjuster may unduly pressure traumatized victims or otherwise engage in unethical behavior. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute unconstitutionally restricts commercial speech and was not narrowly tailored to serve interests in ensuring ethical conduct by public adjusters and protecting homeowners. View "Atwater v. Kortum" on Justia Law