Justia Florida Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This appeal arose from a motion for class certification filed in the trial court by petitioner where petitioner claimed that respondent violated sections 627.840(3)(b) and 627.835, Florida Statutes, by knowingly overcharging him an additional service charge of $20 twice in a twelve month period in two premium finance agreements which he entered into with respondent. At issue was whether the putative class members satisfied the requirements of commonality and predominance needed for class certification under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.220. The court held that the Third District's decision was incorrect because it afforded no deference to the trial court's actual factual findings and conducted a de novo review which constituted error where the proper appellate standard of review for a grant of class certification was abuse of discretion. The court also held that the Third District incorrectly addressed whether petition satisfied section 627.835's "knowingly" requirement and incorrectly held that petitioner and the putative class members failed to satisfy rule 1.220's commonality and predominance requirements. Therefore, the court held that the Third District created conflict with Olen Properties Corp. v. Moss and Smith v. Glen Cove Apartments Condominiums Master Ass'n. Accordingly, the court quashed the Third District's judgment. View "Sosa, etc. v. Safeway Premium Fin. Co., etc." on Justia Law

Parents of a minor child sued defendants for the permanent and substantial brain injury of their child. The issue in these consolidated cases was whether the parents were precluded from suing in a court of law for damages sustained by alleged malpractice and instead were required to pursue limited compensation in an administrative forum provided by the statute under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan (NICA plan). The court held that because the First District failed to read the phrase "immediate postdelivery period" as modifying "resuscitation," the First District expanded the NICA plan to cover infants beyond the limit contemplated by the express language of the statute. The court also held that the First District incorrectly held that under section 766.309(1)(a), Florida Statutes, the rebuttable presumption of coverage under the NICA plan applied to benefit defendants, even though plaintiffs were not making a claim for compensation under the NICA plan. Accordingly, in reviewing the facts under the correct interpretation of the statute, the court held that the ALJ's finding that the child did not sustain a "birth-related neurological injury" under the NICA plan was supported by competent, substantial evidence. View "Bennett, et al. v. St. Vincent's Med. Center, Inc., et al.; FL Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Assoc. v. St. Vincent's Med. Center, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff suffered a stroke with devastating consequences, leaving him with permanent paralysis and aphasia. Following a jury trial on his claim of medical malpractice, plaintiff received a jury verdict that awarded substantial damages to him and his wife. At issue was whether the Second District permissibly reweighed the testimony presented by plaintiff's expert witness as to whether the conduct of the hospital and emergency room doctor caused him to suffer devastating damages as a result of the stroke. The court held that it was within the jury's province to evaluate the expert's credibility and weigh her testimony and that the Second District misapplied the court's precedent by reweighing the evidence and rejecting the expert's explanation. Accordingly, the court quashed the Second District's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cox, et al. v. St. Joseph's Hospital, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder, armed burglary, attempted sexual battery, and armed robbery, and sentenced to death. Defendant appealed the circuit court's denial of his motion to vacate his conviction and sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, raising eleven claims. Defendant also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, raising nine claims. The court discussed and disposed of each claim and subsequently affirmed the circuit court's judgment and denied defendant's habeas petition. View "Barwick v. State; Barwick v. Buss, etc." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder of his step-daughter and sentenced to death. At issue was whether the trial court erred in admitting collateral crime evidence; whether the trial court erred in finding the cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP) aggravator; and whether the death sentence was proportionate. The court held that the collateral crime evidence that defendant was engaged in an illegal sexual relationship with his stepdaughter's minor daughter was relevant to establish motive and inextricably intertwined with the testimony of the chain of events. The court also held that the CCP aggravator was supported by competent, substantial evidence. The court held, however, that the death penalty was disproportionate in light of the circumstances and in light of three statutory mitigating factors: (1) the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time the capital felony was committed; (2) the capacity of defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired; and (3) the age of the defendant. Accordingly, the court confirmed the conviction but vacated the sentence of death and reduced defendant's sentence to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.View "Ballard v. State" on Justia Law

The State sought review of the district court's reversal of defendant's convictions for possession of cocaine for sale. At issue was whether the district court erred in refusing to consider the State's argument on appeal that the evidence was legally discovered following a proper investigatory stop because the theory had not been raised in the trial court. The court held that the Fourth District's refusal to consider the state's theory expressly and directly conflicted with Dade County School Board v. Radio Station WQBA, which held that "an appellee, in arguing for the affirmance of a judgment, is not limited to legal arguments expressly asserted as grounds for the judgment in the court below." Therefore, the court concluded that the Fourth District properly determined that the factual circumstances of the case supported the trial court's conclusion that police officers had probable cause to search defendant. Accordingly, the Fourth District's decision was quashed. View "State v. Hankerson" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a company that processed perlite for horticultural and construction use, sued respondent alleging several counts for damages based on the claim that natural gas being supplied to petitioner was contaminated with debris that caused damage to petitioner's furnaces. Discovery and trial preparation were undertaken, during which time the parties engaged in numerous disagreements concerning discovery and other matters. Neither party filed a motion to have the case reset for trial and respondent subsequently filed a notice of lack of prosecution under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(e), alleging that there had been no record activity for the prior ten months. At issue was the proper interpretation of rule 1.420(e), which provided for involuntary dismissal of court actions for lack of prosecution. The court held that the filing made by petitioner during the sixty-day grace period set forth in rule 1.420(e) met the rule's requirement for record activity and therefore, precluded dismissal for lack of prosecution. Accordingly, the court quashed the decision of the First District and approved the conflict cases certified by the First District. View "Chemrock Corp. v. Tampa Elec. Co., etc. " on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the postconviction court's order denying his motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 to vacate his first degree murder convictions and sentences of death. Defendant also petitioned the court for a writ of habeas corpus where defendant's convictions and sentences stemmed from the murder of his estranged wife, the murder of her parents, the burning of the parents' house with the victims' bodies still in it, and the theft of the wife's vehicle. Defendant raised nine guilt phase issues and three penalty phase issues on appeal. Defendant also filed a habeas corpus petition, raising six issues. The court addressed each issue and consequently affirmed the postconviction court's order denying defendant's rule 3.850 motion for relief and denied defendant's habeas petition. View "Pittman v. State; Pittman v. Buss, etc." on Justia Law

This case arose from certain hurricane damage claims made by respondent under a 2004 insurance policy issued by respondent's original insurer. When the original insurer became insolvent, the Florida Insurance Guaranty Association (FIGA) then became obligated to respond to certain claims made under that insurance policy. At issue was the proper test to be utilized by a court when determining whether a statute could be applied retroactively, in this case to a contract of insurance. The court held that the court's precedents both before and after the Fourth District's decision required the court to engage in a two-pronged inquiry to determine if the 2005 amendments to section 627.7016, Fla. Stat., were to be applied retroactively. Thus, the Fourth District misapplied this precedent when it omitted the first inquiry into whether the Legislature clearly expressed an intent that the statute be applied retroactively and moved directly to the second inquiry, whether retroactive application would be constitutional. For this reason, and because there was no clear evidence of legislative intent for retroactivity, the court quashed the decision of the Fourth District to the extent it was inconsistent with the opinion and remanded for further proceedings. View "Florida Ins. Guar. Assoc., Inc. v. Devon Neighborhood Assoc., Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his three consecutive life sentences from convictions stemming from the armed robbery of an older couple in their home, followed by an incident involving a taxicab outside the couple's home shortly after the home invasion. At issue was whether the trial court improperly designated him as an habitual violent felony (HVFO) offender based on prior convictions that were entered on the same day. The court held that based on the statutory language of section 775.084, Fla. Stat., only one qualifying prior felony was required for an HVFO adjudication, and therefore it did not matter whether the qualifying prior felony conviction was adjudicated together with, or separate from, other felonies, so long as the qualifying felony conviction was entered separately from and prior to the current offense. Therefore, once the State established that defendant had one qualifying prior felony, he was properly sentenced as an HVFO and the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Ponton v. State" on Justia Law