Justia Florida Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Government & Administrative Law
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The case revolves around a dispute between Pinellas County and Pasco County in Florida. Pinellas County owns approximately 12,400 acres of real estate in neighboring Pasco County. Although Pinellas County once paid ad valorem taxes to Pasco County for the property, it now asserts that sovereign immunity relieves it of that obligation. Pinellas County filed a lawsuit against the Pasco County Property Appraiser, seeking a judgment declaring the property immune from ad valorem taxes and an injunction prohibiting future assessment and collection of such taxes.The trial court ruled in favor of Pinellas County, holding that as a political subdivision of the state, Pinellas County is entitled to sovereign immunity, which includes immunity from the ad valorem taxation of its properties, regardless of whether those properties are located within the boundaries of Pinellas County or in another county within the state of Florida. The Pasco County Property Appraiser appealed this decision.The Second District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's ruling. The district court noted that each county has statutory and constitutional authority to assess ad valorem taxes on “all property in the county.” The district court also rejected Pinellas County’s primary contention that its immunity from taxation extends beyond its own borders, noting that Pinellas County had not identified any supporting authority.The Supreme Court of Florida disagreed with Pinellas County's argument that its property in Pasco County was not taxable based on principles of sovereign immunity. The court held that although a county’s real property is immune from that county’s own efforts to assess ad valorem taxes, Pinellas County has not identified any authority recognizing an immunity from taxation of the county’s property located beyond its territorial boundaries. Therefore, the court concluded that sovereign immunity does not shield a county from the obligation of paying ad valorem taxes for property owned by that county but located outside its territorial boundaries. The court approved the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal. View "Pinellas County, Florida v. Joiner" on Justia Law

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The case revolves around Monique H. Worrell, who was suspended from her position as State Attorney for the Ninth Judicial Circuit by Governor Ron DeSantis through Executive Order 23-160. The order alleged that during Worrell's tenure, the administration of criminal justice in the Ninth Circuit was fundamentally derelict, constituting both neglect of duty and incompetence. The order detailed that Worrell authorized or allowed charging practices that permitted violent offenders, drug traffickers, serious juvenile offenders, and pedophiles to evade incarceration when otherwise warranted under Florida law. It also alleged that Worrell authorized or allowed practices that prevented assistant state attorneys from seeking certain sentencing enhancements and limited charges for possession of child pornography.The Florida Constitution allows the governor to suspend any state officer not subject to impeachment for neglect of duty or incompetence. Worrell, not being subject to impeachment, was constitutionally subject to suspension. The Florida Senate has the power to remove from office or reinstate the suspended official.The Supreme Court of Florida's role was to determine whether the governor had met the constitutional mandate to state the grounds of the officer's suspension. The court's review was deferential, confirming that the governor had specified the applicable grounds for suspension and that the allegations in the suspension order bore a reasonable relation to the asserted basis for the suspension.The Supreme Court of Florida found that the Executive Order passed this test. It named the grounds for Worrell's suspension—neglect of duty and incompetence—and provided various factual allegations that reasonably related to those grounds of suspension. The court disagreed with Worrell's claim that the allegations in the Executive Order were impermissibly vague or that they addressed conduct that fell within the lawful exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Therefore, the court denied Worrell's petition for a writ of quo warranto. View "Worrell v. DeSantis" on Justia Law

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In this review of a decision of the Public Service Commission relating to rates charged by Florida Power & Light Company (FPL) for the provision of electric service, the Supreme Court held that the Commission had not supplied a basis for meaningful judicial review of its conclusion that the settlement agreement provided a reasonable resolution of the issues, established reasonable rates, and was in the public interest.The settlement agreement at issue was between FPL and seven parties that intervened in the matter and permitted FPL to increase its base rates and service charges. After hearing arguments in favor of and against the settlement agreement the Commission concluded that the agreement "provides a reasonable resolution of all issues raised, establishes rates that are fair, just, and reasonable, and is in the public interest." The Supreme Court reversed, holding that remand was required because the Commission failed to perform its duty to explain its reasoning. View "Floridians Against Increased Rates, Inc. v. Clark" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that Petitioner, who was ordered to show cause why she should not be further sanctioned and barred from filing any pro se pleadings in the Supreme Court, had abused the Court's limited judicial resources and directed the Clerk of Court to reject any future pleadings or other requests for relief submitted by Petitioner, unless such filings were signed by a member in good standing of The Florida Bar. The Court further denied any pending motions or requests for relief, holding that based on Petitioner's history of filing pro se petitions and requests for relief that were meritless or otherwise inappropriate for appellate review, Petitioner failed to show cause why she should not be sanctioned. View "A.C. v. Dep't of Children & Families" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the order of the Florida Public Service Commission denying Duke Energy Florida, LLC's (DEF) request to recover approximately $16 from its customers for costs DEF incurred to meet its customers' demand for electricity, holding that the cost recovery should have been allowed.The costs at issue were incurred when a 420-megawatt (MW) steam-powered generating unit went offline at DEF's Bartow plant and was placed back in service at a derated capacity of 380 MW. After a hearing, an administrative law judge entered a recommended order denying cost recovery. The commission adopted the ALJ's recommendation in the final order on appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the factual findings forming the basis for the ALJ's ultimate causation determination were not supported by competent, substantial evidence. View "Duke Energy Florida, LLC v. Clark" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that Fla. Stat. 120.68(3), which entitles a party to a presumptive stay upon the appeal of an agency decision that "has the effect of suspending or revoking a license," does not apply to an agency decision to administratively withdraw an incomplete renewal license application.When Ybor Medical Injury and Accident Clinic, Inc. (the clinic), applied to the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) to renew its expiring license the AHCA invited the clinic to supplement its application, which was incomplete. After the clinic failed to do so, AHCA administratively withdrew the incomplete renewal license application from further consideration. The AHCA appealed and sought a presumptive stay under section 120.68(3). The court of appeals granted the presumptive stay. The Supreme Court quashed the decision below, holding that the appeal of an agency’s withdrawal decision does not trigger the statute’s presumptive stay provision. View "Agency for Health Care Administration v. Ybor Medical Injury & Accident Clinic, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that Plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim failed because he received adequate consideration in exchange for the challenged fee when he took advantage of the privilege of using his credit card to pay the penalty.Plaintiff filed a putative class action arguing that a convenience fee that Plaintiff paid in connection with a penalty he paid with his credit card to the City of North Miami Beach. Plaintiff argued that the convenience fee was statutorily prohibited and that American Traffic Solutions, Inc. (ATS), with whom the City had contracted to issue and mail citations and process violators' payments of the civil penalties imposed, was unjustly enriched by retaining the fee. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court of appeals certified a question to the Supreme Court, which answered that Plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim failed because he had not alleged a benefit conferred and accepted which would be unjust for ATS to retain. View "Pincus v. American Traffic Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

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In this dispute over the power to make changes to a county sheriff's budget the Supreme Court held that the Sheriff of Alachua County is not permitted under Florida Statutes chapters 30 and 129 to make object-level transfers without the approval of the Alachua County Board of County Commissioners.At issue was the Sheriff's authority to transfer money within the Sheriff's budget at a level of detail called the "object" level under chapters 30 and 129. The County brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment that the Sheriff had no authority to move approximately $840,000 between two objects in the budget without approval from the County. The court of appeal affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the Sheriff had the authority to make transfers at the object level without County approval. The Supreme Court quashed the decision below, holding that when seeking to transfer money between objects, the Sheriff must follow the budgetary amendment process set forth in chapter 129 and that the Sheriff failed to do so in this case. View "Alachua County v. Watson" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court struck in its entirety an amendment to the Hillsborough County Charter adopted in an initiative election that approved a transportation surtax and directives for allocating the tax proceeds, holding that the spending directives were unconstitutional.The charter amendment at issue enacted a one percent transportation sales surtax and included various provisions governing the use and distribution of the tax's proceeds. Here, the Supreme Court reviewed the circuit court's judgment validating the Hillsborough County Commission's authorization of the issuance of bonds to be funded by a portion of the proceeds of the surtax. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court to the extent that it upheld the validity of any portion of the amendment, holding that core provisions of the amendment were inconsistent with the surtax statute and because the invalid provisions and the remaining provisions of the amendment form an interlocking plan, the amendment was unconstitutional in its entirety. View "Emerson v. Hillsborough County" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court answered a certified question by holding that a mass shooting committed by Patrick Dell was a single "incident or occurrence" for purposes of Fla. Stat. 768.28(5) and that the cumulative liability for all claims of injury resulting from the incident may not exceed the aggregate cap of $200,000 set forth in section 768.28(5).Dell fatally shot his former wife and four of her children and severely wounded a fifth child. Plaintiffs, the two fathers of the deceased and injured children, sued the Florida Department of Children and Families (DCF) alleging wrongful death and negligence. The trial court granted partial summary judgment for Plaintiffs and determined that each wrongful death or personal injury claim was eligible for the $100,000 per person and $200,000 per claim limitation found in section 768.28(5). The court of appeal reversed, concluding that the claims arose from the same incident of negligence, and therefore, the $200,000 cap per incident or occurrence applied to limit recovery for all claims. The Supreme Court approved of the court of appeal's result, holding that the claims stemming from the mass shooting of Dell's victims were subject to the $200,000 aggregate cap for damages paid by the State, its agencies, or subdivisions. View "Barnett v. State, Department of Financial Services" on Justia Law