Justia Florida Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2016, Florida Power & Light Company (FPL) filed a petition requesting that the Florida Public Service Commission (PSC) approve FPL’s purchase of a power plant so that FPL could terminate its existing power purchase agreement with Cedar Bay. The Florida Industrial Power Users Group (FIPUG) and the Office of Public Counsel (OPC) intervened in the proceedings. OPC and FPL subsequently reached a negotiated settlement agreement and filed a motion for the Commission’s approval of the agreement. At a hearing on the petition FIPUG invoked the rule of sequestration of witnesses, codified in Fla. Stat. 90.616. The PSC denied the request, concluding that it had discretion as to whether to apply the rule in its proceedings. The PSC subsequently approved the settlement agreement. FIPUG appealed, arguing that the PSC erred in not sequestering the witnesses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the PSC had the discretion on whether to apply the Florida Evidence Code and, in particular, the rule of sequestration during its proceedings. View "Florida Industrial Power Users Group v. Graham" on Justia Law

In 2009, Bradley Westphal suffered a severe work-related injury. The City of St. Petersburg provided temporary total disability benefits pursuant to Fla. Stat. 440.15(2). Westphal did not reach maximum medical improvement prior to the expiration of the 104-week limitation on temporary total disability benefits and thus filed a petition for benefits pursuant to Fa. Stat. 440.15(1). The Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) denied Westphal’s claim, thus leaving Westphal totally disabled at the cessation of temporary total disability benefits but not yet entitled to permanent total disability benefits because he could not prove he would still be totally disabled when he reached maximum medical improvement. Westphal appealed, arguing that section 440.15(2) was unconstitutional. The First District Court of Appeal “valiantly attempted to save the statute from unconstitutionality” by interpreting it so that Westphal would not be cut off from compensation after 104 weeks. The Supreme Court quashed the First District’s decision, holding that section 440.15(2)(a) is unconstitutional as applied to Westphal and all others similarly situated as a denial of access to courts under article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution. View "Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg" on Justia Law

The PSC approved the recovery of FPL's costs incurred through its joint venture with an oil and natural gas company to engage in the acquisition, exploration, drilling, and development of natural gas wells in Oklahoma. The court agreed with appellants that the PSC lacks the authority to allow FPL to recover the capital investment and operations costs of its partnership in the Woodford gas reserves through the rates it charges consumers. Because the PSC exceeded its statutory authority when approving recovery of FPL’s costs and investment in the Woodford Project, the court reversed the judgment. View "Citizens of the State of Florida v. Art Graham, etc." on Justia Law

The Board challenged two separate orders of the PSC. The first order is a declaratory statement that the PSC issued in response to a petition filed by the City of Vero Beach, in which the PSC declared that the City has the right and obligation under territorial orders issued by the PSC to continue to provide electric service in the territory described in the orders (which includes unincorporated portions of the County) upon the expiration of the City’s franchise agreement with the County. The court rejected the County's challenges and held that the City had standing to seek this declaration from the PSC concerning territorial orders to which the City is a party and which the County had taken the position would be voided by the Franchise Agreement’s expiration, thereby effectively evicting the City. The court also held that the PSC’s declaration is within the PSC’s authority as the entity with exclusive and superior statutory jurisdiction to determine utility service areas, and that the declaration does not impermissibly grant the County’s property rights to the City or violate the statutory prohibition against the PSC affecting a franchise fee. The second order on appeal denies the County’s petition for a declaratory statement on the ground that it failed to meet applicable statutory requirements. The court agreed and affirmed this order without further comment. View "Bd. of Cnty. Comm'r Indian River Cnty. v. Art Graham, etc." on Justia Law

After a traffic stop, Petitioner refused to submit to a blood-alcohol test. The Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV) suspended Petitioner’s driver license for one year. Petitioner sought review, and a hearing officer upheld the suspension. On certiorari review of the administrative decision, the circuit court invalidated the suspension, finding that the hearing officer’s refusal to permit Petitioner’s counsel to ask more than two questions of Petitioner’s witness denied Petitioner due process. The circuit court directed DHSMV to set aside the suspension and reinstate Petitioner’s driver’s license. On second-tier certiorari review of the circuit court’s decision, the Fifth District Court of Appeal agreed that the hearing officer violated Petitioner’s due process rights but ruled that the circuit court was required to remand the case back to DHSMV for another administrative hearing. The Supreme Court quashed the decision below, holding that the Fifth District inappropriately exercised its certiorari jurisdiction to review the circuit court order. Remanded for reinstatement of the circuit court’s decision. View "Futch v. Fla. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the evidentiary standard of proof that applies in an initial license application proceeding under Florida’s Administrative Procedure Act. In 2011, a family day care licensed under Fla. Stat. 402.313 submitted an initial application for a large family child care home license under Fla. Stat. 402.3131. An administrative law judge (ALJ) recommended that the Department of Children and Families (DCF) grant a provisional large family child care license. DCF rejected the ALJ’s recommendation and denied the day care’s application for a large family child care home license. In so doing, DCF rejected the ALJ’s conclusion of law that the clear and convincing evidence standard applied to the denial of the day care’s initial license application, instead concluding that it needed only to produce competent substantial evidence of its stated reasons for denying the application. The Second District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for DCF to enter a final order adopting the ALJ’s recommendation, concluding that the clear and convincing evidence standard applied. The Court quashed the Second District’s decision, holding that the preponderance of the evidence standard applied in this initial license application proceeding. View "Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families v. Davis Family Daycare Home" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a retired Tampa firefighter, filed a class action complaint against the Board of Trustees of the City Pension Fund for Firefighters and Police Officers in the City of Tampa (Board), claiming that the Board failed to pay benefits under a firefighter and police officer pension plan established by local law. Parker and the Board agreed to a settlement, which the trial court approved. The trial court subsequently determined that Petitioner and others similarly situated were entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees. The Second District reversed the court’s decision to require the Board to pay the fees, instead concluding that the attorney’s fees were to be paid from the settlement proceeds. Specifically, the court concluded that the local law plan was “not part of the general statutory construct” of Fla. Stat. 175 and 185. The Supreme Court quashed the Second District’s decision, holding that the prevailing party attorney’s fees provisions of Fla. Stat. 175.061(5) and 185.05(5) are applicable to judicial proceedings to enforce claims under local law plans. View "Parker v. Bd. of Trs." on Justia Law

Florida Power & Light (FPL) filed an application for a rate base increase. Three intervenors to the proceedings and FPL reached a negotiated settlement agreement. After evidentiary hearings pertaining exclusively to the settlement agreement, the Florida Public Service Commission (Commission) approved the settlement agreement, finding that it established fair, just, and reasonable rates and that it was in the public interest. Citizens of the State of Florida (Citizens) appealed the decision of the Commission. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission did not violate the essential requirements of the law or commit a material error in procedure by approving the negotiated settlement agreement over Citizens’ objection; (2) the procedures followed by the Commission did not violate Citizens’ due process rights; and (3) the Commission’s findings and conclusions were support by competent, substantial evidence and were not clearly erroneous. View "Citizens of the State of Fla. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n" on Justia Law

In 2010, the legislature amended state law to preempt regulation of red light cameras to the state. At issue in these consolidated cases was whether pre-2010 municipal ordinances imposing penalties for red light violations detected by camera devices were invalid because they were preempted by state law. The district courts in these cases reached contrary conclusions: the Third District Court of Appeal held that the City of Aventura’s ordinance was a valid exercise of municipal power, and the Fifth District Court of Appeal concluded that the City of Orland’s ordinance was invalid because it was in conflict with and was preempted by state law. The Supreme Court agreed with the Fifth District, holding that the ordinances at issue were invalid because they were expressly preempted by state law. View "Masone v. City of Aventura" on Justia Law

The South Florida Water Management District alleged that RLI, Live Oak, LLC, a land developer and owner of property that purportedly contained wetlands, participated in unauthorized dredging, construction activity, and filling of wetlands without first obtaining the District’s approval. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of the District and awarded the District $81,900 in civil penalties. The district court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in basing its findings on a preponderance of the evidence standard and not the clear and convincing evidence standard. On motion for rehearing or certification, the district court certified a question for a determination by the Supreme Court of the proper burden of proof. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that where the Legislature statutorily authorizes a state governmental agency to recover a “civil penalty” in a “court of competent jurisdiction” but does not specify the agency’s burden of proof, the agency is not required to prove the alleged violation by clear and convincing evidence but, rather, by a preponderance of the evidence. View "S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. RLI Live Oak, LLC" on Justia Law