Justia Florida Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a traffic stop, Petitioner refused to submit to a blood-alcohol test. The Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV) suspended Petitioner’s driver license for one year. Petitioner sought review, and a hearing officer upheld the suspension. On certiorari review of the administrative decision, the circuit court invalidated the suspension, finding that the hearing officer’s refusal to permit Petitioner’s counsel to ask more than two questions of Petitioner’s witness denied Petitioner due process. The circuit court directed DHSMV to set aside the suspension and reinstate Petitioner’s driver’s license. On second-tier certiorari review of the circuit court’s decision, the Fifth District Court of Appeal agreed that the hearing officer violated Petitioner’s due process rights but ruled that the circuit court was required to remand the case back to DHSMV for another administrative hearing. The Supreme Court quashed the decision below, holding that the Fifth District inappropriately exercised its certiorari jurisdiction to review the circuit court order. Remanded for reinstatement of the circuit court’s decision. View "Futch v. Fla. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the evidentiary standard of proof that applies in an initial license application proceeding under Florida’s Administrative Procedure Act. In 2011, a family day care licensed under Fla. Stat. 402.313 submitted an initial application for a large family child care home license under Fla. Stat. 402.3131. An administrative law judge (ALJ) recommended that the Department of Children and Families (DCF) grant a provisional large family child care license. DCF rejected the ALJ’s recommendation and denied the day care’s application for a large family child care home license. In so doing, DCF rejected the ALJ’s conclusion of law that the clear and convincing evidence standard applied to the denial of the day care’s initial license application, instead concluding that it needed only to produce competent substantial evidence of its stated reasons for denying the application. The Second District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for DCF to enter a final order adopting the ALJ’s recommendation, concluding that the clear and convincing evidence standard applied. The Court quashed the Second District’s decision, holding that the preponderance of the evidence standard applied in this initial license application proceeding. View "Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families v. Davis Family Daycare Home" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a retired Tampa firefighter, filed a class action complaint against the Board of Trustees of the City Pension Fund for Firefighters and Police Officers in the City of Tampa (Board), claiming that the Board failed to pay benefits under a firefighter and police officer pension plan established by local law. Parker and the Board agreed to a settlement, which the trial court approved. The trial court subsequently determined that Petitioner and others similarly situated were entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees. The Second District reversed the court’s decision to require the Board to pay the fees, instead concluding that the attorney’s fees were to be paid from the settlement proceeds. Specifically, the court concluded that the local law plan was “not part of the general statutory construct” of Fla. Stat. 175 and 185. The Supreme Court quashed the Second District’s decision, holding that the prevailing party attorney’s fees provisions of Fla. Stat. 175.061(5) and 185.05(5) are applicable to judicial proceedings to enforce claims under local law plans. View "Parker v. Bd. of Trs." on Justia Law

Florida Power & Light (FPL) filed an application for a rate base increase. Three intervenors to the proceedings and FPL reached a negotiated settlement agreement. After evidentiary hearings pertaining exclusively to the settlement agreement, the Florida Public Service Commission (Commission) approved the settlement agreement, finding that it established fair, just, and reasonable rates and that it was in the public interest. Citizens of the State of Florida (Citizens) appealed the decision of the Commission. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission did not violate the essential requirements of the law or commit a material error in procedure by approving the negotiated settlement agreement over Citizens’ objection; (2) the procedures followed by the Commission did not violate Citizens’ due process rights; and (3) the Commission’s findings and conclusions were support by competent, substantial evidence and were not clearly erroneous. View "Citizens of the State of Fla. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n" on Justia Law

In 2010, the legislature amended state law to preempt regulation of red light cameras to the state. At issue in these consolidated cases was whether pre-2010 municipal ordinances imposing penalties for red light violations detected by camera devices were invalid because they were preempted by state law. The district courts in these cases reached contrary conclusions: the Third District Court of Appeal held that the City of Aventura’s ordinance was a valid exercise of municipal power, and the Fifth District Court of Appeal concluded that the City of Orland’s ordinance was invalid because it was in conflict with and was preempted by state law. The Supreme Court agreed with the Fifth District, holding that the ordinances at issue were invalid because they were expressly preempted by state law. View "Masone v. City of Aventura" on Justia Law

The South Florida Water Management District alleged that RLI, Live Oak, LLC, a land developer and owner of property that purportedly contained wetlands, participated in unauthorized dredging, construction activity, and filling of wetlands without first obtaining the District’s approval. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of the District and awarded the District $81,900 in civil penalties. The district court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in basing its findings on a preponderance of the evidence standard and not the clear and convincing evidence standard. On motion for rehearing or certification, the district court certified a question for a determination by the Supreme Court of the proper burden of proof. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that where the Legislature statutorily authorizes a state governmental agency to recover a “civil penalty” in a “court of competent jurisdiction” but does not specify the agency’s burden of proof, the agency is not required to prove the alleged violation by clear and convincing evidence but, rather, by a preponderance of the evidence. View "S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. RLI Live Oak, LLC" on Justia Law

Child was born with birth-related neurological injuries. Child's parents (Petitioners) filed a claim for compensation under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan. The Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association agreed to pay parental compensation of $100,000 to both parents jointly under Fla. Stat. 766.31(1)(b)(1), which provides for an award not exceeding $100,000 to the parents or legal guardians of an infant found to have sustained a birth-related neurological injury. Petitioners reserved the right to have a hearing before an ALJ to raise the issue of the interpretation and constitutionality of section 766.31(1)(b)(1). The ALJ denied Petitioners' claim for an additional $100,000 as part of the parental award, finding that the Legislature clearly intended that the maximum award of $100,000 was for both parents, not for each parent. The district court upheld the ALJ's judgment and denied each of Petitioners' constitutional claims. The Supreme Court approved the district court's decision, holding that the parental award provision (1) unambiguously provides for only a single award of $100,000; (2) does not violate equal protection; and (3) neither is void for vagueness nor unconstitutionally limits the right of access to courts. View "Samples v. Fla. Birth Related Neurological Injury Comp. Ass'n" on Justia Law

In this case the Supreme Court considered whether a municipal ordinance may validly establish superpriority status for municipal code enforcement liens. The court of appeal concluded that such an ordinance superpriority provision was invalid because it conflicted with a state statute and that the City's lien accordingly did not have priority over the lien of Wells Fargo's mortgage that was recorded before the City's lien was recorded. The City appealed, arguing that the ordinance superpriority provision within the "broad home rule powers" of the City. The Supreme Court accepted certification and concluded that the court of appeal correctly decided the ordinance superpriority provision was invalid because it conflicted with state law. View "City of Palm Bay v. Wells Fargo, N.A." on Justia Law

In 2008, the Florida Public Service Commission (PSC) granted the petitions for determination of need for new nuclear power plants proposed by Florida Power & Light company (FPL) and Progress Energy Florida (PEF). The PSC subsequently issued orders granting the utility companies' annual petitions for recovery of their associated preconstruction costs through customer rates. Southern Alliance for Clean Energy (SACE) opposed FPL and PEF's most recent cost recovery petitions, arguing that Fla. Stat. 366.93 unconstitutionally delegates legislative authority to the PSC and, alternatively, the PSC's order authorizing the utility companies to recover preconstruction costs was arbitrary and unsupported by competent, substantial evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that authorizing recovery of preconstruction costs through customer rates in order to promote utility company investment in new nuclear power plants, even though those plants might never be built, is a policy decision for the Legislature, not the Court. View "Alliance for Clean Energy v. Graham" on Justia Law

This case was before the court for review of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Snipes v. Telli, which held that the Florida Constitution permitted Broward County to impose term limits on the office of the county commissioner. Because the court receded from its decision in Cook v. City of Jacksonville, the court approved the Fourth District's decision and held that Broward County's term limits did not violate Florida's Constitution. View "Telli v. Broward County, et al." on Justia Law