Justia Florida Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff brought a personal injury action against Defendant for injuries Plaintiff sustained in an altercation that occurred when Plaintiff was at a bar with Defendant and Defendant’s friend, Russell Noordhoek. The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff. The Third District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for entry of a judgment for Defendant, holding that Defendant did not owe a duty of care to Plaintiff when Plaintiff was attacked by Noordhoek, and therefore, Defendant could not be held liable for Plaintiff’s injuries. The Supreme Court quashed the decision below, holding that the Third District erred when it concluded that the evidence failed to demonstrate that Defendant owed a legal duty of care to Plaintiff, and, under the specific facts of this case, Defendant’s duty of care extended to the misconduct of a third party, Noordhoek. View "Dorsey v. Reider" on Justia Law

In 1991, a group of flight attendants initiated a class action suit against several tobacco companies. The suit resulted in a settlement agreement. Subsequently, the Flight Attendant Medical Research Institute (FAMRI) was formed, and several of the flight attendants who were part of the class action became members of FAMRI’s board, including Patricia Young and Alani Blissard. Thereafter, several flight attendants filed individual suits against the tobacco companies. Steve Hunter and Philip Gerson were among the attorneys who represented the flight attendants. In 2010, a group of attorneys, including Gerson and Hunter, filed a petition against FAMRI on behalf of some of the flight attendants who were part of the original class, seeking an accounting of FAMRI’s funds and requesting that the settlement funds be dispersed directly to their clients. Young, Blissard and FAMRI moved to disqualify the attorneys on the ground of conflict of interest. The trial court entered an order disqualifying several attorneys, including Hunter and Gerson. The Third District Court of Appeals quashed the trial court’s order. The Supreme Court quashed the Third District’s decision and reinstated the trial court’s disqualification order, holding that disqualification was warranted in this case. View "Young v. Achenbauch" on Justia Law

Michelle McCall received prenatal medical care at a United States Air Force clinic as an Air Force dependent. McCall died after delivering her son as a result of severe blood loss. Petitioners filed an action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The federal district court found the United States liable under the FTCA. The court concluded that Petitioners’ economic damages amounted to $980,462 and Petitioners’ noneconomic damages totaled $2 million. However, the district court limited Petitioners’ recovery of wrongful death noneconomic damages to $1 million after applying Fla. Stat. 766.118, Florida’s statutory cap on wrongful death noneconomic damages based on medical malpractice claims. The district court subsequently denied Petitioners’ motion challenging the constitutionality of the wrongful death statutory cap. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the application of the statutory cap on noneconomic damages and held that the statute was not unconstitutional. The Florida Supreme Court accepted certification to answer questions of Florida law and answered by holding the statutory cap on wrongful death noneconomic damages provided in Fla. Stat. 766.118 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Florida Constitution. View "Estate of McCall v. United States" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff was rear-ended by an underinsured motorist (UM), Plaintiff requested her $100,000 UM policy limits from State Farm. Plaintiff indicated that her damages were estimated to be $3.5 million because she suffered from reflex sympathetic dystrophy syndrome. State Farm responded that Plaintiff must schedule a compulsory medical examination (CME) pursuant to the terms of the policy. Plaintiff refused to attend a CME and instead filed suit against State Farm. The trial court entered judgment against State Farm for the UM policy limits. The court of appeal affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff breached the contract when she failed to attend the CME; but (2) State Farm must plead and prove prejudice to avoid liability based on noncompliance with the CME clause, and State Farm failed to meet its burden in this case. The Supreme Court approved of the court of appeal’s decision, holding (1) the forfeiture of benefits under a UM policy will not automatically result upon an insured’s breach of a CME provision unless the insurer pleads and proves actual prejudice as an element of its affirmative defense; and (2) the undisputed facts demonstrate that State Farm was not prejudiced in this case. View "State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Curran" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued defendant, seeking recovery for injuries allegedly sustained in an automobile collision. This case concerned the proper standard of review and the appropriate remedy when an appellate court reviewed a trial court's order granting a new trial on the ground that the jury verdict was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, where the trial court's order was premised, at least in part, on an error of law. The court held that an appellate court properly applied a de novo standard of review to a trial court's conclusions of law in an order granting a new trial based on the manifest weight of the evidence, giving no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Although a trial court's conclusions of law were not entitled to deference, its findings of facts and determinations of credibility were still entitled to deference because of the trial court's superior vantage point of having been present during the entire trial. Although the court concluded that the First District was correct in reversing the trial court's order, the court quashed the First District's decision because it concluded that reinstatement of the jury verdict was not the proper remedy in this case. Accordingly, the court remanded for reconsideration. View "Van, Sr., et ux., v. Schmidt" on Justia Law

After Insured sustained injuries in a car accident he sought MRIs from Virtual Imaging Services. Virtual Imaging obtained an assignment of personal injury protection (PIP) benefits under Insured's policy with GEICO and billed GEICO $3600 for the MRIs. GEICO paid the bill but limited its reimbursement to eighty percent of 200 percent of the applicable Medicare fee schedule in accordance with the formula described in Fla. Stat. 627.736(5)(a). This statutory provision became effective on January 1, 2008 as part of Florida's PIP statute. Virtual Imaging subsequently sued GEICO, alleging that GEICO's reimbursement was insufficient. The county court granted Virtual Imaging's motion for summary judgment. The court of appeal affirmed then certified a question of law to the Supreme Court, which answered by holding that GEICO was required to give notice to Insured by electing the permissive Medicare fee schedules in its policy before taking advantage of the Medicare fee schedule to limit reimbursements. View "Geico Gen. Ins. Co. v. Virtual Imaging Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against County, alleging he was negligently shot by a police officer responding to a burglary alarm at his place of business. County argued it was entitled to immunity because the officer's actions were discretionary and fell under the police emergency exception. The trial court denied County's summary judgment motion as to the negligence claim and granted its motion as to the negligent retention claim. County filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the court of appeal. The court of appeal granted the writ, concluding that the undisputed facts showed a police emergency exception conferred sovereign immunity on County. The Supreme Court quashed the court of appeal's decision, holding (1) County's claim that it was entitled to sovereign immunity was not reviewable by the appellate courts through a petition for writ of certiorari; and (2) the court of appeal erred in concluding that County was entitled to summary judgment based on the police emergency exception. Remanded. View "Rodriguez v. Miami-Dade County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff's automobile insurance policy with Geico included a condition that Plaintiff submit to examination under oath (EUO) before recovering personal injury protection (PIP) benefits. Geico denied Plaintiff's PIP claim due to her failure to satisfy this condition after she was injured in a car accident. Plaintiff filed a class action complaint alleging that Geico had violated Florida's PIP statute. The federal district court dismissed the case, concluding that the PIP statute did not prohibit an insured from requiring an EUO. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit certified a question of law to the Florida Supreme Court, which answered by holding that, under Fla. Stat. 627.736, an insurer cannot require an insured to attend an EUO as a condition precedent to recovery of PIP benefits. View "Nunez v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

After undergoing surgery, Decedent died due to complications resulting from a vein being lacerated during surgery. Decedent's wife, Plaintiff, filed a complaint against the doctor who performed the surgery and the doctor's surgical practice for medical malpractice resulting in wrongful death. Defendants moved to compel arbitration based on a financial agreement signed by Decedent prior to his surgery. The trial court entered an order compelling arbitration, and the court of appeal affirmed. Plaintiff appealed,. The Supreme Court quashed the decision compelling arbitration, holding (1) the damages clause of the arbitration provision of the financial agreement violated the public policy pronounced by the legislature in the Medical Malpractice Act; and (2) the offensive clause was not severable from the remainder of the arbitration provision. View "Franks v. Bowers" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a California resident, was sexually assaulted while vacationing in Mexico. The assault occurred while Petitioner received a complimentary massage in exchange for her attendance at a resort's timeshare presentation. Petitioner sued the resort, a corporation with its primary place of business in Florida, (the Florida Defendants) for negligent vacation packaging. The Florida Defendants filed a motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens, arguing that Mexico would be a more convenient forum. The trial court granted the motion. The court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court quashed the court of appeal's decision, holding that the court misapplied the forum non conveniens analysis, particularly by failing to afford a strong presumption in favor of Plaintiff's initial choice of an otherwise proper forum. View "Cortez v. Palace Resorts, Inc." on Justia Law