Justia Florida Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this negligence action, the Supreme Court considered whether an employee who claims the benefit of sovereign immunity pursuant to Fla. Stat. 768.28(9), which entitles that employee not to be held personally liable in tort or named as a party defendant for acts within the scope of his or her employment, may obtain interlocutory review of an adverse trial court ruling where the question turns on an issue of law. The court of appeal declined to exercise certiorari review over a trial court's order denying summary judgment based on such a claim of individual immunity pursuant to section 768.28(9)(a). The Supreme Court quashed the court of appeal's decision and held (1) a claim of individual immunity from suit under section 768.28(9)(a) should be appealable as a non-final order under Fla. R. App. P. 9.130, obviating the necessity of determining whether common law certiorari would alternatively be available; and (2) the employee in this case was entitled to the individual immunity provided in section 768.28(9)(a). View "Keck v. Eminisor" on Justia Law

This case arose from a fatal automobile-truck collision. Petitioners, as personal representative of the estate of the deceased and other individuals, filed an action against Airgas, a foreign corporation, and the Airgas employee that drove the truck that struck the deceased. The district court certified the following question: "Where an individual, non-resident defendant commits negligent acts in Florida on behalf of his corporate employer, does the corporate shield doctrine operate as a bar to personal jurisdiction in Florida over the individual defendant?" The court answered the question in the negative and concluded that Airgas employees were subject to the personal jurisdiction of Florida courts pursuant to Florida Statute 48.193. View "Kitroser, etc., et al. v. Hurt, et al." on Justia Law

In an automobile and train collision case, the court considered the provisions of Florida law governing the selection of venue based on the residency of defendants. At issue was the limitation placed on the selection of venue - known as the joint residency rule - derived from Enfinger v. Baxley, which held that the selection of venue based on residency was limited to the county of residence shared by the individual defendant and the corporate defendant. Because Enfinger was predicated on a serious misinterpretation of the governing statutes, the court resolved the conflict by receding from Enfinger. The court concluded that the Florida courts should uniformly apply the plain language of the venue statues enacted by the Legislature, not the judicially created joint residency rule. Accordingly, the court quashed the decision of the Fourth District. View "Brown, et al. v. Nagelhout, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner sued respondent under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine after sustaining injuries caused by respondent's farm tractor. Petitioner sought review of the decision of the First District Court of Appeal, which held that a farm tractor was not a dangerous instrumentality as a matter of law. In so holding, the district court rejected petitioner's contentions that, because a farm tractor was a motor vehicle and because it was of such size and character as to be peculiarly dangerous in its operation, a farm tractor was a dangerous instrumentality. The court held that the dangerous instrumentality doctrine could apply to motor vehicles other than automobiles that have the ability to cause serious injury, and Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, where the court concluded that the weight, speed, and mechanism of an automobile or motor vehicle made it particularly dangerous when in operation. Therefore, a farm tractor was a dangerous instrumentality and the First District's decision was quashed. View "Rippy v. Shepard" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a negligence action against Dr. Mary Jane Benson, Dr. George C. Rees, and West Florida Hospital, alleging that the doctors were negligent in rendering medical care to her, which resulted in excessive liver damage. Plaintiff's claim against the hospital were based on both vicarious liability for Dr. Benson's negligence, as well as liability for the direct negligence in granting medical staff privileges to both doctors, which led to the medical care and procedures performed. The court approved the First District's decision because it held that the trial court correctly ordered the disclosure of a blank application for medical staff privileges. Section 381.0287(b)1 impermissible attempted to limit the disclosure requirements of article X, section 25 of the Florida Constitution (Amendment 7), and the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA), 42 U.S.C. 11101 et seq., did not preempt Amendment 7. In accordance with the court's decision, the court disapproved of the decision of the Fourth District in Tenet Healthsystem Hospitals, Inc. v. Taitel and its contrary holding that a blank form used by a hospital for nurse credentialing was confidential and protected by disclosure. View "West Florida Regional Medical Center, Inc., etc. v. See, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioners sought review of the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Geico Indemnity Co. v. Shazier on the basis that it conflicted with the decisions of the court in Susco Car Rental System of Florida v. Leonard and Roth v. Old Republic Insurance Co. In Shazier, the district court resolved a question regarding an insurer's duty to defend and indemnify its insured in favor of the insurer. In doing so, the First District relied on a very constricted definition of "consent" and employed an unauthorized driver provision in contradiction of the court's clear precedent to the contrary under Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine to defeat coverage. Accordingly, the court quashed the First District's decision and directed that judgment be entered in favor of the insureds and injured parties. View "Chandler, etc., et al., v. Geico Indemnity Co. et al.; Steele v. Geico Indemnity Co. et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner filed suit against respondent, alleging negligence, violation of resident's rights, and breach of fiduciary duty. Respondent moved to compel arbitration. Petitioner raised several issues on appeal. The court held that its decision was controlled in part by Shotts v. OP Winter Haven, Inc., another nursing home arbitration case. Pursuant to the court's reasoning in that case, the court held that the district court erred in the following respects: (i) in ruling that the limitation of liability provisions in this case, which placed a $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages and waived punitive damages, were severable; (ii) in failing to rule that the court, not the arbitrator, must decide whether the arbitration agreement violated public policy; and (iii) in failing to rule that the above limitation of liability provisions violated public policy. The court also held that the United States Supreme Court decision in Rent-A-Center, West. Inc. v. Jackson was inapplicable. View "Gessa, etc. v. Manor Care of Florida, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner, as personal representative of her uncle's estate, filed a complaint against respondent alleging negligence and breach of fiduciary duties. Respondent moved to compel arbitration based on an agreement petitioner had signed on her uncle's admission. The court held that the district court erred in failing to rule that the court, not the arbitrator, must decide whether the arbitration agreement violated public policy. The court also held that the district court erred in failing to rule that the limitations of remedies provisions in this case violated public policy, for they undermined specific statutory remedies created by the Legislature. The court further held that the district court erred in ruling that the limitations of remedies provisions that called for imposition of the American Health Lawyer Association rules was severable. The court finally concluded that the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson was inapplicable. View "Shotts, etc. v. OP Winter Haven, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

State Farm petitioned for review of the Third District's determination that the household exclusion in its policy issued to respondents was ambiguous and therefore could not be enforced to eliminate coverage for bodily injuries suffered by members of the household of a permissive-driver insured. The court held that the plain language of the household exclusion precluded coverage for bodily injuries suffered by members of the household of a permissive-driver insured, such as the parents in this case. Therefore, the court quashed the Third District's decision, approved Linehan v. Alkhabbaz, and remanded for further proceedings. View "State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Menendez, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in these cases filed actions based on various degrees of asbestosis. According to plaintiffs, when they filed their lawsuits before the adoption of the Asbestos and Silica Compensation Fairness Act (Act), Chapter 774, Part II, Florida Statutes, it was not necessary to establish that any malignancy or physical impairment had already resulted from their contraction of asbestosis. Instead, plaintiffs claimed that it was merely necessary to show that they had suffered an injury from an asbestos-related disease. At issue was whether the Act could be retroactively applied to prejudice or defeat causes of action already accrued and in litigation. The court held that, based upon well-established common law precedent, plaintiffs had an accrued cause of action for the injuries they allegedly sustained due to asbestos exposure, and these causes of action constituted a property interest in which plaintiffs had a vested right under article I, section 2 of the Florida Constitution. The court also held that retroactive application of the Act here would operate to completely abolish plaintiffs' vested rights in accrued causes of action for asbestos-related injury. Therefore, the court held that the Act could not be constitutionally applied to plaintiffs. View "American Optical Corp., et al. v. Spiewak, et al.; American Optical Corp., et al. v. Williams, et al." on Justia Law