Justia Florida Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case stemmed from respondent's agreement to lease an airplane from Aerolease of America, Inc. (Aerolease) and the subsequent plane crashed that occurred, which killed the pilot and his passenger. Petitioner, in his capacity as administrator ad litem and personal representative of the passenger's estate, filed a wrongful death action against Aerolease. At issue was whether the federal law currently codified at 49 U.S.C. 44112 preempted Florida state law with regard to the liability of aircraft owners under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine and, if it did, how broadly the scope of that preemption covered. The court held that the dangerous instrumentality doctrine imposed vicarious liability upon owners and lessors of aircraft, even where the aircraft was not within their immediate control or possession at the time of the loss. To the extent that the doctrine applied to injuries, damages, or deaths that occurred on the surface of the earth, the doctrine conflicted with, and was therefore preempted by, section 44112. However, because the death of the passenger occurred while he was a passenger in a plane that crashed, not on the ground beneath the plane, the wrongful death action filed by petitioner was not preempted by section 44112. Therefore, the dangerous instrumentality doctrine applied and the Second District erroneously affirmed the summary final judgment entered by the trial court in favor of Aerolease on the basis of federal preemption. View "Vreeland, etc. v. Ferrer, etc., et al." on Justia Law

Parents of a minor child sued defendants for the permanent and substantial brain injury of their child. The issue in these consolidated cases was whether the parents were precluded from suing in a court of law for damages sustained by alleged malpractice and instead were required to pursue limited compensation in an administrative forum provided by the statute under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan (NICA plan). The court held that because the First District failed to read the phrase "immediate postdelivery period" as modifying "resuscitation," the First District expanded the NICA plan to cover infants beyond the limit contemplated by the express language of the statute. The court also held that the First District incorrectly held that under section 766.309(1)(a), Florida Statutes, the rebuttable presumption of coverage under the NICA plan applied to benefit defendants, even though plaintiffs were not making a claim for compensation under the NICA plan. Accordingly, in reviewing the facts under the correct interpretation of the statute, the court held that the ALJ's finding that the child did not sustain a "birth-related neurological injury" under the NICA plan was supported by competent, substantial evidence. View "Bennett, et al. v. St. Vincent's Med. Center, Inc., et al.; FL Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Assoc. v. St. Vincent's Med. Center, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff suffered a stroke with devastating consequences, leaving him with permanent paralysis and aphasia. Following a jury trial on his claim of medical malpractice, plaintiff received a jury verdict that awarded substantial damages to him and his wife. At issue was whether the Second District permissibly reweighed the testimony presented by plaintiff's expert witness as to whether the conduct of the hospital and emergency room doctor caused him to suffer devastating damages as a result of the stroke. The court held that it was within the jury's province to evaluate the expert's credibility and weigh her testimony and that the Second District misapplied the court's precedent by reweighing the evidence and rejecting the expert's explanation. Accordingly, the court quashed the Second District's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cox, et al. v. St. Joseph's Hospital, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a company that processed perlite for horticultural and construction use, sued respondent alleging several counts for damages based on the claim that natural gas being supplied to petitioner was contaminated with debris that caused damage to petitioner's furnaces. Discovery and trial preparation were undertaken, during which time the parties engaged in numerous disagreements concerning discovery and other matters. Neither party filed a motion to have the case reset for trial and respondent subsequently filed a notice of lack of prosecution under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(e), alleging that there had been no record activity for the prior ten months. At issue was the proper interpretation of rule 1.420(e), which provided for involuntary dismissal of court actions for lack of prosecution. The court held that the filing made by petitioner during the sixty-day grace period set forth in rule 1.420(e) met the rule's requirement for record activity and therefore, precluded dismissal for lack of prosecution. Accordingly, the court quashed the decision of the First District and approved the conflict cases certified by the First District. View "Chemrock Corp. v. Tampa Elec. Co., etc. " on Justia Law

Respondent filed a complaint against petitioner, alleging the negligence of certain residents, fellows, and nurses at Jackson Memorial Hospital where her newborn son contracted a severe bacterial infection and subsequently died. At issue was whether, under section 768.28(7), Florida Statutes, the timing of respondent's service of process on the Florida Department of Financial Services ("DFS") was fatal to her negligence action. The court expressly rejected the argument that service of process on DFS was a condition precedent to respondent's cause of action and that proving service of process was an element of her burden of proof. Therefore, the court held that DFS was not a party to the cause of action and petitioner failed to demonstrate prejudice. The court concluded that the timing of respondent's service was not fatal to her negligence claim against petitioner and affirmed the trial court's denial of petitioner's motion for directed verdict. View "The Public Health Trust Of Miami-Dade County, Etc. v. Acanda" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the district court's decision that the trial court erred as a matter of law by directing a verdict on permanency where "permanency was a jury question" and where "the jury was free to reject any testimony regarding permanency, including uncontradicted testimony." At issue was whether permanency was a jury question and whether the jury could reject uncontradicted expert testimony. The court held that the trial court properly directed a verdict for petitioner on the issue of permanency because the district court's statements were overly broad and did not accurately reflect Florida law on these issues where it was not improper to direct a verdict when the evidence of injury and causation were such that no reasonable inference could support a jury verdict for defendant and where, although the medical experts disagreed as to the medical cause of the thigh injury, they agreed that petitioner sustained a permanent injury to his right thigh that was causally related to the accident. The court also held that section 627.737(2)(b) of the Florida Statutes did not preclude an award of noneconomic damages to petitioner for his thigh injury and that respondent did not preserve any issue relating to the adequacy of the injury instruction or the verdict form. Accordingly, the district court improperly reversed the final judgment in favor of petitioner and the court quashed and remanded to reinstate the jury verdict.

Petitioner sued respondents alleging that, as a result of one of the respondent's negligence, petitioner suffered an acute myocardial infarction when he went to the emergency room complaining of chest pains. At issue was whether the First District Court of Appeal erred or exceeded its constitutional authority in reviewing the trial court's order on certiorari. The court quashed the First District's decision in Oken v. Williams and approved the Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision in St. Mary's Hospital v. Bell where the First District exceeded the scope of certiorari review when it granted the petition to determine whether a certain doctor was a qualified expert. The court also held that, because it found that the First District's grant of certiorari was inappropriate, it declined to address petitioner's remaining issues.