Justia Florida Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff's automobile insurance policy with Geico included a condition that Plaintiff submit to examination under oath (EUO) before recovering personal injury protection (PIP) benefits. Geico denied Plaintiff's PIP claim due to her failure to satisfy this condition after she was injured in a car accident. Plaintiff filed a class action complaint alleging that Geico had violated Florida's PIP statute. The federal district court dismissed the case, concluding that the PIP statute did not prohibit an insured from requiring an EUO. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit certified a question of law to the Florida Supreme Court, which answered by holding that, under Fla. Stat. 627.736, an insurer cannot require an insured to attend an EUO as a condition precedent to recovery of PIP benefits. View "Nunez v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Tiara Condominium Association (Tiara) retained Marsh & McLennan (Marsh) as its insurance broker. Marsh secured windstorm coverage through Citizens Property Insurance Corporation (Citizens), which issued a policy that contained a loss limit in an amount close to $50 million. Tiara's condominium subsequently sustained damages caused by two hurricanes. After being assured by Marsh that the loss limits coverage was per occurrence, Tiara spent more than $100 million in remediation efforts. However, when Tiara sought payment from Citizens, Citizens claimed that the loss limit was $50 million in the aggregate, not per occurrence. Tiara filed suit against Marsh, alleging, inter alia, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment for Marsh on all claims. The appeals affirmed with the exception of the negligence and breach of fiduciary claims, as to which it certified a question to the Supreme Court to determine whether the economic loss rule prohibits recovery, or whether an insurance broker falls within the professional services exception that would allow Tiara to proceed with the claims. The Court answered by holding that the application of the economic loss rule is limited to products liability cases. View "Tiara Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Marsh & McLennan Cos. " on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action against a dentist (Dentist) and his dental practice, alleging that Dentist's failure to diagnose and treat his dental conditions resulted in a bone infection and a worsening of his dental problems, which caused severe and permanent physical and emotional damage. In preparation for trial, there was an ex parte predeposition conference conducted between Plaintiff's nonparty treating physician and counsel provided by Defendant's insurance company. Plaintiff contended that the ex parte meeting violated the State's physician-patient confidentiality statute as delineated in Fla. Stat. 456.057(8). The Supreme Court held that section 456.057 prohibits such meetings and quashed the decision of the Fourth District holding otherwise. In particular, the Court held that an ex parte meeting such as the one attempted here is prohibited irrespective of whether the attorney and physician claim they will discuss only non-privileged matters. View "Hasan v. Garvar" on Justia Law

The issue in this case was whether an appellate court should review a non-final order denying a claim of sovereign immunity by Citizens Property Insurance Corporation (Citizens), a state-created entity that provides property insurance, in a bad faith action stemming from the entity's handling of a property damage claim. The issue arose in the context of the broader question of when appellate courts should use common law writs to review non-final orders involving claims of immunity prior to the entry of a final judgment and when the Supreme Court should expand the list of non-final appealable orders. While the Court did not resolve the broader issue in this case, it determined that Citizens' claim of immunity was not reviewable by the appellate courts either through the writ of certiorari or the writ of prohibition, and the Court declined to expand the list of non-final orders reviewable on appeal to include the discrete legal issue presented in this case. View "Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. San Perdido Ass'n, Inc." on Justia Law

Based on unethical actions during the 2004-2005 hurricane season, the Legislature enacted Section 626.854(6), Florida Statutes: A public adjuster may not directly or indirectly through any other person or entity initiate contact or engage in face-to-face or telephonic solicitation or enter into a contract with any insured or claimant under an insurance policy until at least 48 hours after the occurrence of an event that may be the subject of a claim under the insurance policy unless contact is initiated by the insured or claimant. An adjuster sued. The trial court upheld the law, accepting an interpretation that it prohibited only in-person or telephonic communication, that it primarily regulates conduct, not speech, and furthers an important governmental interest. The appeals court reversed, finding that the section regulates commercial speech and that the Department failed to demonstrate that prohibiting property owners from receiving information from public adjusters for 48 hours is justified by the possibility that some public adjuster may unduly pressure traumatized victims or otherwise engage in unethical behavior. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute unconstitutionally restricts commercial speech and was not narrowly tailored to serve interests in ensuring ethical conduct by public adjusters and protecting homeowners. View "Atwater v. Kortum" on Justia Law

This case arose when Mercury, an insurer, offered a settlement proposal to the hospital and the hospital refused the settlement offer. At issue was the constitutionality of the Alachua County Lien Law, chapter 88-539, Laws of Florida (Lien Law), and the Alachua County Hospital Lien Ordinance, Alachua County Code sections 262.20-262.25 (Ordinance), both of which established certain lien rights for charitable hospitals in Alachua County. The court held that the Lien Law was unconstitutional under article III, section 11(a)(9) of the Florida Constitution. The court held, however, that the Ordinance was not unconstitutional and that the First District should have upheld the trial court's judgment on the basis of the Ordinance. In addressing a cross-appeal presented by Mercury, the court held that the trial court properly limited the hospital's damages and properly awarded it attorney fees. View "Shands Teaching Hospital and Clinics, Inc., v. Mercury Ins. Co. of Florida" on Justia Law

This action arose from an appeal to the Eleventh Circuit wherein plaintiff appealed the dismissal of insurance coverage claims under section 627.701(4)(a), Florida Statutes, and the denial of a motion to enforce execution of the judgment, and defendant cross-appealed the denial of motions for a new trial and for judgment as a matter of law. In answering five certified questions, the court concluded that, under Florida law: (1) first-party claims were actually statutory bad-faith claims that must be brought under section 624.155; (2) an insured could not bring a claim against an insurer for failure to comply with the language and type-size requirements established by section 627.701(4)(a); (3) an insurer's failure to comply with the language and type-size requirements established in section 627.701(4)(a) did not render a noncompliant hurricane deductible provision in an insurance policy void and unenforceable as the Legislature had not provided for this penalty; and (4) a contractual provision mandating payment of benefits upon "entry of a final judgment" did not waive the insurer's procedural right to post a bond and stay the execution of a money judgment pending resolution of appeal. View "QBE Ins. Corp. v. Chalfonte Condominium Apt. Assoc., Inc." on Justia Law

This action stemmed from an appeal to the Eleventh Circuit wherein plaintiff appealed the dismissal of claims under section 627.701(4)(a), Florida Statutes, and the denial of a motion to enforce execution of the judgment, and defendant appealed the denial of motions for a new trial and for judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiff had filed a claim with defendant, its property insurer, pursuant to an insurance policy but was dissatisfied with defendant's investigation and processing of its claim. Based on the facts and analysis, the court answered the first, third, fourth, and fifth questions certified by the Eleventh Circuit in the negative. In doing so, the court did not reach the second certified question. The court concluded that under Florida law: (1) first-party claims were actually statutory bad-faith claims that must be brought under section 624.155; (2) an insured could not bring a claim against an insurer for failure to comply with the language and type-size requirements established by section 627.701(4)(a); (3) an insurer's failure to comply with the language and type-size requirements established in section 627.701(4)(a) did not render a noncompliant hurricane deductible provision in an insurance policy void and unenforceable as the Legislature had not provided for this penalty; and (4) a contractual provision mandating payment of benefits upon "entry of a final judgment" did not waive the insurer's procedural right to post a bond and stay the execution of a money judgment pending resolution of appeal. View "QBE Ins. Corp. v. Chalfonte Condominium Apartment Assoc., Inc." on Justia Law

Michael Warfel filed a sinkhole claim with Universal Insurance Company, with whom he had an all-risks homeowners insurance policy that covered sinkhole claims. Universal relied on a report by an outside firm, which determined that the damage was caused by factors that were excluded from coverage under the policy, to deny the claim. Warfel subsequently filed an action against Universal for breach of contract, seeking the recovery of insurance benefits for the loss caused by damage to his home. The trial court granted Universal's motion to apply Fla. Stat. 90.304 to the burden shifting presumption articulated in Fla. Stat. 627.7073(1)(c). The jury returned a verdict in favor of Universal. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the trial court misapplied the presumption at work in this case and gave the jury an instruction improperly shifting the burden of proof. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the language of section 627.7073(1)(c) does not create a presumption affecting the burden of proof under section 90.304 nor does the language create a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence under Fla. Stat. 90.303. View "Universal Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Warfel" on Justia Law

This case arose when petitioner's home was damaged in a hurricane and Florida Preferred was the insurer of the home. After petitioner sued Florida Preferred over a dispute regarding the covered loss and Florida Preferred subsequently became insolvent, petitioner filed a motion to substitute FIGA as the defendant. At issue was whether FIGA could be required to pay petitioner's attorney's fees and costs incurred in the litigation with Florida Preferred. Because petitioner's attorney's fee award pursuant to section 627.428(1), Florida Statutes, was not within the coverage of her insurance policy, it was not a covered claim under section 631.54(3), Florida Statutes, that FIGA must pay. Therefore, the court approved the decision of the Second District. View "Petty, et al. v. Florida Ins. Guaranty Assoc." on Justia Law