Justia Florida Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Borrower stopped making payments on his mortgage and note, both before and after a foreclosure action was brought by Bank and subsequently dismissed. Borrower subsequently filed a crossclaim against Bank in a separate foreclosure action. Borrower sought a declaratory judgment to cancel the mortgage and to quiet title to the property, arguing that the statute of limitations barred the Bank from bringing another foreclosure action. The trial court granted summary judgment for Borrower and cancelled the note and mortgage. The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the statute of limitations had not expired. The Supreme Court approved the Fifth District’s decision, holding (1) when a mortgage foreclosure action is involuntarily dismissed, either with or without prejudice, the mortgagor’s right to continue to make payments on the note is reinstated, and the mortgagee’s right to seek and acceleration and foreclosure based on the mortgagor’s subsequent defaults is also reinstated; and (2) accordingly, Bank was not precluded by the statute of limitations from filing a subsequent foreclosure action based on payment defaults occurring subsequent to the dismissal of the first foreclosure action when the alleged subsequent default occurred within five years of the subsequent foreclosure action. View "Bartram v. U.S. Bank National Ass’n" on Justia Law

The Board challenged two separate orders of the PSC. The first order is a declaratory statement that the PSC issued in response to a petition filed by the City of Vero Beach, in which the PSC declared that the City has the right and obligation under territorial orders issued by the PSC to continue to provide electric service in the territory described in the orders (which includes unincorporated portions of the County) upon the expiration of the City’s franchise agreement with the County. The court rejected the County's challenges and held that the City had standing to seek this declaration from the PSC concerning territorial orders to which the City is a party and which the County had taken the position would be voided by the Franchise Agreement’s expiration, thereby effectively evicting the City. The court also held that the PSC’s declaration is within the PSC’s authority as the entity with exclusive and superior statutory jurisdiction to determine utility service areas, and that the declaration does not impermissibly grant the County’s property rights to the City or violate the statutory prohibition against the PSC affecting a franchise fee. The second order on appeal denies the County’s petition for a declaratory statement on the ground that it failed to meet applicable statutory requirements. The court agreed and affirmed this order without further comment. View "Bd. of Cnty. Comm'r Indian River Cnty. v. Art Graham, etc." on Justia Law

CSX Transportation requested indemnification from the Florida Department of Transportation (DOT) for the amount paid to resolve a negligence action arising from an accident at a railroad crossing. CSX based its request on a railroad crossing agreement under which the DOT received a revocable license to use land as a right-of-way. The sole consideration for the license was an agreement to indemnify the railroad for losses arising out of DOT’s activity on the land. The trial court required DOT to indemnify CSX for the settlement of the lawsuit and for the expenses arising from DOT’s failure to defend the suit. DOT appealed, arguing that the indemnity clause was invalid. The Second District Court of Appeal concluded that the indemnity clause was enforceable. The Second District then certified two questions to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered (1) DOT is bound by the indemnity provision as party of the statutorily authorized railroad crossing agreement, and breach-of-contract principles prohibit DOT from using sovereign immunity to avoid suit for its breach of the crossing agreement; and (2) DOT’s liability under the crossing agreement is not limited by Fla. Stat. 768.28(5). View "Fla. Dep’t of Transp. v. Schwefringhaus" on Justia Law

This case arose from the claims of a group of owners of land abutting a railroad corridor who claimed that conveyances to the railroad by their predecessors in title granted only easements for a railroad right-of-way rather than convey fee simple title, that the abandonment of the railroad right-of-way entitled them to claim the land free of the easements, and that the conversion of the land to a public recreational trail constituted a taking for which they were entitled to compensation. The United States Court of Federal Claims found that the claimants did not own any property interests in the land formerly used as a railroad corridor and, therefore, were not entitled to compensation. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit certified a question of Florida law for the Supreme Court to answer. The Supreme Court answered (1) Fla. Rev. Stat. 2241 does not limit the railroad’s interest in the property, regardless of the language of the deeds; (2) state policy does not limit the railroad’s interest in the property, regardless of the language of the deeds; and (3) factual considerations do not limit the railroad’s interest in the property, regardless of the language of the deeds. View "Rogers v. United States" on Justia Law

Landowners rejected a condemning authority’s (the Authority) presuit written offer to purchase a parcel of their land. The Authority subsequently filed an action to condemn the property. After a jury determined the fair market value of the land, Landowners moved for attorney’s fees. The trial court awarded fees under Fla. Rev. Stat. 73.092(2). The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that the attorney’s fees for the valuation proceedings were limited to those allowed by section 73.092(1). On remand, the trial court found that the Authority had caused excessive litigation and held that section 73.092(1) was unconstitutional as applied under the facts of this case because it operated to deny Landowners their right to full compensation. It then determined that the original fee award remained valid. The Court of Appeal again reversed on appeal. The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Fifth District, holding (1) when a condemning authority engages in tactics that cause excessive litigation, section 73.092(2) shall be used separately and additionally to calculate a reasonable attorney’s fee for the hours attributable to defending against the excessive litigation; and (2) this will result in an amount that must be added to the remainder of the fee calculated utilizing the benefits achieved formula delineated in section 73.092(1). Remanded. View "Joseph B. Doerr Trust v. Cent. Fla. Expressway Auth." on Justia Law

This case was before the Supreme Court on appeal from a circuit court judgment validating a proposed bond issue. The Court affirmed the circuit court’s decision to validate the bonds but remanded with instructions for the circuit court to require Leon County Energy Improvement District to amend the financing agreement to remove all references to judicial foreclosure. The financing agreement was virtually identical to the financing agreement in Thomas v. Clean Energy Coastal Corridor, also decided today. The Court wrote further in order to recede from its decision in Meyers v. City of St. Cloud, in which the Court concluded that citizens and taxpayers who failed to appear in the bond validation proceedings in circuit court nonetheless had the right to appeal from the trial court’s decision. The Court held that the conclusion reached by Meyers cannot be sustained and that citizens and taxpayers are not entitled to appeal without having formally participated in the trial proceedings. View "Reynolds v. Leon County Energy Improvement Dist." on Justia Law

Clean Energy Coastal Corridor, whose purpose is to finance through the issuance of bonds certain qualifying improvements to real property as authorized by the Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) Act, adopted a bond resolution authorizing the issuance of revenue bonds in an amount not to exceed $500,000,000 for the purpose of financing qualifying improvements. Clean Energy filed a complaint to validate those bonds. The only argument relevant to this appeal regarding Clean Energy’s authority to issue the bonds was that the bonds could not be validated because the financing agreement to be signed by Clean Energy and property owners participating in the PACE Program purported to authorize a remedy for the collection of unpaid assessments that was not authorized by Florida law. After a show-cause hearing, the circuit court validated the proposed bond issue. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s final judgment validating the bonds but remanded for the circuit court to require Clean Energy to amend the financing agreement, as the financing agreement’s references to judicial foreclosure were inconsistent with its requirement that the collection of non-ad valorem assessments must be accomplished pursuant to Fla. Stat. 197’s uniform method. View "Thomas v. Clean Energy Coastal Corridor" on Justia Law

The Condominium Association of La Mer Estates filed a complaint to quiet title to the condominium unit. The Association served Bank of New York Mellon, which was assigned the mortgage securing the property. The Association obtained a default final judgment and quieted title against the Bank. The Bank later moved to vacate the quiet title judgment on grounds that it was void because the complaint failed to state a cause of action. The trial court granted the motion. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, ruling that, although the complaint failed to state a cause of action, the resulting default judgment was voidable, rather than void. The Supreme Court approved the decision of the Fourth District, holding that a default judgment is voidable, rather than void, when the complaint upon which the judgment is based fails to state a cause of action. View "Bank of New York Mellon v. Condo. Ass’n of La Mer Estates, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2013, the City of Cape Coral issued a special assessment to provide fire protection services. The City passed an ordinance levying a special assessment against all real property in the City, both developed and undeveloped. The City then filed a complaint to validate the debt. Eight property owners appeared in opposition to the special assessment. After a show cause hearing, the trial court entered its final judgment of validation. The Supreme Court affirmed the order of validation, holding that the City properly exercised its authority to issue a special assessment to fund fire protection services and that the assessment did not violate existing law. View "Morris v. City of Cape Coral" on Justia Law

Clipper Bay Investments, LLC filed an action to quiet title and ejectment against the Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) seeking to quiet title to a portion of land adjacent to an interstate in Santa Rosa County under the Marketable Record Title Act (MRTA). FDOT alleged that the land to which Clipper Bay claimed title was a portion of what FDOT considered part of its interstate right-of-way, and, as such, the property was exempt from the MRTA under the right-of-way exception in Fla. Stat. 712.03. The trial court quieted title in favor of Clipper Bay for a portion of FDOT’s estate but not the entire disputed area. The First District Court of Appeal reversed, finding that FDOT failed to present competent, substantial evidence that its right-of-way included the land claimed by Clipper Bay. The Supreme Court quashed the First District’s decision, holding (1) the exceptions provided under section 712.03 may apply to rights-of-way held in fee; and (2) because the plain language of the statute provides that use of any part of the estate shall exempt the whole, FDOT established its entitlement to the exemption provided in section 712.03(5) for its entire fee estate. Remanded. View "Fla. Dep’t of Transp. v. Clipper Bay Invs., LLC" on Justia Law