Justia Florida Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After Susan Special died following the delivery of her son, Frank Special, Susan’s husband and the personal representative of his wife’s estate, filed a negligence lawsuit against Dr. Ivo Baux, Baux’s related corporations, and West Boca Medical Center, Inc. for negligence. After a jury trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the defendants. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that alleged errors on the part of the trial court “did not contribute to the verdict” and were therefore harmless. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the test for harmless error requires the beneficiary of the error to prove that there is no reasonable possibility that the error complained of contributed to the verdict; and (2) there was a reasonable possibility in this case that the errors by the trial court contributed to the verdict. View "Special v. W. Boca Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

This action arose from an in appropriate relationship between Judge Susan B. Flood, Polk County Judge, and her bailiff. The Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission (JQC) found that Judge Flood’s conduct violated Canons 1 and 2A of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct and recommended the sanction of a public reprimand. The Supreme Court held that there was clear and convincing evidence in support of the JQC’s findings of fact as to both violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and commanded Judge Flood to appear before the Court for the administration of a public reprimand. View "Inquiry Concerning Judge Susan B. Flood" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded no contest to two counts of first-degree murder and one count of sexual battery on a child under the age of twelve. After a capital penalty-phase trial, the trial court sentenced Appellant to death for the murder of his stepdaughter. The Governor signed the death warrant on September 22, 2014. Appellant subsequently filed a second successive motion for postconviction relief, presenting three claims. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant was not entitled to relief on his claim that postconviction counsel rendered ineffective assistance; (2) Appellant’s claim that Florida’s lethal injection protocol violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment did not warrant reconsideration of the Court’s prior decisions upholding the constitutionality of the current protocol; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining objections made by various agencies to Appellant’s public records requests. View "Banks v. State" on Justia Law

Since 2004, Petitioner had initiated forty-three cases other than the instant case that had been denied, transferred, or dismissed. In this case, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition but expressly retained jurisdiction to pursue possible sanctions against Petitioner based upon the number of her meritless and inappropriate filings. Petitioner was directed to show cause why she should not be barred from filing in the Supreme Court any future pro se pleadings, motions, or other requests for relief. Petitioner did not respond to the order, and the Court imposed such sanctions. View "Lomax v. Taylor" on Justia Law

The hearing panel of the Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission determined that Judge Judith W. Hawkins, a county judge in the Second Judicial Court, had committed a series of violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The Commission recommended serious sanctions short of removal. The Supreme Court found, based on clear and convincing evidence, that Judge Hawkins violated Canons 1, 2A, and 5D of the Code of Judicial Conduct and that those violations warranted the most severe sanction in a judicial disciplinary proceeding - that of removal from the bench. Accordingly, the Court removed Judge Hawkins from the office of county judge, effective when this decision became final. View "Inquiry Concerning Judge Judith W. Hawkins" on Justia Law

Crystal Harrington was injured in a single-car accident while riding as a passenger in a car owned by her father but driven by Joey Williams, a non-family member. The vehicle was insured by Travelers Commercial Insurance Company (Travelers), but the vehicle was excluded from uninsured motorist (UM) coverage pursuant to a “family vehicle exclusion” provision in the policy. Williams was underinsured, and the liability payments from Williams’ insurer, when combined with payments under Harrington’s policy, did not fully cover Harrington’s medical costs. Therefore, Harrington sought UM benefits from Travelers, which denied the claim. Harrington sued Travelers, seeking payment of stacked UM benefits, despite the fact that her mother, the named insured and purchaser of the policy, had expressly selected non-stacking UM coverage. The trial court granted summary judgment for Harrington, concluding (1) the policy provision excluding family vehicles from UM coverage was invalid because it conflicted with Fla. Stat. 627.727(3); and (2) Harrington’s mother’s election of non-stacking UM coverage did not apply to Harrington. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a family vehicle exclusion in an automobile insurance policy does not conflict with section 627.727(3); and (2) UM benefits are not stackable under section 627.727(9) if the named insured or purchaser of the policy made a non-stacking election. View "Travelers Commercial Ins. Co. v. Harrington" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a retired Tampa firefighter, filed a class action complaint against the Board of Trustees of the City Pension Fund for Firefighters and Police Officers in the City of Tampa (Board), claiming that the Board failed to pay benefits under a firefighter and police officer pension plan established by local law. Parker and the Board agreed to a settlement, which the trial court approved. The trial court subsequently determined that Petitioner and others similarly situated were entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees. The Second District reversed the court’s decision to require the Board to pay the fees, instead concluding that the attorney’s fees were to be paid from the settlement proceeds. Specifically, the court concluded that the local law plan was “not part of the general statutory construct” of Fla. Stat. 175 and 185. The Supreme Court quashed the Second District’s decision, holding that the prevailing party attorney’s fees provisions of Fla. Stat. 175.061(5) and 185.05(5) are applicable to judicial proceedings to enforce claims under local law plans. View "Parker v. Bd. of Trs." on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of lewd or lascivious battery. The circuit court sentenced Defendant to community control to be followed by seven years of sex offender probation. As an express condition of her plea agreement, Defendant agreed not to seek early termination of probation. Six years into her ten-year nonprison sentence, Defendant sought and was granted early termination of her probation. The State filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari. The Second District Court of Appeal granted the writ, acknowledging that the State had no statutory right of appeal in this case but that the State could seek certiorari review of the order terminating probation because the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of the law by violating the plea agreement, which called for no early termination. The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Second District, holding that the State did not have the right to petition the district court for certiorari review because the court lacked jurisdiction to review the circuit court’s order terminating Defendant’s probation. View "LaFave v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of theft of an amount greater than $20,000 but less than $100,000. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion for a mistrial, arguing that testimony elicited by the State during trial involving his failure to produce exculpatory evidence impermissibly shifted the burden of proof from the State to Defendant. The Third District affirmed, concluding that the State’s questioning of the lead detective assigned to investigate Defendant’s case involving Defendant’s failure to produce documentation during the detective’s pretrial investigation did not shift the burden of proof. The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Third District, holding that the State’s questioning of the detective constituted impermissible burden shifting because the testimony commented on Defendant’s failure to produce exculpatory evidence, which he had no legal duty to produce, and this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Remanded for a new trial. View "Warmington v. State" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the use of real time cell site location information to track a defendant violates the Fourth Amendment if probable cause was not provided to access and use that information. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence derived from the real time cell site information obtained from his cell phone for lack of probable cause. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the application for the order obtained by officers authorizing them to obtain the information did not contain a sufficient factual basis on which to issue a search warrant but that a warrant was not required to use Defendant’s real time cell site location data to track him on public streets where he had “no expectation of privacy.” The Fourth District affirmed. The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Fourth District, holding (1) Defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the location signals transmitted solely to enable the private and personal use of his cell phone, even on public roads, and therefore, probable cause was required; and (2) probable cause did not support the search in this case, and the evidence obtained as a result of this search was subject to suppression. Remanded. View "Tracey v. State" on Justia Law