Justia Florida Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case involving the interpretation of Fla. Stat. 679.5061(3) the Supreme Court held that a financing statement that fails correctly to name the debtors, as required by Florida law, is seriously misleading and therefore ineffective because Florida's filing office does not apply a "standard search logic."Section 679.5061(3) creates a safe harbor for financing statements that are otherwise ineffective to perfect a security interest due to their failure correctly to name the debtor. The safe harbor applies when a financing statement that fails correctly to name the debtor is disclosed by a search of the filing office's records under the debtor's correct name "using the filing office's standard search logic, if any." The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit asked the Supreme Court to delineate the proper scope of the "search" of the filing office's records, as the term is used in the safe harbor provision. The Supreme Court answered that the filing office's use of a "standard search logic" is necessary to trigger the safe harbor protection of section 679.5061(3). View "1944 Beach Boulevard, LLC v. Live Oak Banking Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the court of appeal issuing a writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court from exercising jurisdiction over certain claims, holding that the court of appeal erred in issuing the writ.Plaintiff brought this lawsuit against an insurance company and the law firm representing the company in the underlying suit Plaintiff brought against the insurer, arguing that Defendants violated confidentiality requirements applicable to a mediation. After the circuit court denied Defendants' motions to dismiss Defendants petitioned the Third District relief. The Third District granted a writ of prohibition, concluding that the circuit court had exceeded its jurisdiction by entertaining Defendants' collateral estoppel affirmative defense. The Supreme Court quashed the decision below, holding that the writ of prohibition was used in an improper manner here. View "Mintz Truppman, P.A. v. Cozen O'Connor, PLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a completed purchase of illegal drugs necessarily entails the defendant purchaser's possession of those drugs, as federal law defines possession, and a purchase is not necessarily complete as soon as the would-be purchaser pays for the drugs.Defendant was convicted of a gun possession crime and sentenced to a mandatory prison term under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) after the trial court concluded that Defendant had three previous convictions for a "serious drug offense" as defined by the ACCA. At issue was whether one of Defendant's previous drug trafficking offenses met the ACCA's definition of a "serious drug offense." On appeal, Defendant argued that a purchase is complete upon payment by the defendant, and therefore, a completed purchase does not require proof that Defendant possessed the purchased drugs. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal certified the question to the Supreme Court. The Court answered that, for purposes of Fla. Stat. 893.135(1), a completed purchase requires proof that Defendant both gave consideration for and obtained control of a trafficking quantity of illegal drugs. View "Conage v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the postconviction court denying Defendant's motion to vacate his convictions and sentences, including three convictions for first-degree murder and three sentences of death, holding that Defendant was entitled to neither postconviction relief nor a writ of habeas corpus.In 2014, Defendant pleaded guilty to murdering his girlfriend and her two children. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death for each murder. Defendant later filed a motion for postconviction relief, which the trial court denied. Defendant appealed the court's decision and filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, raising two claims. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding (1) as to Defendant's petition for postconviction relief, Defendant failed to demonstrate error, deficiency, or prejudice as to any of his claims; and (2) as to Defendant's habeas corpus petition, Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claims. View "Covington v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirming Defendant's conviction for arson but finding that his due process rights were violated during sentencing and remanding for resentencing, holding that the trial court committed no fundamental error.After a second trial, Defendant was convicted of arson. The sentencing court conducted the analysis required in Banks v. State, 732 So. 2d 1065 (Fla. 1999) and declared to depart from the minimum sentence, as requested by Defendant. The Fourth District affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the trial court committed fundamental error when it considered impermissible sentencing factors. The Supreme Court quashed the decision below, holding that the trial court's determination that a sentence of eighty-four months was appropriate did not reflect the court's having committed fundamental error on the order of an illegal sentence. View "State v. Garcia" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first-degree murder and his sentence of death, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.Defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree premeditated murder, after which the trial court sentenced him to death. Defendant challenged his sentence on appeal, arguing that the trial court failed to ensure that all available mitigation was developed and presented and failed to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating factors were sufficient to justify death and outweighed the mitigating circumstances. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no fundamental error in the trial court's rulings regarding mitigation; (2) Defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered his plea, was made aware of the consequences, and was apprised of the constitutional rights he was waiving; and (3) Defendant's remaining claim was unavailing. View "Fletcher v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the Florida Public Service Commission denying Duke Energy Florida, LLC's (DEF) request to recover approximately $16 from its customers for costs DEF incurred to meet its customers' demand for electricity, holding that the cost recovery should have been allowed.The costs at issue were incurred when a 420-megawatt (MW) steam-powered generating unit went offline at DEF's Bartow plant and was placed back in service at a derated capacity of 380 MW. After a hearing, an administrative law judge entered a recommended order denying cost recovery. The commission adopted the ALJ's recommendation in the final order on appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the factual findings forming the basis for the ALJ's ultimate causation determination were not supported by competent, substantial evidence. View "Duke Energy Florida, LLC v. Clark" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that mistrial amendments to a charging document that alter the elements of a criminal offense should be assessed on a case-by-case basis to determine, based on the totality of the circumstances, if they prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant.After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of, inter alia, four sexual battery counts for sexually abusing his three stepdaughters. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in allowing the State's motion to amend the four sexual battery counts so that each alleged the crime of lewd or lascivious molestation. The First District Court of Appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the First District applied the correct prejudice standard, and its analysis was supported by the record; and (2) Defendant was not prejudiced by the midtrial amendment in this case. View "Thach v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal affirming Defendant's convictions of driving under the influence (DUI) causing damage to property or person and DUI causing serious bodily injury, holding that Defendant's dual convictions violated double jeopardy.On appeal, Defendant argued that his dual convictions arising from a single episode violated double jeopardy. The Third District affirmed, holding that principles of double jeopardy did not prohibit dual convictions and sentences for DUI property damages/bodily injury and DUI serious bodily injury arising from the commission of a single act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the criminal offenses of DUI causing damage to property or person and DUI causing bodily injury are degree variants of the same offense under Fla. Stat. 775.021(4)(b)2; and (2) Defendant's dual convictions for both offenses as to the same victim arising from a single episode violated the prohibition against double jeopardy. View "Velazco v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying the guilt-phase claims Kim Jackson raised in his motion for postconviction relief filed under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851 and denied Jackson's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that Jackson was not entitled to relief.After a jury trial, Jackson was found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed. Jackson subsequently filed a postcondition motion raising more than twenty claims for relief. The circuit court vacated Jackson's death sentence under Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), and otherwise affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed and denied habeas corpus relief, holding (1) a due process claim for preindictment delay requires a showing of substantial prejudice to the defendant and bad faith on the part of the State; (2) as to two of Jackson's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel this Court assumed deficient performance but found no prejudice; and (3) Jackson was not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus. View "Jackson v. State" on Justia Law