Justia Florida Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Buyers, a married couple from Cuba who were only able to communicate in Spanish, purchased a vehicle from a Dealership. Two of the documents Buyers signed with regard to the purchase contained arbitration clauses, and all of the documents were written in English. Buyers subsequently sued the Dealership for fraud in the inducement and violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act. The Dealership moved to dismiss the complaint and/or compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that no valid agreement to arbitrate existed because the arbitration provisions were not agreed upon by the parties and that the provisions were unenforceable because they were procedurally and substantively unconscionable. The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order denying enforcement of the agreement to arbitrate disputes but reversed the order insofar as it declined to enforce the arbitration on the reverse side of the retail installment contract with respect to Buyers’ claims for monetary relief. The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Third District and remanded with instructions to reinstate the trial court’s judgment based on controlling precedent. View "Basulto v. Hialeah Auto." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the land and improvements on certain leaseholds that were created under long-term leases granted by Santa Rosa County were subject to the ad valorem real property tax. The leaseholders argued that the leasehold interests were taxable only as intangible personal property because the leaseholders were not the actual owners of the property under Florida law, and there could be no equitable ownership absent the right to acquire legal title. The First District Court of Appeals concluded that, given the nature of their perpetual leasehold interests, the leaseholders were the equitable owners of the real property and the improvements thereon, and therefore, the land and improvements at issue were subject to the ad valorem real property tax. The Supreme Court approved of the decision reached by the First District, concluding that the leaseholders were the equitable owners of the real property at issue. View "Accardo v. Brown" on Justia Law

At issue in this case were improvements on certain leaseholds that were created under leases granted by Escambia County. The leaseholders (Petitioners) contended that the improvements were not subject to ad valorem taxation. The First District Court of Appeal determined that Petitioners were the equitable owners of the improvements, and therefore, the improvements were subject to ad valorem taxation. The Supreme Court approved the decision reached by the First District, holding that a lessee can have equitable ownership for purposes of ad valorem taxation of improvements on real property even if the lessees have neither a perpetual lease of the underlying real property nor an option to ultimately purchase such property for nominal value. View "1108 Ariola, LLC v. Jones" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, armed robbery with a deadly weapon, and arson. Appellant was sentenced to death for the murders. Appellant’s death warrant was signed and his execution set for March 20, 2014. Appellant filed several post-trial motions, all of which were denied. In this appeal, Appellant challenged the denial of his second successive motion for postconviction relief filed under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, his motion to declare Fla. Stat. 922.052 unconstitutional, and his motion to dismiss his death warrant. The Supreme Court affirmed the postconviction court’s denial of relief on all three motions and denied Appellant’s motion for a stay of execution, holding that the postconviction court did not err in its judgment. View "Henry v. State" on Justia Law

Michelle McCall received prenatal medical care at a United States Air Force clinic as an Air Force dependent. McCall died after delivering her son as a result of severe blood loss. Petitioners filed an action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The federal district court found the United States liable under the FTCA. The court concluded that Petitioners’ economic damages amounted to $980,462 and Petitioners’ noneconomic damages totaled $2 million. However, the district court limited Petitioners’ recovery of wrongful death noneconomic damages to $1 million after applying Fla. Stat. 766.118, Florida’s statutory cap on wrongful death noneconomic damages based on medical malpractice claims. The district court subsequently denied Petitioners’ motion challenging the constitutionality of the wrongful death statutory cap. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the application of the statutory cap on noneconomic damages and held that the statute was not unconstitutional. The Florida Supreme Court accepted certification to answer questions of Florida law and answered by holding the statutory cap on wrongful death noneconomic damages provided in Fla. Stat. 766.118 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Florida Constitution. View "Estate of McCall v. United States" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff was rear-ended by an underinsured motorist (UM), Plaintiff requested her $100,000 UM policy limits from State Farm. Plaintiff indicated that her damages were estimated to be $3.5 million because she suffered from reflex sympathetic dystrophy syndrome. State Farm responded that Plaintiff must schedule a compulsory medical examination (CME) pursuant to the terms of the policy. Plaintiff refused to attend a CME and instead filed suit against State Farm. The trial court entered judgment against State Farm for the UM policy limits. The court of appeal affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff breached the contract when she failed to attend the CME; but (2) State Farm must plead and prove prejudice to avoid liability based on noncompliance with the CME clause, and State Farm failed to meet its burden in this case. The Supreme Court approved of the court of appeal’s decision, holding (1) the forfeiture of benefits under a UM policy will not automatically result upon an insured’s breach of a CME provision unless the insurer pleads and proves actual prejudice as an element of its affirmative defense; and (2) the undisputed facts demonstrate that State Farm was not prejudiced in this case. View "State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Curran" on Justia Law

In this case, the district court concluded that satisfying the foundational requirements under the past recollection recorded exception to hearsay need not come from the declarant’s testimony. Afterwards, the Supreme Court decided Polite v. State, in which the Court held that the past recollection recorded exception requires the witness to indicate that the events were fresh in her mind when the statement was made, as well as to attest to the accuracy of the memorandum or record. Because the victims in this case did not vouch at trial for the accuracy or correctness of their written statements, the Supreme Court quashed the district court’s decision and remanded for reconsideration in light of Polite. View "McNeal v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder, burglary and robbery. On remand, the trial court imposed a sentence of death for one of the murders. The Supreme Court affirmed. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief, alleging, among other things, that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The postconviction court granted Defendant’s motion to the extent that he was entitled to a new penalty phase trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court reversed the postconviction court’s judgment that Defendant be afforded a new penalty phase, as counsel did not provide constitutionally ineffective assistance under Strickland v. Washington, and otherwise affirmed. View "State v. Woodel" on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged with robbery with a firearm. At trial, Petitioner’s theory of defense was that he abandoned the stolen property prior to threatening or using force. Before the case was submitted to the jury, Petitioner requested a special jury instruction on abandonment. The trial court gave the requested special instruction but modified it to require that the victim be aware of the abandonment. The district court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supported the conclusion that Petitioner failed to abandon the property, and therefore, the trial court’s modification of the proffered special instruction did not render it harmful, where the abandonment of property defense had no application to Petitioner’s case. View "Rockmore v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of lewd or lascivious molestation of a child under the age of twelve in violation of Fla. Stat. 800.04(5)(b). Petitioner sought a downward departure sentence, but the trial court concluded it had no discretion to impose a downward departure sentence because Fla. Stat. 775.082(3)(a)(4) imposed a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five years’ imprisonment for violations of section 800.04(5)(b). The district court affirmed the trial court’s imposition of a twenty-five year sentence, concluding that the legislature intended to impose a mandatory minimum sentence in section 775.082(3)(a)(4). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the plain meaning of the statutory language, the trial court does not have the discretion to impose a sentence below the twenty-five year minimum set forth in section 775.082(3)(a)(4). View "Rochester v. State" on Justia Law