Justia Florida Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was tried on the charge of second-degree murder. The jury was instructed without objection as to the lesser included offense of manslaughter, which included the instructions on manslaughter by act and manslaughter by culpable negligence. Defendant was found guilty of second-degree murder. Defendant appealed, alleging that fundamental error occurred when the jury was given the then-standard jury instruction on manslaughter by act, which the Supreme Court held to be fundamental error in State v. Montgomery. The Supreme Court accepted review in this case to answer a question certified to it by the court of appeal. The Court answered by holding that giving the erroneous manslaughter by act instruction is also fundamental error even if the instruction on manslaughter by culpable negligence is given where the evidence supports manslaughter by act but does not support culpable negligence, and the defendant is convicted of second-degree murder. View "Haygood v. State" on Justia Law

This case arose out alleged defamatory statements an attorney (Attorney) allegedly took in the course of investigating an underlying defamation action he was hired to defend. The legal issue was whether absolute immunity applied to Attorney's alleged defamatory statements, which were made during ex-parte, out-of-course questioning of a potential, nonparty witness. The court of appeal concluded that absolute immunity applied to Attorney's statements. The Supreme Court quashed the court of appeal's decision and held (1) Florida's absolute privilege was never intended to sweep so broadly as to provide absolute immunity from liability to an attorney under the circumstances presented here; and (2) a qualified privilege instead should apply to ex-parte, out-of-court statements, so long as the alleged defamatory statements bear some relation to the subject of inquiry in the underlying lawsuit. View "DelMonico v. Traynor" on Justia Law

Defendant, who had defaulted on his mortgage, sought to have a notice of voluntary dismissal of the mortgage foreclosure action struck and the case reinstated for the trial court to then dismiss the action with prejudice as a sanction to the mortgage holder for allegedly filing fraudulent documentation regarding ownership of the mortgage note. The court of appeal held that a trial court lacks the authority to set aside a plaintiff's notice of voluntary dismissal at the request of a defendant where the plaintiff has not obtained any affirmative relief before dismissing the case. The Supreme Court accepted certification to answer a question of public importance and held that when a defendant alleges fraud on the court as a basis for seeking to set aside a plaintiff's voluntary dismissal, the trial court has jurisdiction to reinstate the dismissed action only when the fraud, if proven, resulted in the plaintiff securing affirmative relief to the detriment of the defendant and, upon obtaining that relief, voluntarily dismissing the case to prevent the trial court from undoing the improperly obtained relief. View "Pino v. Bank of New York" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted and sentenced for lewd and lascivious molestation on a victim under twelve years of age by an offender eighteen years of age or older and for failure to appear. Defendant appealed, arguing that certain comments made by a prosecutor during closing argument were improper. The court of appeal affirmed, holding, among other things, that because the victim's age was not an issue which only Defendant was capable of refuting, the prosecutor's comment in regard to the victim's age could not be construed as a comment on Defendant's right to remain silent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the prosecutor's comment did not constitute an improper comment on Defendant's right to remain silent; (2) the court of appeal erred in holding that a second comment likewise did not constitute an improper comment on Defendant's right to remain silent and that two additional comments constituted improper burden shifting; but (3) the objections to the improper comments were not preserved for appellate review, and because the comments did not constitute fundamental error, they did not require reversal. View "Bell v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was sentenced to death for the 2000 murders of an elderly couple. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's convictions but reversed the death sentences and remanded for a new penalty phase. After a new penalty phase, the trial court followed the jury's recommendation and imposed two death sentences for the murders. The Supreme Court affirmed the sentences, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) finding that Appellant was not mentally retarded; (2) admitting a video of a statement Appellant made to law enforcement; (3) instructing the jury on its advisory role and denying Appellant's proposed instruction regarding victim impact evidence; (4) allowing the prosecution to cross-examine mental health experts regarding their knowledge of the facts surrounding the murders; and (5) considering and weighing several aggravators and mitigators. Lastly, the Court found that the prosecutor made permissible comments at closing argument and that the death sentence was proportionate in this case. View "Snelgrove v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioners and Respondents entered into a contract for the purchase of real property owned by Petitioners, twenty-five percent of which constituted wetlands. Respondents filed an action against Petitioners for fraudulent misrepresentation, alleging that in the advertisement for the sale of the property, Petitioners knowingly and falsely misrepresented that the property had no wetlands. Petitioners moved to dismiss, asserting that the fraud claim arose out of, and was related to, the contract, and therefore, the claim fell within the arbitration provision of the contract. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the action based on fraud was not a dispute subject to arbitration under the contract. The Supreme Court quashed the decision below and concluded that the fraud action had a contractual nexus with, and a significant relationship to, the contract between Petitioners and Respondents and was, as a general principle, within the scope of the contract's broad arbitration provision. Remanded. View "Jackson v. Shakespeare Found., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2007, the Legislature passed several statutes and included a provision in the 2007-2008 General Appropriations Act that exerted control over the setting of and appropriating for the expenditure of tuition and fees for the Florida university system. Petitioners challenged these statutes as unconstitutional, contending that the 2002 constitutional amendment creating the Board of Governors transferred the authority over tuition and fees to the Board, thus divesting the Legislature of any power over these funds. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Legislature, and the court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the challenged statutes by which the Legislature exercised control over the funds was facially constitutional, as (1) the constitutional source of the Legislature's control over the setting of and appropriating for the expenditure of tuition and fees derives from its power under Fla. Const. art. VII, 1(c) and (d) to raise revenue and appropriate for the expenditure of state funds; and (2) the language of the 2002 amendment is devoid of any indication of an intent to transfer this power to the Board. View "Graham v. Haridopolos" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's sentence. Defendant filed a postconviction motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The postconviction court denied the motion after an evidentiary hearing. Defendant appealed and also filed a habeas corpus petition. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of Defendant's postconviction motion and denied his habeas petition, holding (1) Defendant did not establish that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and therefore, his postconviction motion was correctly denied; (2) cumulative error did not deprive Defendant of a fair trial; (2) Defendant's sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment; (3) Florida death penalty statute is not unconstitutional as applied to Defendant; and (4) counsel was not ineffective for failing to allege that Florida's capital sentencing statute is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to Defendant. View "Merck v. State" on Justia Law

In 2004, Defendant, a general contractor, subcontracted with Plaintiff, who was unlicensed under Florida law at the time, to perform work on a parking garage. After a dispute, Plaintiff sued Defendant for breach of contract. Defendant counterclaimed for breach of contract. During litigation, Defendant argued that because Plaintiff was unlicensed, its breach of contract claim was barred under Fla. Stat. 489.128, which provides that contracts entered into by an unlicensed contractor shall be unenforceable. Plaintiff countered that Defendant was also barred from enforcing the contract because the parties were in pari delicto based on Defendant's alleged knowledge of Plaintiff's unlicensed status. The trial court ruled against Plaintiff, holding that the common law defense of in pari delicto was unavailable under section 498.128. The fifth district court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a party's knowledge that a contractor or subcontractor does not hold the state-required license to perform the construction work of the contract is legally insufficient to establish the defense that the parites stand in pari delicto. In so holding, the Court expressly disapproved the third district court of appeals' decision in Austin Building Co. v. Rago, Ltd., which directly conflicted with the fifth district's decision. View "Earth Trades, Inc. v. T&G Corp." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the constitutionality of certain provisions of chapter 2011-68, Laws of Florida, which converted the Florida Retirement System (FRS) from noncontributory by employees to contributory, required all current FRS members to contribute three percent of their salaries to the retirement system, and eliminated the retirement cost-of-living adjustment for creditable service after the effective date of the act. The circuit court held that the challenged amendments were unconstitutional, where the amendments violated three provisions of the Florida Constitution, and ordered Appellants - the governor, state board of administration, and the secretary of the department of management services - to reimburse all funds deducted or withheld pursuant to chapter 2011-68 from the compensation or cost-of-living adjustments of employees who were members of the FRS prior to the effective date of the act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the legislature did not violate the Florida Constitution in enacting the challenged provisions of chapter 2011-68. View "Scott v. Williams" on Justia Law