Justia Florida Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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The trial court entered a directed verdict against Plaintiff on her rear-end collision case against Defendant on the basis that she could not overcome the presumption of negligence that attached to her as the rear driver in this case. The court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court quashed the decision and remanded, holding that the evidence was sufficient for a jury to conclude that the rear driver's presumed negligence was not the sole proximate cause of the collision, and thus, under the Court's holding in Birge v. Charron, a directed verdict should not have been entered against Plaintiff on the basis of the rear-end presumption. View "Cevallos v. Rideout" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff was a passenger on a motorcycle that flipped over when the driver of the motorcycle collided with the rear of an automobile driven by Defendant. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant on the basis that Plaintiff could not rebut the presumption of negligence that attached to the driver of the motorcycle as the rear driver in a rear-end collision case. The court of appeal reversed, concluding that Plaintiff produced evidence from which a jury could find that Defendant was negligent and at least comparatively at fault in causing the collision. This certified conflict involved the interaction of Florida's comparative negligence system of tort recovery and a rebuttable presumption that has been imposed by courts in rear-end motor vehicle collision cases. The Supreme Court approved of the court of appeal's decision, holding that because tort recovery in Florida is governed by the principles of comparative negligence, the presumption that a rear driver's negligence is the sole cause of a rear-end automobile collision can be rebutted and its legal effect dissipated by the production of evidence from which a jury could conclude that the front driver was negligent in the operation of his or her vehicle. View "Birge v. Charron" on Justia Law

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In this negligence action, the Supreme Court considered whether an employee who claims the benefit of sovereign immunity pursuant to Fla. Stat. 768.28(9), which entitles that employee not to be held personally liable in tort or named as a party defendant for acts within the scope of his or her employment, may obtain interlocutory review of an adverse trial court ruling where the question turns on an issue of law. The court of appeal declined to exercise certiorari review over a trial court's order denying summary judgment based on such a claim of individual immunity pursuant to section 768.28(9)(a). The Supreme Court quashed the court of appeal's decision and held (1) a claim of individual immunity from suit under section 768.28(9)(a) should be appealable as a non-final order under Fla. R. App. P. 9.130, obviating the necessity of determining whether common law certiorari would alternatively be available; and (2) the employee in this case was entitled to the individual immunity provided in section 768.28(9)(a). View "Keck v. Eminisor" on Justia Law

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Appellant appealed from a judgment of conviction of first-degree murder and a sentence of death for the killing of Andrea Boyer, as well as a conviction for sexual battery by use of actual physical force likely to cause serious personal injury. The Supreme Court reversed the convictions, vacated the sentence of death, and remanded for a new trial, holding that reversible error occurred in the guilt phase of the trial, when the State introduced a lengthy videotape of Appellant's custodial interrogation in which the investigating officers repeatedly expressed their personal opinions about Appellant's guilt and the victim's character and family life. View "Jackson v. State" on Justia Law

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The issue in this case was whether an appellate court should review a non-final order denying a claim of sovereign immunity by Citizens Property Insurance Corporation (Citizens), a state-created entity that provides property insurance, in a bad faith action stemming from the entity's handling of a property damage claim. The issue arose in the context of the broader question of when appellate courts should use common law writs to review non-final orders involving claims of immunity prior to the entry of a final judgment and when the Supreme Court should expand the list of non-final appealable orders. While the Court did not resolve the broader issue in this case, it determined that Citizens' claim of immunity was not reviewable by the appellate courts either through the writ of certiorari or the writ of prohibition, and the Court declined to expand the list of non-final orders reviewable on appeal to include the discrete legal issue presented in this case. View "Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. San Perdido Ass'n, Inc." on Justia Law

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Appellant appealed his first-degree murder conviction and sentence of death for the killing of Quatisha Maycock, as well as his convictions and sentences for related offenses. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's convictions and sentences, holding, among other things, (1) the trial court did not err in denying Appellant's motion to suppress the statements he made to police officers, all post arrest / custody observations of Appellant made by police officers, and evidence seized from Appellant; (2) the trial court did not err in denying Appellant's two motions to disqualify; (3) the prosecutor's comments during closing argument and made during the State's penalty phase closing argument did not rise to the level of fundamental error; (4) the evidence introduced at trial was sufficient to support Appellant's convictions for burglary, child neglect, and attempted escape; (5) The trial court did not err by requiring Appellant to argue all of his nonstatutory mitigating evidence as a single mitigating factor; (6) the trial court did not err by allowing the State to introduce at Appellant's penalty phase trial evidence of his prior violent felony convictions; and (7) Appellant's sentence was proportionate to death sentences that the Court has upheld in other cases. View "Braddy v. State" on Justia Law

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Defendant was tried and convicted for the murder of a five-month-old. Defendant was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentence of death but remanded for resentencing on the aggravated child abuse conviction. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to vacate judgment and sentence. The lower court denied Defendant's claims. Defendant then appealed, asserting that his counsel was ineffective. The Supreme Court denied the appeal. Thereafter, Defendant filed a successive motion to vacate judgment and sentence with special request for leave to amend, asserting that his counsel was ineffective. The circuit court summarily denied the motion and subsequent rehearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Defendant's motion was untimely, the postconviction court properly summarily denied the motion; and (2) because Defendant did not address the merits of his claim on appeal, and because the postconviction court did not rule on the merits, the Court would not reach the merits of his claim. View "Lukehart v. State" on Justia Law

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Defendant was tried, convicted, and sentenced for several crimes against four separate victims. Two of the victims - Iris White and Jackie McCahon - were murdered, while two were not. This appeal stemmed from Defendant's first-degree murder conviction and accompanying death sentence for the killing of Jackie McCahon. Defendant raised thirteen claim on direct appeal. The Supreme Court denied each of Defendant's claims, determined that the death penalty was proportional to Defendant's crime, and affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief, raising sixteen claims. The postconviction court ultimately denied all of Defendant's claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant was not entitled to postconviction relief from his conviction and sentence for the first-degree murder of McCahon. View "Johnson v. State " on Justia Law

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Defendant was tried, convicted, and sentenced for several crimes against four separate victims. Two of the victims - Iris White and Jackie McCahon - were murdered, while two were not. This appeal stemmed from Defendant's first-degree murder conviction and accompanying death sentence for stabbing Iris White to death inside her home. The Supreme Court denied each of Defendant's claims on appeal, found the death penalty to be proportionally warranted, and affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief, raising twenty claims. Ultimately, the postconviction court denied Defendant's postconviction motion in its entirety. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's denial of Defendant's motion for postconviction relief, holding that Defendant was not entitled to postconviction relief from his conviction and sentence for the first-degree murder of White. View "Johnson v. State" on Justia Law

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Petitioner was convicted by a jury of two counts of lewd and lascivious acts on a minor. The court of appeal reversed and remanded for a new trial. At Petitioner's second trial, the trial court partially closed the courtroom during the testimony of the victim pursuant to Fla. Stat. 918.16(2), which provided for partial closure of the courtroom during the testimony of a victim of a sex offense upon the victim's request. Appellant was again convicted of the charges. The court of appeals affirmed Appellant's convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant was not denied his right to a public trial by the trial court's partial closure during the victim's testimony; and (2) a partial closure pursuant to section 918.16(2) acceptably embraces the requirements set forth in the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Waller v. Georgia. View "Kovaleski v. State" on Justia Law