Justia Florida Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Florida Bar filed a complaint against Knowles, alleging misconduct relating to her representation of a client in immigration and civil matters. Specifically, the Bar cited Rules Regulating the Florida Bar 4-1.3 (diligence), 4-1.6 (confidentiality of information), 4-3.3 (candor toward the tribunal), 4-8.4(c) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and 4-8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). In a motion to withdraw as attorney of record, Knowles had made disparaging statements about the client; she then told the client that she would continue the representation only if the client paid an additional $1,500. When the client decided to retain new counsel, Knowles made additional claims, including telling the Department of Homeland Security that she had reason to believe her client would lie to the Immigration Court. Knowles disclosed confidential paperwork pertaining to the client’s political asylum case; failed to appear at mediation in the client’s injury case, and failed to advise her client that a final judgment had been entered. A referee recommended that Knowles be suspended from the practice of law for 90days and attend the Florida Bar’s Ethics School and a professionalism workshop. The Florida Supreme Court concluded that a one-year suspension was the appropriate sanction. View "Florida Bar v. Knowles" on Justia Law

Judge Nelson was observed driving a vehicle erratically, weaving between lanes, striking a guardrail several times, and ultimately crashing on a bridge. After initially identifying herself as a judge to the police officer at the scene, she explained to the officer that she lost control of the vehicle because she was talking on her cellular phone. However, the officer smelled alcohol on her breath, and noticed that her eyes were glassy and bloodshot. Her clothes were in disarray. At first, Judge Nelson was unable to tell the officer where she was coming from or where she was going, but she later recalled that she may have been at a restaurant. She refused to exit the vehicle and refused to submit to field sobriety exercises. Judge Nelson was taken to the county jail where she refused to submit to a breathalyzer test. The Notice of Formal Charges stated that these acts, if they occurred as alleged, were in violation of Canons 1 and 2A of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The Florida Supreme Court recommended a sanction of public reprimand. View "Inquiry Concerning A Judge" on Justia Law

Defendant was sentenced to death for a drug-related 1988 murder. The Florida Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's denial of post-conviction relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase. Counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate, develop, and present available mitigating evidence that would have legally precluded the trial court from overriding the jury's life recommendation. The evidence in question concerned the abuse defendant endured at the hands of his father and the extremely negative influence his father had on his life and that from a young age he witnessed violent acts being committed against his mother and others, including witnessing others being killed. View "Robinson v. State of Florida" on Justia Law

Delhall, was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, unlawful use of a firearm, unlawful discharge of the firearm resulting in death or serious bodily harm, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. At the jury trial the State presented evidence that Delhall murdered the victim because he was, at that time, the only known eyewitness to the murder of another individual (Bennett) with which Delhall’s brother was charged. The jury recommended a death sentence by a vote of eight to four, and the trial court entered an order sentencing Delhall to death. The Florida Supreme Court vacated the sentence, stating that the prosecutor, “by her overzealous and unfair advocacy, appeared to be committed to winning a death recommendation rather than simply seeking justice.” Her improper advocacy continued even after an objection was sustained. In one instance, the judge was forced to step in and specifically admonish her to stop it. Cumulative errors fundamentally tainted the guilt phase, which was especially significant in view of the fact that the jury recommended death by a vote of eight to four, a recommendation that was far from unanimous. View "Delhall v. State of Florida" on Justia Law

Butler was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death for the 1997 murder of his former girlfriend. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and death sentence on direct appeal. Butler filed a motion to vacate his conviction and death sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. The post-conviction court held three evidentiary hearings and denied relief. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting claims that appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to file a petition for certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court; appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by abandoning the claim that a witness was incompetent to testify at trial; Florida’s lethal injection protocol constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; and Butler’s right against cruel and unusual punishment will be violated because he may be incompetent at the time of execution. View "utler v. State of Florida" on Justia Law

Based on unethical actions during the 2004-2005 hurricane season, the Legislature enacted Section 626.854(6), Florida Statutes: A public adjuster may not directly or indirectly through any other person or entity initiate contact or engage in face-to-face or telephonic solicitation or enter into a contract with any insured or claimant under an insurance policy until at least 48 hours after the occurrence of an event that may be the subject of a claim under the insurance policy unless contact is initiated by the insured or claimant. An adjuster sued. The trial court upheld the law, accepting an interpretation that it prohibited only in-person or telephonic communication, that it primarily regulates conduct, not speech, and furthers an important governmental interest. The appeals court reversed, finding that the section regulates commercial speech and that the Department failed to demonstrate that prohibiting property owners from receiving information from public adjusters for 48 hours is justified by the possibility that some public adjuster may unduly pressure traumatized victims or otherwise engage in unethical behavior. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute unconstitutionally restricts commercial speech and was not narrowly tailored to serve interests in ensuring ethical conduct by public adjusters and protecting homeowners. View "Atwater v. Kortum" on Justia Law

Hackley was convicted of burglary of a conveyance with a person assaulted, arising out of a 2006 incident in which Hackley assaulted two individuals, one of whom was inside a car. Because the offense occurred less than three years after he had been released from serving another sentence in state prison, the trial court sentenced Hackley to life in prison as a prison releasee reoffender under section 775.082(9)(a)1, Florida Statutes. The trial court granted a motion to correct, finding that the crime for which he was convicted did not qualify him for PRR sentencing. The appeals court affirmed. Noting a conflict between districts, the Florida Supreme Court held that burglary of a conveyance with an assault is a qualifying offense under the PRR statute.View "State of Florida v. Hackley" on Justia Law

Draughon was admitted to the Florida Bar in 1987. In 1993, he formed NLMC to purchase property for $315,000, and lease it to a client. The seller, Onusic, received a $7,500 down payment and accepted a promissory note which required NLMC to make monthly payments. Onusic signed the deed with the understanding that Draughon would hold the deed in escrow and not record it until she received full payment. In 1997, Draughon recorded the deed. In 2001, Draughon transferred the property from NLMC to himself, took out a mortgage of $274,975, and used the money to pay personal tax liabilities; none of the funds were used to pay the $110,000 owed Onusic. In 2003 Onusic filed suit, but Draughon filed for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court found actual intent to defraud. A referee recommended that Draughon be found guilty of violating Bar Rule 3-4.3: commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and justice, whether committed in the course of the attorney’s relations as an attorney or otherwise. The referee recommended that Draughon be found not guilty of violating Rule 4-4.3(a) concerning dealings with persons not represented by counsel, and recommended public reprimand. The supreme court imposed a one-year suspension. View "FL Bar v. Draughon" on Justia Law

McMillian was sentenced to death for premeditated first degree murder of his girlfriend. He has given at least five different accounts of events relating to the murder; no two are wholly consistent with each other, and none can be fully reconciled with the evidence. The evidence collected at the scene of a shootout between McMillian and police and the scene of the murder, showed that McMillian’s gun was used in the murder. Evidence also included a security video from a convenience store near the victim’s townhome and phone records and McMillian’s confession. McMillian was approximately one year into a five-year term of felony probation stemming from an incident in Georgia in which McMillian fled police, who were attempting to pull him over, at speeds up to 120 m.p.h. through a residential neighborhood. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "Mcmillian v. State of Florida" on Justia Law

This case arose when Mercury, an insurer, offered a settlement proposal to the hospital and the hospital refused the settlement offer. At issue was the constitutionality of the Alachua County Lien Law, chapter 88-539, Laws of Florida (Lien Law), and the Alachua County Hospital Lien Ordinance, Alachua County Code sections 262.20-262.25 (Ordinance), both of which established certain lien rights for charitable hospitals in Alachua County. The court held that the Lien Law was unconstitutional under article III, section 11(a)(9) of the Florida Constitution. The court held, however, that the Ordinance was not unconstitutional and that the First District should have upheld the trial court's judgment on the basis of the Ordinance. In addressing a cross-appeal presented by Mercury, the court held that the trial court properly limited the hospital's damages and properly awarded it attorney fees. View "Shands Teaching Hospital and Clinics, Inc., v. Mercury Ins. Co. of Florida" on Justia Law