Justia Florida Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Michael Warfel filed a sinkhole claim with Universal Insurance Company, with whom he had an all-risks homeowners insurance policy that covered sinkhole claims. Universal relied on a report by an outside firm, which determined that the damage was caused by factors that were excluded from coverage under the policy, to deny the claim. Warfel subsequently filed an action against Universal for breach of contract, seeking the recovery of insurance benefits for the loss caused by damage to his home. The trial court granted Universal's motion to apply Fla. Stat. 90.304 to the burden shifting presumption articulated in Fla. Stat. 627.7073(1)(c). The jury returned a verdict in favor of Universal. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the trial court misapplied the presumption at work in this case and gave the jury an instruction improperly shifting the burden of proof. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the language of section 627.7073(1)(c) does not create a presumption affecting the burden of proof under section 90.304 nor does the language create a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence under Fla. Stat. 90.303. View "Universal Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Warfel" on Justia Law

Raymond Bright was convicted of two counts of first-degree premeditated murder and sentenced to death for the murders. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding (1) sufficient evidence existed in the record for the jury to convict Bright of first-degree premeditated murder; (2) the prosecutor did not improperly comment on Bright's right to remain silent, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Bright's motion for a mistrial; (3) the trial court erred when it found and weighed as two separate aggravating circumstances Bright's prior felony conviction, but the improper double finding of the prior violent felony aggravating circumstance constituted harmless error; (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding and affording the aggravating circumstance that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, great weight; and (5) the sentences imposed by the trial court were proportionate. View "Bright v. State" on Justia Law

This case arose when petitioner's home was damaged in a hurricane and Florida Preferred was the insurer of the home. After petitioner sued Florida Preferred over a dispute regarding the covered loss and Florida Preferred subsequently became insolvent, petitioner filed a motion to substitute FIGA as the defendant. At issue was whether FIGA could be required to pay petitioner's attorney's fees and costs incurred in the litigation with Florida Preferred. Because petitioner's attorney's fee award pursuant to section 627.428(1), Florida Statutes, was not within the coverage of her insurance policy, it was not a covered claim under section 631.54(3), Florida Statutes, that FIGA must pay. Therefore, the court approved the decision of the Second District. View "Petty, et al. v. Florida Ins. Guaranty Assoc." on Justia Law

Petitioner sued respondent under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine after sustaining injuries caused by respondent's farm tractor. Petitioner sought review of the decision of the First District Court of Appeal, which held that a farm tractor was not a dangerous instrumentality as a matter of law. In so holding, the district court rejected petitioner's contentions that, because a farm tractor was a motor vehicle and because it was of such size and character as to be peculiarly dangerous in its operation, a farm tractor was a dangerous instrumentality. The court held that the dangerous instrumentality doctrine could apply to motor vehicles other than automobiles that have the ability to cause serious injury, and Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, where the court concluded that the weight, speed, and mechanism of an automobile or motor vehicle made it particularly dangerous when in operation. Therefore, a farm tractor was a dangerous instrumentality and the First District's decision was quashed. View "Rippy v. Shepard" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a negligence action against Dr. Mary Jane Benson, Dr. George C. Rees, and West Florida Hospital, alleging that the doctors were negligent in rendering medical care to her, which resulted in excessive liver damage. Plaintiff's claim against the hospital were based on both vicarious liability for Dr. Benson's negligence, as well as liability for the direct negligence in granting medical staff privileges to both doctors, which led to the medical care and procedures performed. The court approved the First District's decision because it held that the trial court correctly ordered the disclosure of a blank application for medical staff privileges. Section 381.0287(b)1 impermissible attempted to limit the disclosure requirements of article X, section 25 of the Florida Constitution (Amendment 7), and the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA), 42 U.S.C. 11101 et seq., did not preempt Amendment 7. In accordance with the court's decision, the court disapproved of the decision of the Fourth District in Tenet Healthsystem Hospitals, Inc. v. Taitel and its contrary holding that a blank form used by a hospital for nurse credentialing was confidential and protected by disclosure. View "West Florida Regional Medical Center, Inc., etc. v. See, et al." on Justia Law

In this case, the court considered an appeal from a final circuit court judgment validating revenue bonds proposed to be issued by the county to finance a beach restoration project. The court held that appellants erroneously contended that in adopting the Assessment Resolution, the county failed to comply with the requirements of its MSBU Ordinance, and as a result, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction; appellants contention, that the county failed to demonstrate that the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) would issue the permits at issue for the beach renourishment project and thus the circuit court erred in validating the bonds, was rejected; beach and shore preservation projects confronted a critical threat to the welfare of the people of the state and those special benefits that flow incidentally to certain properties because of the nature of the project did not diminish its predominately public nature; competent, substantial evidence supported the trial court's determination that the county's methodology was fair and reasonable; and regardless of how much sand was added outside the boundaries of the MSBU, the special benefits were nevertheless provided. Accordingly, the court affirmed the circuit court's final judgment of validation of the bonds. View "Donovan, et al. v. Okaloosa County, FL, etc., et al." on Justia Law

Codefendants, Christopher Johnson and James Mayfield, appealed their convictions of robbery with a firearm and carjacking. At issue was the interpretation of sections 27.511(8) and 27.5303(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and whether the Office of Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel (RCC) had standing to challenge a public defender's motion to withdraw. The court held that section 27.5303(1)(a) governed all public defender motions to withdraw based on conflict, both at the trial and appellate level and the court where the motion was filled was required to review such motions for sufficiency. The court also held that RCC did not have standing to challenge a public defender's good faith request to withdraw based on conflict. View "Johnson v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant, who was 25-years-old at the time of the crime, was convicted of the 1999 sexual battery and first-degree murder of an 18-year-old and sentenced to death. On direct appeal, the court affirmed the convictions and sentences. Defendant subsequently appealed the denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and simultaneously petitioned the court for a writ of habeas corpus. The court agreed with defendant that trial counsel's performance in preparation for the penalty phase was deficient but, nevertheless, affirmed the postconviction court's denial of relief because the court concluded that defendant did not demonstrate prejudice. View "Douglas v. State; Douglas v.Tucker, etc." on Justia Law

This case involved questions of law regarding probation revocation for failure to pay future restitution. The court held that before a trial court could properly revoke probation and incarcerate a probationer for failure to pay, it must inquire into the probationer's ability to pay and determine whether the probationer had the ability to pay but willfully refused to do so. Under Florida law, the trial court must make its finding regarding whether the probationer willfully violated probation by the greater weight of the evidence. The court also held that an automatic revocation of probation without evidence presented as to ability to pay to support the trial court's finding of willfulness violated due process. Accordingly, the State must present sufficient evidence of willfulness, including that the probationer has, or has had, the ability to pay, in order to support the trial court's finding that the violation was willful. Once the State has done so, it was constitutional to then shift the burden to the probationer to prove inability to pay to essentially rebut the State's evidence of willfulness. However, while it was constitutional to place the burden on the probationer to prove inability to pay, the aspect of section 948.06(5), Florida Statutes, that required the probationer to prove inability to pay by the heightened standard of clear and convincing evidence was unconstitutional. View "Del Valle v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from the denial of his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and fundamental error with respect to the admission of a 45-caliber revolver. The Fourth District held that the trial court properly admitted the revolver, which was recovered from defendant when he was arrested five years after the murder - even though the revolver was indisputably not connected to the crime. The Fourth District concluded that because the revolver was properly admitted, both defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim and his fundamental error claim failed. The court held that the Fourth District erred in holding that a gun unrelated to the crime was admissible where the purported relevancy was outweighed by the danger of confusing the issues and misleading the jury. The court also held that the district court erred in admitting the bandana and latex gloves. Accordingly, the court quashed the Fourth District's decision and approved the Fifth District's decision in Moore v. State. View "Agatheas v. State" on Justia Law