Justia Florida Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court of Florida was asked to interpret Florida’s law prohibiting riot, section 870.01(2), Florida Statutes (2021). The question was whether the law applies to a person who is present at a violent protest, but neither engages in, nor intends to assist others in engaging in, violent and disorderly conduct. The court ruled that it does not.The case originated from a lawsuit filed by a group of plaintiffs against Governor Ron DeSantis, three Florida sheriffs, and Attorney General Ashley Moody in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida. The plaintiffs argued that the statute was vague and overbroad in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court agreed and enjoined the enforcement of the statute. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that the central constitutional question was the statute’s scope and certified the question to the Supreme Court of Florida.The Supreme Court of Florida concluded that a "violent public disturbance" under section 870.01(2) is characterized by harm to persons or property, and not by peacefulness. To "willfully participate" in a "violent public disturbance," a defendant must have "intentionally, knowingly, and purposely" chosen to be part of it. Therefore, to be guilty of the crime of riot, one must "engage in," or at least "intend to assist others in engaging in, violent and disorderly conduct." The court found that the statute was not ambiguous and returned the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. View "DeSantis v. Dream Defenders" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Monique H. Worrell, who was suspended from her position as State Attorney for the Ninth Judicial Circuit by Governor Ron DeSantis through Executive Order 23-160. The order alleged that during Worrell's tenure, the administration of criminal justice in the Ninth Circuit was fundamentally derelict, constituting both neglect of duty and incompetence. The order detailed that Worrell authorized or allowed charging practices that permitted violent offenders, drug traffickers, serious juvenile offenders, and pedophiles to evade incarceration when otherwise warranted under Florida law. It also alleged that Worrell authorized or allowed practices that prevented assistant state attorneys from seeking certain sentencing enhancements and limited charges for possession of child pornography.The Florida Constitution allows the governor to suspend any state officer not subject to impeachment for neglect of duty or incompetence. Worrell, not being subject to impeachment, was constitutionally subject to suspension. The Florida Senate has the power to remove from office or reinstate the suspended official.The Supreme Court of Florida's role was to determine whether the governor had met the constitutional mandate to state the grounds of the officer's suspension. The court's review was deferential, confirming that the governor had specified the applicable grounds for suspension and that the allegations in the suspension order bore a reasonable relation to the asserted basis for the suspension.The Supreme Court of Florida found that the Executive Order passed this test. It named the grounds for Worrell's suspension—neglect of duty and incompetence—and provided various factual allegations that reasonably related to those grounds of suspension. The court disagreed with Worrell's claim that the allegations in the Executive Order were impermissibly vague or that they addressed conduct that fell within the lawful exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Therefore, the court denied Worrell's petition for a writ of quo warranto. View "Worrell v. DeSantis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Florida was asked to consider amendments to the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure. The amendments were in response to recent legislation and involved changes to several forms, including Forms 8.959 (Summons for Dependency Arraignment), 8.979 (Summons for Advisory Hearing), and 8.982 (Notice of Action for Advisory Hearing). Initially, the changes were only made to the English versions of the forms, and the Spanish and Creole translations were deleted to prevent inconsistencies. The Committee later requested that the forms be further amended with updated Spanish and Creole translations.The Supreme Court of Florida found that the Creole translations did not conform to the recent amendments to the English versions of the forms and contained errors. Therefore, the court decided to only amend the forms to include the Spanish translations at this time. The court requested that if the Committee wanted to amend the forms with Creole translations, they should file a new case proposing accurate Creole translations.The court ruled that the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure are to be amended as reflected in the appendix to the opinion. The amendments were to take effect immediately upon the release of the opinion. The court also clarified that the filing of a motion for rehearing would not alter the effective date of these amendments. View "In Re: Amendments to Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure" on Justia Law

Reginald Scott Walter, an inmate serving a thirty-year sentence for attempted first-degree murder and armed burglary, filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Supreme Court of Florida. This was not his first petition; since 2014, Walter had filed eight habeas corpus petitions and two mandamus petitions, all related to his convictions and sentences. All of these petitions were denied, dismissed, or transferred by the court. In his most recent petition, Walter argued that the evidence against him was insufficient to support his convictions, a claim he had raised in two previous habeas petitions.Walter's convictions and sentences were affirmed by the Second District Court of Appeal in 2001. His continued filings began in 2014, and all were related to his original case. Despite the repeated denials, dismissals, or transfers of his petitions, Walter continued to file petitions with the Supreme Court of Florida.The Supreme Court of Florida denied Walter's latest petition as successive and directed him to show cause why he should not be barred from filing any further pro se requests for relief. Walter responded by repeating much of his previous argument and asserting his constitutional right of access to courts and equal protection under the law. However, he failed to acknowledge the frivolous nature of his repeated filings and expressed no remorse for his misuse of the court's resources. The court found that Walter had failed to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed and concluded that he had abused the court's limited judicial resources. As a result, the court ordered that any future pleadings or requests for relief submitted by Walter related to his original case be rejected unless signed by a member in good standing of The Florida Bar. The court also directed the clerk to forward a copy of the opinion to the Florida Department of Corrections' institution where Walter is incarcerated. View "Walter v. Department of Corrections Secretary" on Justia Law

The case involves Joshua Lyle Creller, who was charged with resisting an officer without violence and possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, following a 2018 traffic stop. Creller refused to comply with a K-9 officer’s command to exit his vehicle during the traffic stop for officer safety. After his arrest, methamphetamine was found on his person. Creller moved to suppress the evidence of its discovery.The trial court denied Creller’s motion to suppress, finding the State’s evidence credible. The court concluded that the officer's request for Creller to exit the vehicle was for officer safety and did not violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. Creller was subsequently convicted by a jury. However, the Second District Court of Appeal reversed the conviction, holding that Creller was unlawfully seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment when the initial traffic stop transformed into a narcotics investigation for which no prior probable cause existed. The court certified conflict with the Fifth District Court of Appeal in State v. Benjamin, which reached the opposite conclusion.The Supreme Court of Florida disagreed with the Second District Court of Appeal's interpretation. The court held that the Fourth Amendment allows a K-9 officer to order a driver to exit a vehicle during a lawful traffic stop for officer safety reasons. The court concluded that the K-9 officer's command to Creller to exit the vehicle was reasonable and did not transform the traffic stop into a narcotics investigation. Therefore, the court quashed the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal and approved the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in State v. Benjamin. View "State of Florida v. Creller" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Jennifer Ripple, who married Richard Counter after he was diagnosed with mesothelioma, a disease allegedly caused by asbestos exposure from the 1950s to the 1990s. Counter filed a personal injury complaint against multiple defendants, claiming negligence and strict liability. After Counter's death, Ripple, as the personal representative of Counter's estate, amended the complaint to wrongful death claims under the Florida Wrongful Death Act. The estate sought damages for Ripple under section 768.21(2) of the Act, which allows a surviving spouse to recover for loss of companionship and mental pain and suffering from the date of injury.The trial court granted the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Ripple could not recover damages under section 768.21(2) because she was not married to Counter at the time of his alleged asbestos exposure. The court based its decision on Florida's common law rule that a party must have been legally married to the injured person at the time of the injury to assert a claim for loss of consortium. The trial court also granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the claim of Counter's adult children, concluding that Ripple was Counter's surviving spouse, thus barring the children from recovery under section 768.21(3) of the Act.The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision regarding Ripple's claim but reversed the decision regarding the adult children's claim. The district court held that Ripple could not recover damages as a surviving spouse under section 768.21(2) because she was not married to Counter at the time of his injury.The Supreme Court of Florida disagreed with the lower courts' decisions. The court held that a spouse who married the decedent after the injury can recover damages as a surviving spouse under section 768.21(2). The court rejected the argument that the common law "marriage before injury" rule bars recovery under section 768.21(2). Consequently, the court approved the holding in Domino’s Pizza, LLC v. Wiederhold, where the Fifth District Court of Appeal held that a spouse who married the decedent after the injury can recover damages as a surviving spouse under section 768.21(2). The court concluded that Jennifer Ripple can recover as a surviving spouse under section 768.21(2). View "Ripple v. CBS Corporation" on Justia Law

In 2015, Zachary Penna committed a series of violent crimes in Florida, including two murders. After his arrest, Penna was read his Miranda rights and initially invoked his right to counsel. However, during his hospitalization, Penna voluntarily initiated several conversations with Deputy Michael Nettles, during which he made incriminating statements. Penna was subsequently charged with several crimes, including two counts of first-degree murder. Before trial, Penna moved to suppress the statements made to Deputy Nettles, arguing that they were obtained in violation of Miranda. The trial court denied the motion, and Penna was found guilty on all counts and sentenced to life in prison.Penna appealed to the Fourth District Court of Appeal, which found that the statements during the first two conversations were not obtained in violation of Miranda. However, the court ruled that Deputy Nettles violated Miranda by failing to re-read Penna his Miranda rights prior to the final three conversations. The court relied on its own precedent, which had interpreted a previous Florida Supreme Court decision to require a full re-reading of Miranda warnings under the circumstances of this case. The court found that the error was not harmless, despite the overwhelming evidence of Penna’s guilt.The Supreme Court of Florida accepted the case for review. The court was asked to consider whether a defendant’s Fifth Amendment Miranda rights are automatically violated when an officer fails to re-read a Miranda warning following a defendant’s voluntary re-initiation of contact. The court held that there is no per se requirement that an officer remind or readvise a defendant of his Miranda rights. The court found that the Fourth District Court of Appeal had improperly expanded the requirements of Miranda and receded from its previous decision that had established a categorical rule requiring a full re-reading of Miranda warnings. The court remanded the case for reconsideration under the proper standard. View "State of Florida v. Penna" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over the amount of reimbursements for medical expenses that an insurer, Allstate Insurance Company, was required to pay under a personal injury protection (PIP) policy. The dispute arose when Revival Chiropractic, LLC, a medical provider, submitted charges for services rendered to two of Allstate's policyholders. Allstate paid 80% of the submitted charges, which was less than the amount that would have been reimbursable under the statutory schedule of maximum charges. Revival Chiropractic argued that Allstate was required to pay either 80% of the maximum charge under the schedule or the full amount of the submitted charge.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida agreed with Revival Chiropractic, ruling that Allstate violated Florida law by paying only 80% of the submitted charges when the charges were less than the amounts allowed under the statutory schedule of maximum charges. Allstate appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which certified a question to the Supreme Court of Florida due to the lack of controlling precedent.The Supreme Court of Florida, after reviewing the relevant statutory provisions and the terms of Allstate's PIP policy, concluded that Allstate was entitled to pay 80% of the billed charges. The court found that the PIP policy expressly authorized such a payment and that nothing in the statutory scheme stood in the way of that policy provision. The court held that the PIP statute contemplates that an insurer providing notice that it may use the schedule of maximum charges will not thereby be precluded from paying 80% of reasonable charges as otherwise determined under the provisions of the statute. The court also rejected the argument that the statutory provision requiring an insurer to pay the full amount of the charge submitted when that amount is below the reimbursement payable under the schedule was mandatory. The court concluded that the provision was permissive and did not displace the statutory provision limiting reimbursements to 80% of reasonable charges. The court answered the certified question in the affirmative and returned the case to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. View "Allstate Insurance Company v. Revival Chiropractic, LLC" on Justia Law

In this case, the Attorney General of Florida petitioned the Supreme Court of Florida for an advisory opinion regarding the validity of a proposed citizen initiative amendment to the Florida Constitution, titled "Amendment to Limit Government Interference with Abortion". The proposed amendment was sponsored by Floridians Protecting Freedom, Inc., and sought to limit the government's ability to prohibit, penalize, delay, or restrict abortion before viability or when necessary to protect the patient’s health, as determined by the patient’s healthcare provider.The court approved the proposed amendment for placement on the ballot. In its ruling, the court held that the proposed amendment complied with the single-subject requirement of article XI, section 3 of the Florida Constitution, and that the ballot title and summary complied with section 101.161(1), Florida Statutes. The court also concluded that there is no basis for finding that the proposed amendment is facially invalid under the United States Constitution.The court noted that the ballot summary, which essentially followed the language of the proposed amendment, was an "accurate, objective, and neutral summary of the proposed amendment." Therefore, it concluded that the summary did not mislead voters about what the proposed amendment would achieve. View "Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General re: Limiting Government Interference with Abortion" on Justia Law

The Florida Supreme Court was asked to review a proposed amendment to the state constitution legalizing the recreational use of marijuana. The court evaluated the amendment for adherence to the constitution’s single-subject requirement, the clarity of the ballot summary, and whether the amendment was facially invalid under the federal constitution. The amendment, titled "Adult Personal Use of Marijuana," aimed to modify the Florida Constitution to legalize the personal use of marijuana by adults and allow licensed centers to sell and distribute marijuana for personal use.The court ruled that the amendment adhered to the single-subject requirement as it focused on a single dominant plan or scheme, which is the legalization of marijuana for personal use. The court disagreed with the argument that the amendment violated the single-subject requirement by both decriminalizing and commercializing recreational marijuana, stating that the sale and possession are logically and naturally related as part of a dominant plan or scheme.The court also ruled that the ballot summary met the statutory standard for clarity. The court disagreed with the opposition that the ballot summary was misleading because it implied that there were already other state-licensed entities ready to engage in the sale of recreational marijuana.Lastly, the court ruled that the amendment is not facially invalid under the U.S. Constitution. The court rejected the argument that the proposed amendment is preempted by the federal Controlled Substances Act and thus invalid under the Supremacy Clause.In conclusion, the court approved the proposed amendment for placement on the ballot, finding it complies with the requirements imposed by the Florida Constitution and Florida Statutes. View "Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General Re: Adult Personal Use of Marijuana" on Justia Law