Justia Florida Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal affirming the ruling of the trial court that Plaintiffs’ claims that Defendants negligently failed to protect Plaintiffs, who were twins, from suffering physical, mental, and emotional injuries at the hands of their mother were barred by the four-year statute of limitations applicable to negligence claims, holding that Plaintiffs’ negligence action was tolled by Fla. Stat. 95.051(1)(h) - the tolling statute - because Plaintiffs did not have a guardian ad litem appointed for the purposes of bringing a negligence action.Specifically, the Court held (1) the statute of limitations applicable to Plaintiffs’ claims was tolled under section 95.051(1)(h) at all times prior to Plaintiffs’ grandparents being appointed as their permanent guardians; and (2) therefore, the statute of limitations did not bar Plaintiffs’ claims in this case. View "D.H. v. Adept Community Services, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that juvenile offenders’ sentences of life with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years do not violate the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, as delineated by the United States Supreme Court in Graham v. Florida, 460 U.S. 48 (2010), Miller v. Alabama, 467 U.S. 460 (2012), and related cases, and therefore, such juvenile offenders are not entitled to resentencing under Fla. Stat. 921.1402.Appellee was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and related crimes he committed when he was sixteen years old. Appellee was sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years for the murder. Appellee later filed a motion for postconviction relief asserting that he was entitled to relief under Miller. The trial court summarily denied the motion, determining that Miller was inapplicable because Appellee had the opportunity for release on parole. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that resentencing was required. The Supreme Court quashed the Fourth District’s opinion, holding that juvenile offenders’ sentences of life with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years do no violate Graham’s requirement that juvenile have a meaningful opportunity to receive parole. View "State v. Michel" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court approved the decision of the First District Court of Appeal concluding that an automobile can be a weapon for purposes of Florida’s reclassification statute, Fla. Stat. 775.087(1), holding that an automobile is a weapon under section 775.087(1) if it is used to inflict harm on another and that it is a question of fact for the jury to determine whether an automobile or other object was used as a weapon by the defendant.Defendant was convicted of manslaughter with a weapon, where the weapon supporting the charge was an automobile, and leaving the scene of a crash involving death. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in allowing his manslaughter conviction to be reclassified from a second-degree felony to a first-degree felony for using a weapon pursuant to section 775.087(1). The First Circuit disagreed and upheld the conviction. The Supreme Court approved the First District’s conclusion that an automobile can be a weapon for purposes of the reclassification statute, holding that any object used or intended to be used to inflict harm on another constitutes a weapon within the meaning of the statute. View "Shepard v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reaffirmed the postconviction court’s denial of Appellant’s intellectual disability (ID) claim, holding that Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017), did not impact the denial of Appellant’s ID claim.On direct appeal in this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Appellant’s ID claim. Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court issued Moore, a decision potentially relevant to this case. The United States Supreme Court then vacated the Supreme Court’s decision and remanded to allow the Court to reconsider its decision on appeal. On remand, the Supreme Court held that Appellant failed to prove adaptive deficits by clear and convincing evidence - a conclusion that Moore did not alter. View "Wright v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the postconviction court dismissing the postconviction proceedings brought by Appellant, a prisoner under sentence of death, but not discharging counsel, holding that the postconviction court’s order was not erroneous.Appellant was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder, kidnapping, and sexual battery. The jury recommended sentence of death by a vote of seven to five, and the trial court imposed a sentence of death. The Supreme Court affirmed. Thereafter, Appellant filed a motion to vacate judgments of conviction and sentence of death pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851. After concluding that Appellant sought to waive the postcondition proceedings, the postconviction court dismissed the postconviction motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Appellant’s waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, and therefore, valid, and the postconviction court properly allowed Appellant to waive the instant proceedings while maintaining counsel. View "Davis v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court invalidating and enjoining the Constitutional Revision Commission’s Revision 1, designated as Amendment 6 and entitled “Rights of Crime Victims; Judges,” from placement on the ballot, holding that it was not clearly and conclusively demonstrated that the ballot title and summary were misleading and did not reasonably inform voters of the chief purpose of Amendment 6.The circuit court struck Amendment 6 from the ballot, finding that the ballot summary and title were misleading. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court’s injunction, holding that read together, the title and summary reasonably informed voters of the chief purpose and effect of the proposed amendment, namely that it would create victims’ rights, would require de novo review of agency interpretations of statutes and rules, would raise judges’ and justices’ mandatory retirement age, and would no longer allow completion of a judicial term if one-half of the term had already been served by retirement age. View "Department of State v. Hollander" on Justia Law

After denying Kenneth L. Shirah, Sr.’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus the Supreme Court directed the Clerk of Court to reject any future pleadings or other requests for relief submitted by Shirah related to his criminal convictions in circuit court case number 301992CF000178XXAXMX unless such filings are signed by a member in good standing of the Florida Bar, holding (1) the habeas petition in this case was facially insufficient; and (2) where this was Shirah’s fourteenth petition or notice pertaining to his convictions filed in the Court since 2000 and the eighth such petition to be dismissed as facially insufficient, and where Shirah’s filings indicate a lack of understanding of the appellate process and an unwillingness to gain an understanding of it, if not constrained, Shirah will continue to abuse the judicial process and burden the Court with frivolous and meritless pertaining to his criminal case. View "Shirah v. State" on Justia Law

After denying Ronald K. Schiming’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus as repetitive, the Supreme Court instructed the Clerk of Court to reject any future pleadings, petitions, motions, documents, or other filings submitted by Schiming related to case number 481987CF005037000AOX, unless such filings are signed by a member in good standing of The Florida Bar. Where Schiming had a persistent history of filing pro se petitions that were frivolous, meritless, or otherwise inappropriate for the Supreme Court’s review, the Court found that Schiming had abused the judicial process and burdened the Court’s limited judicial resources. View "Schiming v. Jones" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the postconviction court’s denial of Appellant’s successive motion to vacate judgments of conviction, including one of first-degree murder, and sentence of death under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, holding that Appellant was not entitled to relief.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016) and Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016) were applicable to Appellant’s case, but the Hurst error in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) Appellant was not entitled to relief on his Hurst-induced claim under Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), or his claim that he was entitled to application of chapter 2017-1, Laws of Florida. View "Conahan v. State" on Justia Law

For the reasons discussed in this opinion, by a prior order, Dana Marie Santino was removed from office on the grounds that Santino’s conduct “does not evidence a present fitness to hold judicial office.”On July 2, 2018, the Supreme Court issued an order removing Santino from the office of county judge of Palm Beach County, Florida. Here, the Court provided an opinion explaining the reasons for removal. The Judicial Qualifications Commission hearing panel concluded that Santino violated Judicial Canons 7A(3)(a), (3)(b), (3)(c), (e)(i), and (e)(ii) and Rule 4-8.2(a) and (b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct for making false and misleading statements about her opponent, Gregg Lerman, in e-mail advertisements and on social media during her 2016 election campaign and recommended that she be removed from office. The Supreme Court held that Santino’s campaign misconduct warranted removal under these facts. View "Inquiry Concerning Judge Dana Marie Santino" on Justia Law