Justia Florida Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case arising from two unrelated episodes in which a Tallahassee police officer used lethal force in detaining a suspect after asserting self-defense the Supreme Court held that Marsy's Law, Fla. Const. art. I, 16(b)-(e), guarantees to no victim, including a police officer, the categorical right to withhold his or her name from disclosure to the public.After the City of Tallahassee proposed to release the law enforcement officers' names to the public, the Florida Police Benevolent Association sought an emergency injunction to prevent that from happening. The trial court denied the injunction and ordered that the names of the two officers be released. The First District Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that nothing in article I, section 16 excluded police officers or other government employees from the protections granted crime victims. The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the First District, holding that Marsy's Law did not preclude the City from releasing the two police officers' names under the circumstances of this case. View "City of Tallahassee v. Fla. Police Benevolent Ass'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, carjacking with a firearm, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and Defendant's death sentence, holding that there was no error.On appeal, Defendant raised thirteen challenges to his convictions and death sentence. The Supreme Court rejected all of Defendant's allegations of error, holding that none of Defendant's arguments on appeal were convincing and that there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions. View "Loyd v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the holding of the court of appeal that the dangerous instrumentality doctrine did not support the trial court's judgment in the underlying case, holding that the court of appeal did not err.The son of the couple in this case was driving the subject car with the permission of both parents when he injured someone. Plaintiff alleged vicarious liability against the son's parents for the son's negligent use of the car under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. The jury found that the son was seventy-five percent at fault for the accident and that the mother was a bailee who consented to the son's use of the car on the night of the accident. The trial court entered judgment against the son and mother. The court of appeal reversed as to the mother's vicarious liability, concluding that the trial court erred in denying the mother's renewed motion for directed verdict because the jury's determination that the mother was a bailee of the car was not a basis upon which vicarious liability could be applied under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the dangerous instrumentality doctrine did not make the mother vicariously liable. View "Emerson v. Lambert" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court summarily denying Appellant's successive motion for DNA testing filed under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.853, holding that that the trial court did not err in summarily denying Appellant's successive motion for DNA testing.Appellant was found guilty to two counts of first-degree murder and one count of second-degree murder and sentenced to death for each first-degree murder conviction. This case arose after Appellant filed a second motion requesting DNA testing. The trial court summarily denied the successive motion as procedurally barred and insufficiently pled. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's request for DNA testing was procedurally barred; and (2) even if Appellant's claim were not procedurally barred his motion still would not support relief. View "Reynolds v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Public Service Commission allocating partial replacement power costs to Duke Energy Florida, LLC (DEF), holding that the Office of Public Counsel (OPC) waived the arguments it presented on appeal.In its appeal to the Supreme Court for judicial review OPC raised a series of legal challenges to the Commission's authority to assign partial costs and consider mitigating factors when making a determination that DEF's actions were "reasonable and prudent" and argued that the Commission erred in interpreting and applying the burden of proof. DEF argued in response that the issues were not preserved for appellate review. The Supreme Court agreed and affirmed, holding that the issues raised by OPC were not properly preserved and were thus waived. View "Citizens of State of Fla. v. Clark" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court declined to answer the first portion of a certified question and answered the second portion of the certified question that a settlement payment made by an uninsured motorist insurer to settle a first-party bad faith claim is not a collateral source under Fla. Stat. 768.76(2)(a)2.Plaintiff, who was injured in a car crash, sued Defendant for vicarious liability based on Defendant's co-ownership of the other car involved in the crash. Plaintiff further sued his uninsured motorist insurance carrier, seeking to recover policy benefits and statutory bad faith damages. Plaintiff and his insurer settled for $4 million. After a trial against Defendant, the jury returned a $30 million verdict for Plaintiff. Defendant sought to set off the $4 million insurance settlement against the damages award, but the motion was denied. The court of appeal affirmed the denial of the setoff request. The Supreme Court held (1) Defendant did not ask the trial court for a setoff under section 768.041(2); and (2) a settlement payment made by an uninsured motorist insurer to settle a first-party bad faith claim is not a collateral source within the meaning of Fla. Stat. 768.76(2)(a)2. View "Ellison v. Willoughby" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction and pro se barred Petitioner, an inmate in state custody, holding that Petitioner failed to show cause why he should not be barred and sanctioned.Petitioner was convicted of attempted second-degree murder and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Including the habeas corpus petition in the instant case, Petitioner filed thirty-one pro se petitions with the Supreme Court, and the Court never granted Petitioner the relief he sought in his filings. The Supreme Court held that Petitioner had abused this Court's limited judicial resources, concluded that Petitioner's habeas petition was a frivolous proceeding, and directed the Clerk of Court to reject any future pleadings or other requests for relief submitted by Petitioner unless such filings are signed by a member of The Florida Bar. View "Chestnut v. Dixon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court pro se barred Petitioner, an inmate in state custody, holding that Petitioner failed to show cause why he should not be barred and sanctioned.Petitioner was convicted of lewd and lascivious sexual battery of a victim twelve to fifteen years old lewd and lascivious exhibition using a computer and traveling to meet a minor for sex. Including the habeas corpus petition in the instant case, Petitioner filed nineteen pro se petitions with the Supreme Court, but the Court never granted Petitioner the relief he sought in his filings. As to the current action seeking a writ of habeas corpus, the Supreme Court held that Petitioner had abused this Court's limited judicial resources, concluded that Petitioner's habeas petition was a frivolous proceeding, and directed the Clerk of Court to reject any future pleadings or other requests for relief submitted by Petitioner unless such filings are signed by a member of The Florida Bar. View "Levin v. State" on Justia Law

In this review of a decision of the Public Service Commission relating to rates charged by Florida Power & Light Company (FPL) for the provision of electric service, the Supreme Court held that the Commission had not supplied a basis for meaningful judicial review of its conclusion that the settlement agreement provided a reasonable resolution of the issues, established reasonable rates, and was in the public interest.The settlement agreement at issue was between FPL and seven parties that intervened in the matter and permitted FPL to increase its base rates and service charges. After hearing arguments in favor of and against the settlement agreement the Commission concluded that the agreement "provides a reasonable resolution of all issues raised, establishes rates that are fair, just, and reasonable, and is in the public interest." The Supreme Court reversed, holding that remand was required because the Commission failed to perform its duty to explain its reasoning. View "Floridians Against Increased Rates, Inc. v. Clark" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the postconviction court summarily denying the claims in Michael Duane Zack, III's fourth successive postconviction motion and denied Zack's motion for stay of execution and request for oral argument, holding that Zack was not entitled to relief.Defendant was sentenced to death for the murder of Ravonne Smith and was scheduled for execution on October 3, 2023. In his successive postconviction motion Defendant claimed that his execution should be barred under the Eighth Amendment. The postconviction court summarily denied the claims as untimely, procedurally barred, and meritless. The Supreme Court affirmed and denied Zack's motion for stay of execution and request for oral argument, holding that the postconviction court did not err by summarily denying Defendant's claims as untimely, procedurally barred, and meritless. View "Zack v. State" on Justia Law