Justia Florida Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant’s sentence of death and remanded this case for a new penalty phase.After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of first-degree premeditated murder. Following a penalty phase, the trial court found four aggravating circumstances and thirteen mitigating circumstances, and sentenced Defendant to death. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions but vacated the death sentence, holding (1) the trial court did not err in dismissing Juror 105 for cause; (2) the trial court erred in permitting the State to introduce evidence of high capacity .22 and .223 caliber magazines recovered from Emmanuel Wallace’s residence, but the error was harmless; (3) there was competent, substantial evidence to sustain the conviction in this case; but (4) because the jury did not unanimously find the facts necessary to sentence Defendant to death and did not unanimously recommend the death sentence, Defendant’s death sentence was unconstitutional in light of Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016). View "Okafor v. State" on Justia Law

The caps on personal injury noneconomic damages in medical negligence actions provided in Fla. Stat. 766.118 violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Florida Constitution.This case arose after complications from surgery left Appellee severely injured. After trial, Appellee’s noneconomic damages were capped by Fla. Stat. 766.118(2) and (3). The Fourth District Court of Appeal directed the trial court to reinstate the total damages award as found by the jury, concluding that section 766.118 was invalid. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the caps on noneconomic damages in sections 766.118(2) and (3) arbitrarily reduce damage awards for plaintiffs who suffer drastic injuries; and (2) there is no rational relationship between the personal injury noneconomic damage caps in section 766.118 and alleviating a purported medical malpractice insurance criss. View "North Broward Hospital District v. Kalitan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Appellant’s motion for rehearing and substituted this revised opinion for its previous opinion issued October 22, 2015 in order to consider Appellant’s claim that he was entitled to a new penalty phase under Hurst v. Florida, 477 U.S. ___ (2016) and Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016). The court affirmed Appellant’s conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death, holding (1) the trial court erred in finding the avoid arrest aggravator and the cold, calculated and premeditated aggravator, but the errors were harmless; (2) Appellant’s death sentence was proportional; (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion to continue the penalty phase to set the order of penalty phase witnesses; (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defense funds to appoint a mitigation specialist; (5) the trial court appropriately performed the individualized sentencing required for death penalty cases; (6) the trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress his videotaped confession; (7) the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; (8) the felony murder aggravator is constitutional; and (9) any Hurst error during Appellant’s penalty phase proceedings was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Middleton v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted for the robbery of a convenience store and first-degree murder of the store clerk. Petitioner was sentenced to death for the murder. In 2015, the Supreme Court remanded Petitioner’s case because to the circuit court for a new intellectual disability hearing. Following the Supreme Court’s opinion in Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40, Petitioner filed a postconviction motion seeking relief under Hurst. Petitioner then filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he was entitled to have his death sentence vacated pursuant to Hurst and that the determination of whether a defendant is intellectually disabled is a fact that must be found by the jury. The Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition, holding (1) Petitioner was not entitled to Hurst relief because Hurst does not apply retroactively to Petitioner's sentence, which became final in 1985; and (2) the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and this court’s decision in Hurst does not require that the jury, rather than the trial judge, determine intellectual disability. Further, Petitioner failed to demonstrate that Florida’s implementation of Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), as set forth in Fla. Stat. 921.137, is unconstitutional. View "Oats v. Jones" on Justia Law

Petitioner pled guilty in 1994 to three charges of first-degree murder for the deaths of his wife and his two children. The jury recommended sentences of death for the murders of Petitioner’s wife and son, both by a vote of seven to five. The jury recommended a sentence of life imprisonment without parole for the murder of Petitioner’s daughter. The trial court overrode the jury’s recommendation on the third murder and sentenced Defendant to death for all three murders. The Supreme Court affirmed the three death sentences on direct appeal. In the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Petitioner claimed that his death sentences were unconstitutional under Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016) and Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (2016). The Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of habeas corpus, holding that because Petitioner’s sentences became final in 1999 and because Hurst does not apply retroactively to sentences of death that were final before the United States Supreme Court decided Ring, Petitioner was not entitled to Hurst relief. View "Zakrzewski v. Jones" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court approved the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s ruling that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner’s request to “unstrike” a juror, or withdraw a previously exercised peremptory challenge, when Petitioner had exhausted his peremptory challenges and the state subsequently accepted the jury panel. The court, however, disapproved the Fourth District’s decision to the extent that it can be read as endorsing a blanket rule prohibiting the withdrawal of a peremptory challenge after a party as exhausted its peremptory challenges but before the jury is sworn. As McIntosh v. State, 743 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), demonstrates, after a party has exhausted its peremptory challenges, the withdrawal of a peremptory challenge could be warranted by unusual or extenuating circumstances. View "McCray v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court approved the holding of the First District Court of Appeal in City of Jacksonville v. Smith, 159 So. 3d 888 (Fla. 1st CA 2015), that the Bert J. Harris Jr., Private Property Protection Act (Act) does not apply to claims from government action that regulates property adjacent to the claimant’s property and disapproved the Second District Court of Appeal’s contrary decision in FINR II, Inc. v. Hardee County, 164 So. 3d 1260 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015).Hardee County granted FINR, Inc., which operated a neurological rehabilitation center on a parcel adjacent to property owned by a phosphate mining company, a setback on the phosphate mining company’s adjacent property. Hardee County subsequently decreased the quarter-mile setback to as little as 150 feet. FINR brought a claim under the Act seeking $38 million in damages for devaluation of its property. The trial court concluded that the Act did not apply to FINR because the quarter-mile setback change did not directly restrict or limit FINR’s property. The Second District reversed and certified conflict with Smith. The Supreme Court disapproved the decision below, holding that the setback in this case was not a property right for which FINR may state a claim under the Act. View "Hardee County v. FINR II, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, vacated his death sentence, and remanded for a new penalty phase, holding that Petitioner’s death sentence violated Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (2016) because the jury verdict at the penalty phase was not unanimous. Petitioner was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder. The jury recommended a sentence of death by a vote of ten to two. After determining that Petitioner fell within the category of defendants to whom Hurst is applicable, the Supreme Court held that the error that occurred during the penalty phase was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Hertz v. Jones" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s order summarily denying Appellant’s successive motion for postconviction DNA testing pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.853. In the instant postconviction motion, Appellant, a prisoner under sentence of death, sought DNA testing of ten items, seven of which were previously requested in his first Rule 3.853 motion. The Supreme Court held (1) Appellant’s claims as to the aforementioned seven items were procedurally barred; and (2) the circuit court did not err in denying DNA testing on the three remaining items because there was no reasonable probability that the results of DNA testing on these three additional items would have resulted in Appellant’s acquittal or reduced his sentence. View "Bates v. State" on Justia Law

At issue was whether Gadsden County is a “county in which a majority of voters have approved slot machines…in a countywide referendum held pursuant to a statutory or constitutional authorization after the effective date of this section” under Fla. Stat. 551.102(4). Under the section 551.104(1), the Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering is authorized to issue licenses to conduct slot machine gaming to “eligible facilities,” as defined in section 551.102(4). However, under section 551.102(2), licenses are limited to facilities in counties where the voters have approved slot machines as provided by article X, section 23 of the Florida Constitution, which does not extend beyond the counties of Miami-Dade and Broward. The Division denied a slot machine permit to Gretna Racing, LLC, a horse track facility in Gadsden County, based on the Division’s conclusion that neither the requirements of section 551.102(2) nor section 551.102(4) had been satisfied. The First District Court of Appeal upheld the Division’s denial of the license. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, based on the law establishing the powers of non-charter counties and the provisions of chapter 551, Florida Statutes, the Division’s denial of the slot machine permit sought by Gretna Racing was correct because submission of the ballot question to the voters was not legally authorized. View "Gretna Racing, LLC v. Florida Department of Business & Professional Regulation" on Justia Law