Justia Florida Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2015, the Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission (JQC) filed a notice of formal changes against Judge John P. Contini of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit for conduct in violation of the Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The JQC did not recommend suspension or removal for the misconduct but, rather, reasoned that a public reprimand plus conditions was appropriate. The Supreme Court approved the JQC’s findings and recommendations of a public reprimand plus conditions, holding that, in light of Judge Contini’s actions, the relevant case law, and the mitigating factors, these sanctions and conditions were fitting and appropriate. View "Inquiry Concerning Judge John P. Contini" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an inmate, filed a pro se complaint against four employees of the Santa Rosa County Jail, alleging negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress relating to his attack at the jail by two inmates. Petitioner also raised federal law claims against the jail employees. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, concluding that Petitioner’s state law claims were barred by the one-year statute of limitations period in Fla. Stat. 95.11(5)(g) and that Petitioner’s federal law claims were governed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), and exhaustion of administrative remedies was mandatory. The First District Court of Appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court quashed the First District’s decision and remanded for further proceedings, holding (1) the one-year statute of limitations period in section 95.11(5)(g) did not apply in this case, but rather, the four-year statute of limitations in Fla. Stat. 768.28(14) governed; and (2) the circuit court erred in dismissing Petitioner’s federal law claims, as the burden fell on the jail employees to demonstrate that Petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. View "Green v. Cottrell" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. After the United States Supreme Court ruled in Atkins v. Virginia that it was unconstitutional to execute persons with intellectual disabilities, Appellant raised claims that he was intellectually disabled and could not be executed. The trial court and Supreme Court denied relief, relying, in part, on the bright-line cutoff of an IQ score of 70 that was subsequently invalidated in theUnited States Supreme Court’s holding in Hall v. Florida. This appeal concerned Appellant’s seventh motion for postconviction relief, alleging that his death sentence violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under Atkins. The postconviction court summarily denied Appellant’s motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that failing to give Appellant the benefit of Hall would result in a manifest injustice, which is an exception to the law of the case doctrine. Remanded for a new evidentiary hearing regarding intellectual disability, to be conducted pursuant to Hall. View "Thompson v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was the Appellant in two separate death penalty direct appeals. In the present case, Appellant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, one count of attempted first-degree murder, and one count each of attempted armed robbery and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Appellant was sentenced to death for both of the murders. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgments of conviction and sentences of death, holding (1) the trial court did not commit prejudicial error in its rulings; (2) the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant’s attempted robbery conviction; (3) Appellant’s death sentences were proportionate; and (4) the Florida death penalty statutory scheme is facially constitutional under Ring v. Arizona. View "Davis v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of three counts of first-degree murder, one count of attempted first-degree murder, one count of armed robbery, and one count of first-degree arson. The trial court imposed two sentences of death. Defendant appealed his convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgments of conviction and sentences of death, holding (1) the trial court properly admitted the statements of one victim as a dying declaration; (2) the trial court did not err in admitted certain out-of-court and in-court identifications of Appellant; (3) the trial court did not err in admitting nearly four dozen autopsy and hospital photographs of the murder victims; (4) the trial court properly found that Appellant committed the murder of one victim in order to avoid arrest; (5) competent, substantial evidence of guilt supported Appellant’s convictions; and (6) Appellant’s death sentences satisfied the Court’s proportionality requirement. View "Davis v. State" on Justia Law

Relying on the reputations of Defendants, Plaintiffs, the owners of one of South Florida’s largest general contractors, initiated a custom adjustable rate debt structure (CARDS) transaction. The IRS later issued notices of deficiency disallowing tax deductions based on the CARDS transaction on Plaintiffs’ federal tax returns on the ground that the CARDS transaction lacked economic substance. The tax court upheld the notice of deficiency. Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed a diversity action against Defendants in a federal district court alleging several tax law claims. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the statute of limitations on Plaintiffs’ claims had run. Plaintiffs appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit certified a question of state law to the Supreme Court regarding whether Plaintiffs’ claims accrued at the time the IRS issued the notice of deficiency or when Plaintiffs’ underlying dispute with the IRS was concluded or final. The Supreme Court held that Taxpayers’ claims accrued at the time their action in the tax court became final, and that action became final ninety days after the tax court’s judgment, at the expiration of the time period for an appeal of that judgment. View "Kipnis v. Bayerische Hypo-Und Vereinsbank" on Justia Law

Petitioner was the victim of an armed robbery, carjacking, and shooting that occurred in the parking lot of an Embassy Suites hotel. Petitioner filed a negligence action against Hilton Hotels and related companies (collectively, Respondents). Following one mistrial, the parties commenced a second trial. Ultimately, the jury found that Petitioner sustained a total of $1.7 million in damages, and the trial court entered judgment in accordance with the verdict. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a motion for attorneys’ fees. The trial court denied the motion. The Fifth District affirmed, concluding that Petitioner’s pretrial offers of settlement to Respondents did not satisfy the requirements of Fla. Stat. 768.79 and Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.442. The Supreme Court quashed the decision below, holding that the plain language of both section 768.79 and Rule 1.442 indicated that Petitioner was entitled to attorneys’ fees because he submitted sufficient offers to settle his claims against Respondents and obtained satisfactory judgments in his favor. View "Anderson v. Hilton Hotels Corp." on Justia Law

Borrower stopped making payments on his mortgage and note, both before and after a foreclosure action was brought by Bank and subsequently dismissed. Borrower subsequently filed a crossclaim against Bank in a separate foreclosure action. Borrower sought a declaratory judgment to cancel the mortgage and to quiet title to the property, arguing that the statute of limitations barred the Bank from bringing another foreclosure action. The trial court granted summary judgment for Borrower and cancelled the note and mortgage. The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the statute of limitations had not expired. The Supreme Court approved the Fifth District’s decision, holding (1) when a mortgage foreclosure action is involuntarily dismissed, either with or without prejudice, the mortgagor’s right to continue to make payments on the note is reinstated, and the mortgagee’s right to seek and acceleration and foreclosure based on the mortgagor’s subsequent defaults is also reinstated; and (2) accordingly, Bank was not precluded by the statute of limitations from filing a subsequent foreclosure action based on payment defaults occurring subsequent to the dismissal of the first foreclosure action when the alleged subsequent default occurred within five years of the subsequent foreclosure action. View "Bartram v. U.S. Bank National Ass’n" on Justia Law

Insureds, who owned a policy from Insurer, alleged that Insurer failed to pay them for damage to their home from sinkhole loss, thus breaching the terms of the insurance policy. When Insurer became insolvent, Florida Insurance Guaranty Association (FIGA) was activated to handle the “covered claims.” The circuit court ordered appraisal, and the appraisers determined the amount of loss to be $130,600. FIGA objected to the confirmation of the appraisal award, arguing that the statutory definition of “covered claim” in effect when Insurer was adjudicated insolvent should govern any payments made on the claim, thus prohibiting any direct payment to Insureds for their sinkhole loss. The circuit court confirmed the appraisal award and entered judgment in favor of Insureds in the amount of $130,600, concluding that Insureds’ rights to recover against FIGA for sinkhole loss were established when Insurer issued the insurance policy. The Second District Court of Appeal reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the definition of “covered claim” in effect on the date that Insurer was adjudicated to be insolvent governed the scope of FIGA’s liability to Insureds for the sinkhole loss at their property; and (2) Insureds were precluded from obtaining an appraisal award for their sinkhole loss directly from FIGA under the terms of the policy. View "de la Fuente v. Florida Insurance Guaranty Ass’n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff served Defendants with offers of judgment. Plaintiff ultimately prevailed on her negligence claim against Defendants and was awarded damages in excess of the amount contained in her offers of judgment, enough to trigger the payment of fees under Fla. Stat. 768.79(1). The trial court granted Plaintiff’s motion to tax attorney’s fees and costs, determining that Plaintiff’s failure to include the attorney’s fees language in the offer of judgment did not create an ambiguity because Plaintiff did not seek attorney’s fees in her complaint. The First District Court of Appeal reversed the order granting Plaintiff’s motion to tax attorney’s fees and costs, holding that an offer of settlement that fails to address attorney’s fees is invalid even where no attorney’s fees have been sought in the case. The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the First District, holding that an offer of settlement is not invalid for failing to state whether the proposal includes attorney’s fees and whether attorney’s fees are part of the legal claim if attorney’s fees are not sought in the pleadings. View "Kuhajda v. Borden Dairy Co. of Alabama" on Justia Law