Justia Florida Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Defendant moved to dismiss the charge, contending that his rifle was a permissible antique firearm or “replica” thereof under Fla. Stat. 790.23. Section 790.23 prohibits convicted felons from possessing “any firearm.” In the alternative, Defendant argued that the felon-in-possession statute was unconstitutionally vague if it prohibited convicted felons from possessing black-powder rifles. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss and adjudicated him guilty of the offense. The First District Court of Appeal reversed Defendant’s conviction, holding that section 270.23 was unconstitutionally vague. The Supreme Court approved the First District’s reversal of Defendant’s conviction but not its conclusion that section 790.23 is unconstitutionally vague, holding (1) a “replica” of an “antique firearm” under the statutory definition is construed as emphasizing the type of firing system of the replica antique firearm as its distinctive feature; and (2) therefore, Defendant was entitled to the statutory exception of the felon-in-possession statute because his firearm was a permissible “replica” of an “antique firearm.” View "State v. Weeks" on Justia Law

When Hampton Court Nursing Father admitted Father to its nursing home facility, Son and Hampton Court signed a a nursing home contract that included an arbitration clause. Father did not sign the contract. Son later filed suit on Father’s behalf, alleging negligence and statutory violations. The circuit court granted Hampton Court’s motion to compel arbitration and stay the judicial proceedings. The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that Father was the intended third-party beneficiary of the nursing home contract, and therefore, Hampton Court could bind him to its contract, which Father never signed. The Supreme Court quashed the Third District’s decision, holding that the third-party beneficiary doctrine did not bind Father to the arbitration agreement in the nursing home admission agreement. View "Mendez v. Hampton Court Nursing Center, LLC" on Justia Law

James Wright, who sought election for the office of Mayor in the City of Miami Gardens, tendered a check to qualify as a candidate for the office. The check was returned due to a banking error. After qualifying had ended, Wright was informed of this bank error. Pursuant to Fla. Stat. 99.061(7)(a)1., Wright was disqualified. Wright filed this action seeking declaratory and mandamus relief against the City, the City Clerk, and the Miami-Dade County Supervisor of Elections (collectively, Defendants). Specifically, Wright sought to require Defendants to recognize him as a properly and validly qualified candidate for the office of Mayor in the August 30 election. The trial court denied relief, concluding that section 99.061(7)(a)1. explicitly required the City Clerk to disqualify Wright. The Court of Appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court quashed the decision below, holding that the law unconstitutionally erects a barrier that is an unnecessary restraint on one’s right to seek elective office. The Court, therefore, severed the portion of section 14 of chapter 2011-40, Laws of Florida, that amends section 99.061(7)(a)1. of the Florida Statues and, thus, the version of section 99.061(7)(a)1. in existence prior to the 2011 amendments was revived by operation of law. View "Wright v. City of Miami Gardens" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to twenty counts of transmitting child pornography to an undercover officer via the Internet. Defendant appealed, arguing that the use of a file-sharing program for the dissemination of child pornography does not violate the statutory prohibition on transmitting child program. The trial court denied relief, and the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court approved the decision of the Fourth District, holding that the use of a file-sharing program, where the originator affirmatively grants the receiver access to child pornography placed by the originator in files accessible through a file-sharing program, constitutes the transmission of child pornography under Fla. Stat. 847.0137. View "Smith v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of a felony and sentenced to two years in the Department of Corrections. As part of a work release program, Petitioner began employment with a construction company, working outside of the correctional facility during the daytime. On July 29, 2014, Petitioner reported to his employer and then left his place of employment without permission. Petitioner was unaccounted for until he timely returned to the work release center. Petitioner was subsequently charged with escape. The trial court granted Petitioner’s motion to dismiss, but the Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that deviation from a work release program establishes a prima facie case for escape. The Supreme Court approved the decision below, holding that, pursuant to the applicable statutes, an inmate is confined when he is working as part of a work release program, and if an inmate leaves without permission he or she is subject to a charge of escape. View "Poillot v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. After the Supreme Court decided in Atkins v. Virginia that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of a person with an intellectual disability, Appellant filed a successive motion to vacate his sentence. The circuit court denied Appellant’s claim. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the Supreme Court’s interpretation, in Cherry v. State, of Fla. Stat. 921.137(1) was proper. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court properly denied Appellant’s claim where Appellant failed to establish that his IQ was below 70. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that Florida courts may not have a bright-line cutoff IQ test score where it bars the consideration of other evidence of deficits in intellectual and adaptive functioning. On remand, the Supreme Court vacated Appellant’s death sentence and remanded with instructions to enter a life sentence, holding that Appellant presented sufficient evidence that he met the clinical and statutory definition of intellectual disability. View "Hall v. State" on Justia Law

The Department of Children and Families (DCF) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother to her three children. Although Mother conceded that grounds for termination of parental rights had been met, she challenged whether termination was the least restrictive means of protecting the children from harm. The court terminated Mother’s parental rights, concluding that DCF had proven grounds for termination as well as that termination was in the manifest best interest of the children. The Court of Appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the least restrictive means prong enunciated in Padgett v. Dep’t of Heath & Rehab. Servs. does not require the trial court to consider a permanent guardianship, instead of adoption, after the grounds for termination have been established and it has been determined that reunification with the parent would be harmful to the child; and (2) to the extent C.D. v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families could be read as prohibiting termination of parental rights if there is any emotional bond between the parent and child and there is another permanency option that would protect the child from harm, the Court disapproves the decision. View "S.M. v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of two counts of lewd or lascivious molestation for touching the victim’s breasts and touching the victim’s buttocks. The court of appeal affirmed, concluding (1) the trial court did not err in restricting cross-examination of the victim and her mother, and (2) Petitioner’s convictions did not violate double jeopardy. The Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences, holding (1) Petitioner’s dual convictions under the lewd or lascivious molestation statute did not violate double jeopardy; and (2) the trial court did not err in restricting defense counsel’s cross-examination of the victim and her mother. View "Graham v. State" on Justia Law

Robert Granicz, as personal representative of his wife's estate, filed a medical malpractice action asserting that her primary care physician, Dr. Joseph S. Chirillo, Jr., breached his duty of care in treating her, which resulted in her suicide. The decedent had a history of depression. The trial court granted petitioners' motion for summary judgment, finding that Dr. Chirillo did not have a legal duty to prevent the decedent's suicide. Relying on Florida case law and Fla. Stat. 766.102(1), the Second District reversed, agreeing with Granicz that the trial court improperly characterized the duty Dr. Chirillo owed to the decedent. The Second District found that Granicz had provided sufficient expert testimony regarding the standard of care to establish that Dr. Chirillo owed the decedent a general, legal duty - not a duty to prevent her suicide - thereby precluding summary judgment. The district court also found that based on the evidence, a jury question still remained as to proximate cause. The court approved the Second District’s decision, reversing and remanding the case to the trial court with instructions to proceed to trial. The court disapproved the decision of the First District in Lawlor v. Orlando as an improper determination of duty. View "Chirillo v. Granicz" on Justia Law

Defendant argued that the trial court erred as a matter of law by sentencing him for attempted second-degree murder (count III) to 40 years with a 25-year mandatory minimum pursuant to Fla. Stat. 775.087(2), the 10-20-Life statute. In this case, the trial court imposed a total sentence of 40 years’ imprisonment for count III, with a 25-year mandatory minimum sentence. The trial court did not impose its entire sentence pursuant to the 10-20-Life statute. The court concluded that a sentence imposed pursuant to the 10-20-Life statute is a mandatory minimum sentence that is not eligible for gain-time or early release. Therefore, the court quashed the First District’s decision in Hatten v. State and remanded for resentencing. The court also approved the holding of the Fourth District in Wiley v. State certified to be in conflict by the First District in Hatten, as well as the holdings certified to be in conflict from the Second, Fourth, and Fifth Districts. View "Hatten v. Florida" on Justia Law