Justia Florida Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This workers’ compensation case involved the statutory attorney’s fees provision declared unconstitutional in the Supreme Court’s opinion in Castellanos v. Next Door Co. Pursuant to the fee schedule in Fla. Stat. 440.34, the judge of compensation claims awarded the claimant's attorney a total of $13,017 in attorney’s fees, to be split by three attorneys, for a fee award of $50.44 per hour. The attorney for the employer/carrier, however, was paid more than $50,000. The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the statutory fee award. The Supreme Court quashed the First District’s decision, concluding that the holding in Castellanos resolves this issue. Remanded. View "Pfeffer v. Labor Ready Southeast, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner, who was injured in the course of his employment with Respondent, prevailed in his workers’ compensation claim through the assistance of his attorney. The fee awarded to Petitioner’s attorney amounted to only $1.53 per hour. Petitioner had no ability to challenge the reasonableness of the hourly rate, and both the Judge of Compensation Claims and First District Court of Appeal were precluded by Fla. Stat. 440.34, which mandates a conclusive fee schedule for awarding attorney’s fees to the claimant in a workers’ compensation case, from assessing whether the fee award was reasonable. The First Circuit certified a question to the Supreme Court regarding the constitutionality of section 440.34, which creates an irrebuttable presumption that precludes any consideration of whether the fee award is reasonable to compensate the attorney. The Supreme Court held that the mandatory fee schedule in section 440.34 is unconstitutional under as a violation of due process under both the state and federal Constitutions. Remanded for entry of a reasonable attorney’s fee. View "Castellanos v. Next Door Co." on Justia Law

The State sought to revoke Defendant’s probation based upon Defendant's alleged illegal drug use in violation of the conditions of his probation. The Second District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s revocation order, holding that the probation officer’s testimony that Defendant failed a field drug test personally administered by the officer was not competent, nonhearsay evidence that Defendant had used an opiate in violation of his probation and that the only other evidence of the violation was hearsay. The Supreme Court quashed the Second District’s decision, holding (1) the probation officer testimony regarding the result of the field drug test was competent, nonhearsay evidence of a probation violation; and (2) this evidence, together with the hearsay evidence, was sufficient to establish that Defendant violated the conditions of his probation. View "State v. Queior" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death for the murders. Defendant filed a motion to vacate his convictions and sentences, arguing that he was denied a fair guilt phase because of counsel’s deficient performance and that he was denied a fair penalty phase because counsel provided ineffective assistance. After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court denied relief on all claims. The Supreme Court affirmed the postconviction court’s order denying postconviction relief on all claims, holding that Defendant’s counsel provided constitutionally effective assistance during both the guilt phase and the penalty phase. View "Rigterink v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on two counts of first-degree murder. Defendant moved to suppress any statements he made to law enforcement and any evidence obtained as a result of those statements, asserting that he was in custody when he was questioned and was not read the Miranda warnings and that he was improperly denied access to his attorney. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The Second District Court of Appeal reversed, holding (1) Defendant was not in custody when he initially confessed to the murders, but (2) once Defendant confessed and was read the Miranda warnings, he was in custody and should have been informed that the attorney retained on his behalf was at the sheriff’s office where Defendant was being interrogated and was available to speak to Defendant. The Supreme Court quashed the Second District’s decision and remanded, holding (1) when a person is questioned in a non-public location and an attorney retained on his behalf appears at the location, due process requires that law enforcement notify the person with regard to the presence and purpose of the attorney, regardless of whether the person is in custody; and (2) the Miranda violation in this case constituted harmful error. View "State v. McAdams" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit racketeering and one count of first-degree grand theft. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered Defendant to serve ten years in prison followed by ten years of probation. The sentence, however, provided that if Defendant made a certain restitution payment within sixty days then his prison term would be reduced to eight years. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court quashed the Fourth District’s decision, holding that Defendant's sentence violated his due process rights under the federal Constitution and that Defendant was entitled to resentencing. View "Noel v. State" on Justia Law

After Father and Mother were assigned case plans by the Department of Children & Families (DCF) regarding their two children, the children were reunified with Mother. The trial court then terminated supervision by DCF and issued an order limiting the ability of Father to seek future visitation to the discretion of the children. Father sought review, alleging that the trial court denied him due process by terminating DCF supervision without a motion and departed from the essential requirements of the law when it limited his future contact with his children to the sole discretion of the children. The Third District granted Father’s second claim and quashed the trial court’s order to the extent that it limited Father’s contact with the children to the children’s sole discretion. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether a post-dependency order that is subject to future modification for purposes of child welfare and parental visitation is reviewable as a final order by appeal, as an interlocutory order reviewable by appeal, or as a non-final order reviewable by certiorari. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision below, holding that a post-dependency order that is subject to future modification for purposes of child welfare and parental visitation is a non-final order reviewable by certiorari. View "M.M. v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families" on Justia Law

After a traffic stop, Petitioner refused to submit to a blood-alcohol test. The Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV) suspended Petitioner’s driver license for one year. Petitioner sought review, and a hearing officer upheld the suspension. On certiorari review of the administrative decision, the circuit court invalidated the suspension, finding that the hearing officer’s refusal to permit Petitioner’s counsel to ask more than two questions of Petitioner’s witness denied Petitioner due process. The circuit court directed DHSMV to set aside the suspension and reinstate Petitioner’s driver’s license. On second-tier certiorari review of the circuit court’s decision, the Fifth District Court of Appeal agreed that the hearing officer violated Petitioner’s due process rights but ruled that the circuit court was required to remand the case back to DHSMV for another administrative hearing. The Supreme Court quashed the decision below, holding that the Fifth District inappropriately exercised its certiorari jurisdiction to review the circuit court order. Remanded for reinstatement of the circuit court’s decision. View "Futch v. Fla. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

Curtis Lee requested public records from the Board of Trustees, Jacksonville Police & Fire Pension Fund (Pension Fund), which imposed certain conditions before allowing Lee to inspect and photocopy the records. Lee sought declaratory relief alleging that the conditions and fees were not legally valid. The trial court determined that two conditions were imposed in violation of Fla. Stat. 119.07. The First District Court of Appeal affirmed. Lee then moved for attorney’s fees under Fla. Stat. 119.12. The trial court denied the request. The First District reversed, concluding that the lower court erred in determining that Lee was not entitled to attorney’s fees because the Public Fund’s violation was neither knowing, willful, nor done with malicious intent. The Supreme Court approved the decision, holding (1) a prevailing party is entitled to statutory attorney’s fees under the Public Records Act when the trial court finds that the public agency violated a provision of the Act in failing to permit a public record to be inspected or copied; and (2) there is no additional requirement that a trial court find that the public agency did not act in good faith, acted in bad faith, or acted unreasonably before awarding attorney’s fees. View "Bd. of Trs., Jacksonville Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Lee" on Justia Law

CSX Transportation requested indemnification from the Florida Department of Transportation (DOT) for the amount paid to resolve a negligence action arising from an accident at a railroad crossing. CSX based its request on a railroad crossing agreement under which the DOT received a revocable license to use land as a right-of-way. The sole consideration for the license was an agreement to indemnify the railroad for losses arising out of DOT’s activity on the land. The trial court required DOT to indemnify CSX for the settlement of the lawsuit and for the expenses arising from DOT’s failure to defend the suit. DOT appealed, arguing that the indemnity clause was invalid. The Second District Court of Appeal concluded that the indemnity clause was enforceable. The Second District then certified two questions to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered (1) DOT is bound by the indemnity provision as party of the statutorily authorized railroad crossing agreement, and breach-of-contract principles prohibit DOT from using sovereign immunity to avoid suit for its breach of the crossing agreement; and (2) DOT’s liability under the crossing agreement is not limited by Fla. Stat. 768.28(5). View "Fla. Dep’t of Transp. v. Schwefringhaus" on Justia Law