Justia Florida Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a professional artist, brought suit against the United Parcel Service (UPS) and other defendants, alleging that two of her paintings were unscrupulously removed from their packaging during the interstate shipment process and sold to a third party without her consent or knowledge. The trial court dismissed all of Plaintiff’s claims against UPS, concluding that they were preempted by the federal Carmack Amendment. The Court of Appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court quashed the Court of Appeal’s decision to the extent it was inconsistent with this opinion, holding that Plaintiff’s state law causes of action were not preempted because neither the Carmack Amendment nor public policy supports UPS’s attempt to evade liability arising from its intentional misconduct. View "Mlinar v. United Parcel Serv., Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of four counts of aggravated assault with a firearm, during the course of which he actually possessed and discharged a firearm. The convictions arose from a single episode during which Defendant pointed a gun at four men. The trial court imposed consecutive minimum terms of imprisonment for each count. The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that the trial court was required to impose consecutive sentences under Fla. Stat. 775.087(2)(d). The Supreme Court quashed the Court of Appeal’s decision, holding a trial court is not required under section 775.087(2)(d) to impose consecutive minimum terms of imprisonment for multiple offenses when the offenses arise from a single criminal episode. Remanded. View "Williams v. State" on Justia Law

June Dhar was a short-term renter of an automobile that was detected by an automated traffic camera running a red light. The vehicle was registered to Dollar Rent A Car Systems, Inc. Dollar was sent a notice of violation. Dollar responded by sending an affidavit identifying Dhar as the person having control of the vehicle at the time of the violation. Thereafter, Dhar was issued a uniform traffic citation. Dhar filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that as a short-term renter of the motor vehicle she was treated unequally because she was not initially issued a notice of citation under Fla. Stat. 316.0083(1)(b)1.a and therefore could not avoid the payment of added court costs by paying the statutory penalty of $158. The trial court granted Dhar’s motion, concluding that the unequal treatment of short-term renters violated equal protection. The court of appeal affirmed the lower court’s order granting Dhar’s motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Fla. Stat. 316.0083 is unconstitutional as applied to short-term vehicle renters such as Dhar. View "City of Fort Lauderdale v. Dhar" on Justia Law

Petitioner was injured in an automobile accident with an underinsured motorist. Petitioner filed a claim with his insurer (Insurer) for the limits of his uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM) policy of $50,000. After Insurer refused to pay, Petitioner filed a complaint against Insurer to determine liability under the UM policy and the full extent of his damages. Prior to trial, Insurer tendered a check to Petitioner for $50,000 and filed a confession of judgment for that amount. Petitioner opposed the entry of a confessed judgment, arguing that a jury verdict would determine the upper limits of Insurer’s potential liability under a future bad faith claim. The trial court denied Insurer’s motion to confess judgment. After a trial, the jury set Petitioner’s damages at $1 million. The court of appeal vacated the jury’s verdict, concluding that after Insurer confessed judgment in the amount of $50,000, Petitioner’s UM action became moot. The Supreme Court quashed the court of appeal’s decision, holding (1) an insured is entitled to a determination of liability and the full extent of his damages in a UM action before filing a first-party bad faith action; and (2) that determination of damages is generally binding, as an element of damages, in a subsequent first-party bad faith action. Remanded. View "Fridman v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Ill." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of both sexual battery on a person under twelve years of age and lewd or lascivious molestation on a person under twelve years of age for a single act. Defendant appealed, arguing that his dual convictions violated his constitutional protection against double jeopardy. The court of appeal concluded that convictions for both lewd or lascivious molestation and sexual battery arising from the same act do not violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant’s separate sentences for capital sexual battery and lewd or lascivious molestation arising from a single act do not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. View "Roughton v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, and related crimes. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and death sentence. Appellant later filed a motion for postconviction relief, which the trial judge denied. Appellant appealed and also petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court remanded for a new penalty phase and denied Appellant’s habeas petition, holding (1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present mitigation, including Appellant’s background and intellectual functioning, at the penalty phase; and (2) Appellant’s claims in his habeas petition were unavailing. View "Salazar v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was found guilty of the first-degree murder and aggravated child abuse of her three-year-old son, Lazaro. The Supreme Court vacated Appellant’s convictions and remanded for a new trial, holding that the pervasiveness and the cumulative effect of the prosecutor’s multiple improper closing arguments in the guilt phase, which repeatedly invoked “justice for Lazaro” and appealed to the passions of the jury, constituted impermissible prosecutorial misconduct and deprived Appellant of a fair trial. Moreover, most of the improper comments were objected to, and those objections were overruled by the trial court, increasing the prejudicial effect of the comments. View "Cardona v. State" on Justia Law

Fla. Stat. 790.23(1) makes it a criminal offense for a person to own or have in his care, custody, possession, or control any firearm if that person has been convicted of a felony in a Florida court. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit asked the Supreme Court to determine if, under Florida law, a person is “convicted” for purposes of that statute if the person has pleaded guilty to a felony offense but adjudication for that offense has been withheld. The Supreme Court answered the certified question in the negative, holding that, for purposes of the statute, a guilty plea for a felony for which adjudication was withheld does not qualify as a conviction under section 790.23(1)(a). View "Clarke v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of burglary with a firearm after he removed firearms from the victim’s storage unit. The victim testified at trial that Defendant did not have permission to enter the storage unit without him. After Defendant’s trial, the victim wrote a letter to the trial court purporting to provide a possible motive for Defendant’s action. Defendant filed a motion for new trial asserting that the letter qualified as newly discovered evidence. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the letter did not constitute a recantation. The court of appeal affirmed, concluding that the letter did not contradict the victim’s trial testimony and did not contain evidence that disproved one of the elements of burglary with a firearm. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for a new trial without an evidentiary hearing even though the trial court and court of appeal misstated the appropriate standard for analyzing whether a recantation constitutes newly discovered evidence. View "Koo v. State" on Justia Law

Tyron Francois, a Democrat, filed paperwork to run as a write-in candidate for Broward County Commission for District 2. A resident voter filed a complaint alleging that Francois was not properly qualified to be a write-in candidate because he did not physically live within the boundaries of the district as required by Fla. Stat. 99.0615. In response, Francois argued that section 99.0615 is facially unconstitutional. The circuit court found that section 99.0615 is constitutional and disqualified Francois as a write-in candidate. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that the statute is facially unconstitutional because the timing of its residency requirement for write-in candidates conflicts with the timing of the residency requirement for county commission candidates as established by Fla. Const. art. VIII, 1(e). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 99.0615 contravenes the residency requirement applicable to county commissioners under Fla. Const. art. VIII, 1(e), and thus Francois properly qualified as a write-in candidate; and (2) write-in candidates are included within the intended meaning of “opposition” as used in a different constitutional provision, and therefore, it was appropriate for the Democratic Party’s primary election to be closed to only Democratic-registered voters. View "Brinkmann v. Francois" on Justia Law