Justia Florida Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Horace Mann issued an insurance policy to Richard Chase. Richard signed a form in which he selected reduced uninsured motorist limits. Horace Mann later removed Richard as the sole named insurance from the policy and instead listed Allison Chase, Richard’s daughter, as the named insured on that policy. At no time did Allison reject uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage in writing or select lower limits. After a crash that injured Allison and killed Richard, Allison asserted that she, individually and as personal representative of her father’s estate, was entitled to uninsured motorist (UM) coverage in the amount equal to the policy’s bodily injury limits because she never selected lower UM coverage in writing as required by Fla. Stat. 627.727. The trial court agreed with Allison and determined that Allison and the Estate were entitled to $100,000 of insurance coverage under Allison’s policy. The district court reversed, concluding that Richard’s waiver of high UM coverage bound Allison individually and as personal representative of the Estate. The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the district court, holding that Allison was not subject to Richard’s waiver of benefits, and therefore, Horace Mann did not obtain a valid waiver of benefits from Allison as the named insured of her auto insurance policy. View "Chase v. Horace Mann Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Two young adults were shot to death by unknown assailants inside their apartment. The apartment was located in an apartment complex marketed as a “gated community.” Plaintiff, as personal representative of the decedents’ estate, sued Defendant, a national company that owned the complex, alleging that Defendant’s negligence was a proximate cause of the deaths because Defendant failed to provide adequate security at the apartment complex. A jury found Defendant forty percent comparatively negligent and awarded $4.5 million in damages. Defendant filed a motion for directed verdict, which the trial court denied. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s ruling on Defendant’s motion for directed verdict, concluding that without proof of how the assailants gained entry into the apartment, Plaintiff could not prove causation. The Supreme Court quashed the Fourth District’s decision granting a directed verdict to Defendant, holding that Plaintiff presented evidence that could support a finding that Defendant more likely than not substantially contributed to the deaths in this case. View "Sanders v. Erp Operating Ltd. P’ship" on Justia Law

Give Kids the World, Inc. is a non-profit organization that provides free vacations to seriously ill children and their families at its resort village. Stacy and Eric Sanislo were vacationing at the village with their seriously ill child when Stacy sustained injuries. The Sanislos brought this negligence action against Give Kids the World. Give Kids the World moved for summary judgment on its affirmative defense that the Sanislos signed releases that precluded an action for negligence. The trial court denied the motion. After a jury trial, judgment was entered in favor of the Sanislos. The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s denial of summary judgment, concluding that an exculpatory clause in the liability release form signed by the Sanislos was effective to bar the negligence action despite the absence of express language referring to release of Give Kids the World for its own negligence or negligent acts. The Supreme Court approved of the Fifth District’s decision, holding that the absence of the terms “negligence” or “negligent acts” in an exculpatory clause does not render the agreement per se ineffective to bar a negligence action. View "Sanislo v. Give Kids The World, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant. Defendant did not file an answer or other responsive pleadings and failed to appear at the hearing on Plaintiff’s motion for final default. Defendant later moved to set aside the default and final default judgment entered against him and to quash service of process on the bases that service was defective and that the return of service was defective on its face. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the return of service was not facially defective and that Plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption that service was proper. The Second District Court of Appeal concluded that a strict construction of Fla. Stat. 48.21, defining valid return of service, does not require express reference to Fla. Stat. 48.031(1)(a), listing the factors defining the “manner of service.” The Second District then certified conflict with three decisions from the Third District Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court granted review and answered that a facially valid return of service is not required to expressly list the factors defining the “manner of service” contained in section 48.031(1)(a), which are not included in the requirements of section 48.21. View "Koster v. Sullivan" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Emilia Carr was found guilty of first-degree murder and kidnapping. The trial court sentenced Carr to death, concluding that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. The Supreme Court affirmed Carr’s conviction for first-degree murder and her sentence of death, holding (1) the trial court’s evidentiary rulings as to the admissibility of certain documents were proper; (2) the trial court did not err by denying Carr’s motions to continue; (3) the trial court did not err by overruling Carr’s objections to certain prosecutorial comments during the penalty phase; (4) the trial court did not err in its treatment of the mitigating evidence; (5) the trial court did not err in finding the cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravator and the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator; (6) the death sentence was proportionate; and (7) there was sufficient evidence to support Carr’s first-degree murder conviction. View "Carr v. State" on Justia Law

In this “Craigslist killer case,” Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not violate the Supreme Court’s holding in Muhammad v. State by not calling its own witnesses that had knowledge of mitigation after Defendant decided to waive the presentation of mitigating circumstances; (2) Defendant failed to provide a good-faith basis for suggesting that the Court recede from controlling precedent established in Hamblen v. State, which subjects a trial court’s judgment about whether to call its own mitigation witnesses or appoint special mitigation counsel to an abuse of discretion standard of review; (3) the trial court did not violate Ring v. Arizona in sentencing Defendant to death; (4) there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction; and (5) Defendant’s death sentence was proportionate. View "Sparre v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and burglary of a dwelling with a firearm. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death for the two murders. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and death sentences, holding (1) the trial court did not commit error in its evidentiary rulings; (2) no fundamental error occurred in the trial court’s placement of certain restrictions on Defendant’s presentation of his case; (3) the prosecutor did not improperly comment on Defendant’s guilt in front of the jury; (4) the trial court did not err in finding certain aggravating circumstances; (5) there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions; (6) the death sentences were proportionate; and (7) the trial court did not violate the attorney-client privilege by appointing Defendant’s standby counsel and investigators to present mitigation. The Court also prospectively modified the principles and procedures articulated in Muhammad v. State to the limited extent that trial courts should utilize an independent, special counsel, rather than standby counsel, to present mitigation evidence even when the defendant waives mitigation - as was done in this case. View "Marquardt v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of the murder of a seventy-year-old woman. Appellant was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed on appeal. Appellant subsequently filed a motion to vacate his conviction and sentence pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, asserting, inter alia, that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The postconviction court denied all claims. Appellant appealed the denial of his postconviction motion and also petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Appellant’s postconviction claims and denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding (1) the postconviction court did not err in determining that Appellant failed to demonstrate prejudice by any purported failure to trial counsel; and (2) the majority of Appellant’s claims were not cognizable in a petition for habeas relief, and the remainder of his claims were without merit. View "Zommer v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was found guilty of first-degree murder and three counts of sexual battery with the use of a deadly weapon or physical force, among other crimes. Appellant was sentenced to death. Appellant later filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850 and 3.851, alleging a claim of newly discovered evidence. Specifically, Appellant alleged that he was not the shooter and that his codefendant was the shooter. The trial court denied relief, determining that the newly discovered evidence was not credible and would not have changed the outcome of the trial. The Supreme Court affirmed. Appellant then filed a successive postconviction motion pursuant to rule 3.851, asserting claims of newly discovered evidence and ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel. The trial court summarily denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the record conclusively showed that Appellant was not entitled to relief on his claim of newly discovered evidence; and (2) Appellant’s ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel claim was not cognizable in a rule 3.851 motion. View "Kormondy v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of several sexual offenses after his stepdaughter reported that Defendant had been sexually abusing her since she was ten years old. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court (1) abused its discretion by admitting into evidence two recordings of conversations Defendant had in his bedroom with his stepdaughter, asserting that the conversations should have been suppressed under Florida Statutes chapter 934’s statutory exclusionary rule; and (2) erred in concluding that the testimony of the stepdaughter’s boyfriend recounting statements that Defendant had raped her was non-hearsay. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) chapter 934’s prohibition on intercepting certain oral communications applies to recordings of solicitation and confirmation of child sexual abuse when the recordings were surreptitiously made by the child in the bedroom of the accused, and therefore, the recordings should have been suppressed; and (2) the boyfriend’s testimony was hearsay and should have been excluded. View "McDade v. State" on Justia Law